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Abstract
Development of Recognition Memory:
Process Dissociation of Recollection and Familiarity in Children
Laura Koenig
There is an extensive debate in the adult literature on whether recognition mem-
ory can better be explained by a single- or a dual-process account. Single-process
accounts assume that a single memory strength signal underlies recognition. Dual-
process accounts propose two independent processes, namely recollection (slow and
associated with contextual details) and familiarity (fast and automatic). The aim
of this dissertation was to advance this debate using a cognitive developmental
approach. By investigating age-related changes of recognition memory across child-
hood as a function of theoretically motivated experimental manipulations, predic-
tions drawn from single- and dual-process models of recognition memory were tested.
We adapted the Process Dissociation Paradigm to disentangle processes underlying
recognition memory in 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds and adults using a Dual-Process
Signal Detection cognitive modelling approach. Experiments 1 – 6 demonstrated
that 5-year-olds are able to recollect items based on perceptual details. Consistent
with dual-process theory a response time limit decreased recollection while leaving
familiarity unaffected across all age groups (Chapter 2). Converging evidence con-
sistent with dissociations of recollection and familiarity during childhood was found
after repeated item presentation (Chapter 3). Finally, after a thorough empirical
validation of our approach, the new paradigm was used to investigate the develop-
mental perceptual to semantic shift (Chapter 4). These findings have advanced the
theoretical debate on the nature of recognition memory by showing that one process
is insufficient to account for the developmental and experimental findings reported
here. Recollection and familiarity follow different developmental trajectories and are
affected by encoding and retrieval manipulations (i.e., repetition and time limits).
This provides a challenge for existing theories of recognition memory.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
When looking through the lost and found box at the end of a school week, a child
might recognize a toy car as being familiar and remember bringing it to school earlier
that week. Occasionally, however, a deeper more effortful memory process known as
recollection might be used to retrieve specific details about the toy car: The child
might recollect placing the car on the top of the toy-shelf, allowing her to infer the
car in the box must not be the one she brought to school.
These two aspects of recognition memory, namely specific recollection and
vague familiarity, are assumed to be two qualitatively different memory processes
(Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994). This assumption originates from dual-process the-
ory (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Hintzman & Curran, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby &
Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). However, this process distinction is not uncontrover-
sial (e.g., Benjamin, 2010; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Keren & Schul, 2009) and has
been challenged by single-system models which assume that there is a single strength
process underlying recognition memory (e.g., Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink, & Hen-
son, 2012; Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). This theoretical debate about whether
one or two processes are necessary to explain recognition memory is predominantly
based on research with adults (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002).
Surprisingly, this distinction of memory processes is not well investigated
in young children. Instead, developmental research investigating memory has mainly
focused on quantitative changes in children’s true and false memories (for a review
see Raj & Bell, 2010). Age related memory improvements throughout childhood
have consistently been demonstrated using free recall tasks (e.g., Cole, Frankel, &
Sharp, 1971; Jarrold et al., 2015; Schwenck, Bjorklund, & Schneider, 2007). How-
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ever, findings from recognition memory tasks are not so clear cut. Whilst some
studies find reliable developmental changes in memory accuracy (e.g., Chastelaine,
Friedman, & Cycowicz, 2007; Dirks & Neisser, 1977), others do not report age-
related differences across childhood (e.g., Ghetti, Mirandola, Angelini, Cornoldi,
& Ciaramelli, 2011). One possible explanation is that different memory processes
contribute differently to recognition than to free recall performance (Ghetti & Lee,
2014). Specifically, recall performance is assumed to rely predominantly on recol-
lection processes whereas recognition performance is assumed to rely on recollection
and familiarity (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, otherwise put, developmen-
tal changes in quality of memories can occur independently of a change in quantity
(Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004). This highlights the theoretical relevance of
investigating the qualitative processes underlying memory. If we do not take the
quality of memory (i.e., recollection and familiarity) into account, then important
changes in the development of memory may be missed. Thus, to get a complete
picture of recognition memory development throughout childhood it is important to
investigate recollection and familiarity across the full age range between 5 years of
age up to young adulthood.
Traditional methods used to assess processes underlying recognition mem-
ory in adults require insight into memory states (i.e., the remember-know paradigm;
Tulving, 1985) or the ability to monitor and report on memory performance (i.e.,
the confidence rating ROC procedure; Yonelinas, 1994). These abilities are devel-
oping throughout childhood (Ghetti, Hembacher, & Coughlin, 2013; Ghetti, Lyons,
Lazzarin, & Cornoldi, 2008; Ghetti et al., 2011; Roebers, 2002; Roebers, Gelhaar,
& Schneider, 2004). Therefore, it is difficult to dissociate whether memory findings
reflect children’s changes in recognition memory or their ability to monitor memory
processes. One well established method in adult research overcomes these issues by
contrasting a condition which requires participants to use recollection to get a cor-
rect response, with a condition where recollection and familiarity based responses
result in a correct response (Process Dissociation Paradigm; PDP; Jacoby, 1991).
Recollection is estimated based on whether participants are able to recollect specific
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details of an item, instead of introspecting on memory states. Thus, the PDP is
suitable for research in young children (e.g., Anooshian, 1999).
1.2 The development of memory
Memory changes substantially from infancy to adolescence (e.g., Fandakova, Lin-
denberger, & Shing, 2015; Raj & Bell, 2010). Ofen and Shing (2013) have recently
described memory development using the predictive interactive multiple memory
system framework (PIMMS; Henson & Gagnepain, 2010). Within this framework
distinct perceptual, semantic and episodic systems are assumed to interact. Ofen
and Shing (2013) proposed that these memory systems separate throughout child-
hood. Specifically, during early childhood children’s memories are based on per-
ceptual processing, as illustrated by better memory performance for specific details
compared to adults (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Throughout childhood this percep-
tual preference shifts to the ability to form semantic concepts. This is illustrated
by studies demonstrating age-related increases in false memories to new semanti-
cally related items (e.g., Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004) and by a different neuronal
activation pattern during encoding of semantic and perceptual features in children
than in adults (Maril et al., 2011). Once children have acquired basic knowledge of
semantic information (e.g., vocabulary) episodic memories can be formed by binding
contextual details to semantic memories (Newcombe, Lloyd, & Ratliff, 2007).
Another memory system for episodic memory is assumed to be in place
at the age of 4 (Hayne & Imuta, 2011) but continues to develop throughout pri-
mary school (Newcombe, Lloyd, & Balcomb, 2012). An episodic memory has been
formed if contextual information (e.g., location of objects) is successfully bound to
semantic information (e.g., the object) (Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Ottinger, 2004).
This can be investigated using the source monitoring paradigm (M. K. Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Here the source of the item (i.e., location of objects)
has to be retrieved in a later memory test. Memory for the semantic information
(i.e., content memory, e.g., earlier studied item) is called item memory, memory
for source judgements can refer to different aspects, such as contextual details (e.g.,
study list, location), perceptual details (e.g., colour) or cognitive operations (e.g.,
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encoding type). Dependent on task difficulty, age-related changes in the ability to
make a source judgements, occur until early (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002) or late
childhood (Kovacs & Newcombe, 2006).
Both, the ability to recollect (Yonelinas, 2002) and the ability to retrieve
the source of a memory judgment (Raj & Bell, 2010) require retrieving information
from the episodic system and are associated with memory for contextual details.
Importantly, successful source memory judgements demonstrate the ability to form
and retrieve episodic memories. Successful item memory judgements demonstrate
the ability to form and retrieve semantic memories. In contrast, recollection and
familiarity are retrieval processes underlying recognition memory allowing for re-
trieval of episodic or semantic memories. This distinction is important because
episodic as well as semantic memory can be retrieved via recollection or familiarity.
Because recollection and familiarity are processes whereas source and item memory
are measures of episodic and semantic memory, it is important that source and item
memory are not used as a process pure measurement of recollection and familiarity,
respectively (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008; Mollison & Curran, 2012;
Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010). Therefore, it is important to examine the
developmental changes in recollection and familiarity across childhood.
1.3 Single vs. dual-process theory
In cognitive psychology there has been a debate whether recognition memory is best
described by single- or dual-process models (e.g., Henson, 2006). Dual-process the-
ories postulate that recollection and familiarity are based on two distinct forms of
memory (Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 2002). Traditionally this was
demonstrated by Mandler’s (1980) “butcher-on-the-bus” example: ”Consider seeing
a man on a bus whom you are sure that you have seen before; you ”know” him in
that sense. Such a recognition is usually followed by a search process asking, in
effect, Where could I know him from? Who is he? The search process generates
likely contexts (Do I know him from work; is he a movie star, a TV commentator,
the milkman?). Eventually the search may end with the insight, That’s the butcher
from the supermarket!” To test recognition memory in the laboratory, participants
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typically first study a list of words or pictures. Then they are presented with an-
other list of items and are asked to accept earlier studied items (old) and to reject
unstudied items (new).
Recollection and familiarity are assumed to be independent at retrieval
(Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 2002). Familiarity is often
described as a more automatic (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler,
1980) and faster process than recollection (Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas,
2002). Recollection is assumed to be based on the retrieval of qualitative details
(e.g., location of an item or specific thought during encoding) about an event or item
(Yonelinas, 2002) whereas familiarity is defined as a reflection of memory strength
(Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1991) often within a signal-detection model (Yoneli-
nas, 2002). Familiarity is described as ranging from low to high, whereas recollection
either does or does not occur (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). Althought, these
characteristics are commonly accepted, dual-process models also differ in various
aspects. For instance, whereas some models assume that recollection and familiarity
reflect conceptual and perceptual processes, respectively (Atkinson & Juola, 1974;
Mandler, 1980), Jacoby (1984) assumes that familiarity reflects both conceptual
and perceptual processes and Tulving (1982) assumes that familiarity is based on
semantic memory. Further, whereas Atkinson and Juola (1974), Yonelinas (2002)
and Mandler (1980) assume that familiarity does not contribute to learning new as-
sociations, Jacoby and Tulving (1985) assume that both processes support learning
of new information.
There is much overlap in the use of the terms recollection and familiarity;
the present thesis uses the terms recollection and familiarity, unless otherwise indi-
cated, as defined with in the PDP (outlined in more detail in section 1.3.1; Jacoby,
1991). Here, an item is recollected if one specific detail about an item is remembered
(cf. Yonelinas, 2002). The definition of recollection that underlies the PDP is non
exhaustive in the sense that only information that supports the required discrim-
ination (i.e., location of the item) is counted as recollection. Recollection of non-
criterial information (i.e., remembering that one coughed during the presentation of
16 CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW
the study item) would not support the required discrimination and thus, would not
be measured as recollection. This is important because this definition differs from
paradigms where the subjective experience of memory is measured (i.e., the remem-
ber/ know procedure; Tulving, 1985) which allow distinguishing weak from strong
memory (Wixted & Mickes, 2010). Moreover, different recollective criteria (e.g.,
number of presented items, semantic detail) might lead to differing developmental
patterns.
Research in the adult population has provided well founded evidence for
this dual-process distinction by demonstrating that recollection and familiarity can
be dissociated (for reviews see Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Evidence
in line with dissociations stems from neuronal evidence and behavioural studies.
Functional neuroimaging and ERP evidence provides compelling support for the
dual-process dissociation by showing that recollection and familiarity are function-
ally and neuroanatomically dissociable (e.g., Curran, 2000; Henson, 2006; Vilberg
& Rugg, 2007; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg, 2006). Recollection and familiarity rely
on partially distinct neural substrates where recollection seems to rely more on the
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, whereas familiarity seems to rely more on an-
terior medial temporal cortex regions (Ranganath et al., 2004). These qualitative
neuronal differences favour dual-process theory.
Recognition memory can also be dissociated behaviourally. Specifically, if
manipulations only affect one process, then this is taken as evidence for distinct pro-
cesses (Jacoby, 1999; for an overview see Yonelinas, 2002). For instance, one way to
manipulate recollection without influencing familiarity is by limiting response time
during recognition (Benjamin & Craik, 2001). This indicates that familiarity is a
faster process than recollection (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994). There is a series of fur-
ther manipulations which were found to predominantly affect recollection but not
familiarity: deep vs. shallow encoding (e.g., Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn,
1996), full vs. divided attention at retrieval (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997;
but see Knott & Dewhurst, 2007) and study (Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Yonelinas,
2001), young vs. aging adults (Jacoby, 1999; Perfect, Williams, & Anderton-Brown,
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1995; but see Jennings & Jacoby, 1997; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). Familiarity can
also be experimentally manipulated. For instance, fluency manipulations increase
familiarity without showing detectable effect on recollection (e.g., Kinoshita, 1997).
There is a series of manipulations that result in comparable effects, such as forget-
ting (e.g., Yonelinas & Levy, 2002), or response criterion placement manipulations
(liberal vs. conservative) (e.g., Yonelinas, 2001). This demonstrates that some vari-
ables differentially affect recollection, whereas other variables differentially affect
familiarity. This constitutes a double dissociation which is consistent with a dual-
process view. Before outlining issues surrounding dissociations as evidence in favour
of dual-process theory, the single-process account will be explained.
Single-process models describe memory as a monolithic construct or uni-
fied type of memory, rather than positing the existence of distinct processes un-
derlying memory (e.g., Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008; Berry et al., 2012; Dunn,
2008). Recognition memory is based on signal-detection theory. It is assumed that
old/new responses are based on a single dimension of memory strength in relation
to a response criterion. Mean memory strength of old items is higher than mean
memory strength of new items (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2008; for a review see
Wixted, 2007). Single-process theorists interpret dissociations of recollection and
familiarity not as different processes but instead assume two criteria on the memory
strength axis (see Figure 1.1). The more liberal criterion (red line in Figure 1.1)
allows distinguishing old from new items while the more conservative criterion (blue
line in Figure 1.1) allows distinguishing recollection (i.e., remember) from familiarity
(i.e., know) responses (Dunn, 2004). Single-process models are considered preferable
over dual-process models because they provide a more parsimonious explanation of
recognition memory.
However, note that Wixted and Mickes (2010) suggested a hybrid model
consistent with single-process theory (i.e, unequal-variance signal detection model,
UVSD) which postulates that two kinds of memories exist, which can be combined
into a single decision signal. In other words, recollection and familiarity (within the
remember/ know procedure) are not two distinct processes (cf. Yonelinas, 2002), but
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Figure 1.1. Items that exceed the more liberal criterion (illustrated by the vertical
line in red) are reported as being familiar (know-response), otherwise items are
rejected and a new response follows. Items that exceed the less liberal criterion
(illustrated by the vertical line in blue) elicit recollection (remember-response).
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are weak and strong memories within one signal-detection model. Thus, similarly
to a dual-process model, this model is based on multiple sources of memory which
allows for easier interpretation of the psychological constructs.
The dissociation logic as evidence consistent with two processes underlying
recognition is controversial (e.g., Berry et al., 2012; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988, 2003;
Kinder & Shanks, 2003; Newell & Dunn, 2008). First, dissociations rely on the lack
of an effect of a manipulation on one process. Such null findings cannot be verified
(Newell & Dunn, 2008). Second, Teuber (1955) argued that single dissociations (e.g.,
recollection is affected more than familiarity by manipulation A) can arise simply
because of a difference in the sensitivity of the measures. In other words, it is possi-
ble that recollection is more sensitive to certain manipulations than familiarity (or
vice versa). If it is indeed the case that dissociations are caused by differences in
the reliabilities of the measures, then dissociations might not necessarily reflect dis-
tinct processes (in line with dual-process theory) but might also be consistent with
single-process theories (e.g., Berry et al., 2012; Dunn, 2004; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988).
The issue of sensitivity can be overcome by demonstrating double dissociations (e.g.,
G. V. Jones, 1983; Teuber, 1955). Specifically, if there are two distinct processes,
then it should be possible to shift recollection relative to familiarity in one condition,
and familiarity relative to recollection in another condition. Dual-process theorists
argue that this crossover interaction which forms a double dissociation provides com-
pelling evidence consistent with the notion that there are distinct memory processes
underlying recognition (e.g., Rugg & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002). Neverthe-
less, it has been argued that not all double dissociations are sufficient to conclude
a dual-process model (e.g., Berry et al., 2012; Dunn & Kirsner, 2003; Newell &
Dunn, 2008). State-trace analysis can be used to distinguish double-dissociations
that are indicative of a dual-process model from double dissociations that are con-
sistent with a single process model (e.g., Bamber, 1979; Newell & Dunn, 2008). In
a state-trace plot, for example, recollection is plotted against familiarity across dif-
ferent experimental conditions (e.g., limited response time). If the values of each
of these conditions fall on one monotonically increasing curve, then a single-process
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model can be concluded. However, if the values form two monotonic curves, then a
dual-process model is favourable. Some double dissociations form one monotonically
increasing curve (in line with a single-process model) whereas others from two curves
(in line with a dual-process model). Therefore, even though some manipulations re-
sult in double dissociations, dual-process theory cannot necessarily be concluded. In
response to this, Ashby (2014) has recently argued that evidence from state-trace
plots is not conclusive because single- and dual-process models can provide state-
trace plots compatible with either theory. In sum, the issue of sensitivity holds
for all single, and some double dissociations. Given that double dissociations are
necessary (if not sufficient) for independent processes, this dissertation relies on the
double dissociation logic to provide evidence consistent with dual-process theory.
Given the enormous body of research in the adult population examining
whether single- or dual-process models are more suitable to investigate recognition
memory (e.g., Berry et al., 2012; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Parks,
2007), it is surprising that this debate has barely been tackled from a developmental
perspective (e.g., Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Riggins & Rollins, 2015). Developmen-
tal research could contribute in two ways to this debate. First, applying a well-
established manipulation from the adult literature to a developmental sample could
show whether recognition memory can already be dissociated in early childhood.
This would provide evidence whether there are two qualitative different processes
underlying recognition from an early age onwards. If there are two processes under-
lying recognition memory, then specific manipulations are expected to selectively
affect one process and other manipulations are expected to selectively affect the
other process (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002). If double dissociations are found across all age
groups, then this indicates that two processes are active at an early age of 5 years.
Second, dual-process theory can be tested by providing evidence of whether
recollection and familiarity develop at the same or at different rates. Figure 1.2
shows hypothetical outcomes providing strong or weak support for each view. Dual-
process theory would predict distinct age-related changes for recollection and famil-
iarity. Specifically, given that familiarity is more automatic and faster than recollec-
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tion (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002); familiarity is expected to reach a maximum adult level
earlier than recollection (cf. Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Otherwise put, given that
infants are already able to recognize items or faces (for a review see Bauer, 2004),
probably on the basis of familiarity, shallower developmental trajectories across age
were expected for familiarity than recollection (cf. Barrouillet, 2011). This is would
provide at least weak support for dual-process theory and be incompatible with
single-process theory (see Figure 1.2, panel d). No developmental changes in fa-
miliarity, combined with increases in recollection across age, does not only provide
evidence for distinct developmental trajectories but shows a dissociation of memory
processes and thus, provides strong support for dual-process theory (see Figure 1.2,
panel a; cf. Anooshian, 1999). Importantly, these most straight forward develop-
mental predictions drawn from dual-process theory constitute a specific, directed
prediction, rather than a simple dissociation of recollection and familiarity across
age.
Note that in the aging literature it has been argued, consistent with a single-
system view, that different developmental courses of recollection and familiarity may
simply reflect differences in the sensitivity of the measures, instead of real differences
in memory processes (Ward, Berry, & Shanks, 2013). However, the argument that
age-related changes in recollection can be explained by a difference in the sensitivity
of measures does not hold for developmental predictions. Dissociations show that
recollection is more sensitive than familiarity (see Yonelinas, 2002).
According to single-process theory, recollection and familiarity would peak
at the same age, resulting in comparable developmental increases for both processes.
Consistent higher levels of recollection than familiarity show that recollection and
familiarity increase at the same rate, with one process being more sensitive than the
other one, and does thus provide weak support for single-process theory (see Figure
1.2, panel e). Similar levels combined with comparable increases of recollection and
familiarity provides strong support for single -process theory (see Figure 1.2, panel
b).
An alternative possible outcome pattern would be that recollection reaches
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a maximum adult level earlier than familiarity (see Figure 1.2, panel c). This
would suggest shallower developmental trajectories for recollection than familiar-
ity. This indicates distinct developmental trajectories which are incompatible with
single-process theory. However, evidence for an automatic process (i.e., familiarity)
peaking later in development than the effortful one (i.e., recollection) challenges ex-
isting dual-process theories. Together, each of the possible developmental patterns
can help to further our understanding of recognition memory.
Figure 1.2. Hypothetical patterns of developmental change for recollection and
familiarity that would support dual-process theory (DPT), single-process theory
(SPT) or neither.
In the next section we will introduce different methods used to examine the
development of recognition memory and providing an overview of the developmental
evidence up to date.
1.4 Recollection and familiarity in children
In the adult literature a variety of measures has been proposed to assess how recollec-
tion and familiarity contribute to recognition memory (for an overview see Yonelinas,
2002). Due to methodological difficulties only a few studies have used these methods
to investigate how these processes contribute to the development of recognition mem-
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ory in children (Anooshian, 1999; Billingsley, Smith, & McAndrews, 2002; Brainerd
et al., 2004; Czernochowski, Mecklinger, Johansson, & Brinkmann, 2005; Friedman,
Chastelaine, Nessler, & Malcolm, 2010; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Ghetti et al., 2008;
Holliday, Reyna, & Hayes, 2002; Mecklinger, Brunnemann, & Kipp, 2011). The
main developmental findings as well as the advantages and the disadvantages of
each of these methods will be outlined below.
One of the first studies attempting to investigate recognition memory in
children (Billingsley et al., 2002) used the remember-know procedure (Tulving, 1985)
which requires introspection on memory states. Participants first study a list of items
and have to indicate in a recognition test whether they remember or know whether
an item was studied before. Remember responses should be given if participants
recollect qualitative details about encoding the item, for example, thoughts during
encoding or the colour of the item. Remember responses are used as a proxy for
recollection. Know responses should be given if items evoke a sense of familiarity
without recollecting specific details. Know responses are used as proxy for familiar-
ity.
Developmental studies employing the remember-know procedure (Tulving,
1985) in children revealed inconsistent developmental patterns of recollection and
familiarity (Billingsley et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2010; Ghetti et al., 2011).
Specifically, Billingsley et al.1 (2002) and Friedman et al. (2010) demonstrated
developmental change in remember-responses (recollection) between 8-10-year-olds
and 14-16-year-olds (Cohen’s d = .76) but not thereafter (Cohen’s d = .48), whereas
Ghetti et al. (2011) demonstrated increases between 6-7-year-olds and 9-10-year-olds
(Cohen’s d = .58) but decreases in 17-18-year-olds (Cohen’s d = .90).
Further, whereas Billingsley et al. (2002) found that know-responses (fa-
miliarity) were stable across age, Ghetti et al. (2011) and Friedman et al. (2010)
found more know-responses in 17-18-year-olds than in the younger ages (Ghetti et
al.: 6-7-year-olds - 17-18-year-olds: Cohen’s d = 1.10; 9-10-year-olds - 17-18-year-
olds: Cohen’s d = 1.36; 12-13-year-olds - 17-18-year-olds: Cohen’s d = .80; Friedman
1Due to lack mean and sd values, Cohen’s d could not be calculated.
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et al.: 9-10-year-olds - adults: Cohen’s d = .38; 13-14-year-olds - adults: Cohen’s
d = 1.31). Together, the remember-know procedure does not provide a clear pic-
ture about the developmental course of recollection and familiarity. Although these
studies revealed different age effects for recollection and familiarity, they show that
recollection and familiarity develop differently, providing preliminary support for
dual process theory.
Alongside behavioural data, Friedman et al. (2010) also conducted ERPs
during the remember/ know procedure. Late (500-700 ms after stimulus presenta-
tion) parietal activation, which is typically associated with recollection-based remem-
bering (e.g., for evidence in adults see Curran, 2000), was found in all age groups.
Conversely, early mid-frontal activation (300-500 ms after stimulus presentation),
which typically reflects familiarity-based remembering in adults, was only observed
in 13-14-year-olds and adults. In 9-10-year-olds a different, not yet isolated neural
activation was interpreted as a sign of familiarity. The difference in neuronal pat-
terns observed for associates of familiarity in children and adults, raises the question
whether for younger children it is possible to infer processes underlying recognition
from cortical activation patterns. Future studies should aim to replicate this dissoci-
ation of children’s cortical activation patterns compared to adults’ to provide more
convincing evidence consistent with dual-process theory.
It has been argued that the remember-know procedure is too complex for
children (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008) because it requires accurate self-report
of memory experience (i.e., metacognitive monitoring). This aspect of metamemory
develops around age 8 and increases in accuracy until early adulthood (Ghetti et
al., 2011). Further, the remember-know procedure distinguishes strong from weak
memories rather than providing process pure measures of recollection from famil-
iarity (Wixted & Mickes, 2010). Thus, remember-know responses may not be a
proxy for processes underlying recognition as defined within Yonelinas’ dual-process
model, but might rather reflect the subjective experience of recollection and familiar-
ity as defined by Tulving (1985) (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007). Thus, the remember/
know procedure may be used to measure how metamemory develops during child-
1.4. RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY IN CHILDREN 25
hood (Ghetti et al., 2008, 2011) instead of examining the development of processes
underlying recognition memory. It allows measuring how criteria for subjective rec-
ollection and familiarity differ across childhood.
Another frequently used method in adults is the receiver operating charac-
teristics procedure (ROC, Green & Swets, 1966; Yonelinas, 1994). In a childfriendly
version (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008) participants indicate their confidence on a 3-point
scale (i.e., very sure, kind of sure, not sure) after each old/ new decision. Plots of
hits (i.e., correct old-response to an earlier presented item) and false alarms (i.e.,
incorrect yes-response to a new item) as a function of confidence form an ROC curve.
Within the dual-process signal detection model (DPSD) it is assumed that recollec-
tion and familiarity are independent processes. Recollection is modelled as an all or
none process, meaning that items which exceed a certain threshold are recollected.
Familiarity is assumed to be a continuous process defined within signal-detection
theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The DPSD will be discussed in more detail
below (see section 1.4.1 under “Dual-Process Signal Detection model”). This model
can be fit to the ROC curves to estimate recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas,
1994; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998).
The only developmental study which employed the ROC procedure with
children is by Ghetti and Angelini (2008). Six, eight, ten year-old children and young
adults were presented with a list of pictures and completed either a perceptual en-
coding condition, in which they stated the colour (red or blue) of the presented line
drawing or a semantic encoding condition, in which they made a semantic judge-
ment depending on the colour of objects (for objects presented in red, participants
stated whether an item was soft or hard, for items in blue, whether it was heavy or
light). Ghetti and Angelini (2008) found first, that both recollection and familiarity
are higher after deep than after shallow encoding, showing that all age groups bene-
fited from deep, semantic encoding. Second, the magnitude of semantic encoding on
recollection was larger for older than younger children. However, semantic encoding
increased familiarity to the same extent across all age groups. Developmental change
in familiarity occurred between the age of 6 and 8 independent of encoding condi-
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tion. Age related increases in recollection were observed only after semantic but
not after perceptual encoding. In their Experiment 2 children studied pictures and
judged their characteristics (e.g., hard versus soft) either under short (1500ms) or
long study duration (4500ms). Increases in recollection occurred throughout child-
hood until age 10 independent of study duration. Age related increases in familiarity
were observed only after the short study duration but not after the long one. These
findings indicate that recollection and familiarity may undergo different rates of de-
velopmental change. Further, study duration dissociated recollection and familiarity
showing that short study duration selectively reduced familiarity whereas recollec-
tion was unaffected. To our knowledge to date this is the only study revealing clear
developmental evidence for a task dissociation (caused by an encoding time manip-
ulation) and a dissociation of developmental trends in familiarity and recollection
between 6- and 10 years.
However, although the ROC method does not require direct introspection
into memory states, it does require confidence ratings to be reported and assumes a
positive correlation between memory accuracy and confidence (Yonelinas, Dobbins,
Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996). The ROC approach relies on participants’
ability to vary their response criterion given a certain level of memory sensitivity
(Yonelinas et al., 1996). However, the ability to distinguish between correct and
incorrect responses with confidence ratings increases between 5- and 10-years of age
(Ghetti et al., 2008; Roebers et al., 2004). Thus, it is not entirely certain whether
these changes in recollection and familiarity values reflect different recognition pro-
cesses or children’s developing ability to monitor and report on memory performance.
Moreover, the disadvantage of the ROC procedure is that it requires a high num-
ber of trials (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008), which may be problematic specifically for
5-year-old children. Together, further research applying more age-appropriate meth-
ods is needed to conclude whether recollection and familiarity can be dissociated
developmentally.
To overcome the need for self-report of metacognitive monitoring, a few
studies implemented indirect methods of assessing memory processes such as the con-
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joint recognition paradigm (Brainerd et al., 2004), exclusion tasks (Czernochowski
et al., 2005) and the process dissociation paradigm (PDP; Anooshian, 1999; Holliday
& Hayes, 2000, 2001; Holliday et al., 2002). In all of these studies recollection and
familiarity were estimated by contrasting performance in different test conditions.
Brainerd et al. (2004) used the conjoint-recognition procedure to assess
recognition memory in 7-, 11-, and 14 year-olds (Experiment 1) and 5- and 11-
year-olds (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1 participants encoded Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) lists of associative
words (e.g., “fly”, “jet”, “sky”, “flight”), in Experiment 2 participants encoded cat-
egory lists (e.g., “celery”,” lettuce“). This was followed by one of three recognition
tests, in which participants had to respond”yes” to either previously seen items (e.g.,
fly, jet; verbatim rule), to semantically related items that were not earlier presented
(e.g., cockpit; gist rule) or to both targets and semantically related items (verbatim
and gist rule). A mathematical model was applied to the task dissociation logic of
these data to estimate familiarity and recollection parameters. Briefly, the ability to
reject semantically related distractors is an approximation of recollection, incorrectly
accepting these distractors approximates familiarity. Findings revealed development
of recollection occurs between 7- and 14- years (Experiment 1) and 5- and 11-years
(Experiment 2). Familiarity did not differ between 7- and 14-years (Experiment 1)
but differed between 5- and 11-years (Experiment 2).
The advantage of the conjoint-recognition procedure is that it does not re-
quire introspection into memory states but works by contrasting different conditions.
However, due to the nature of the task, semantically related word lists are required,
which restricts measuring recollection to a semantically based content. This does
not allow measuring whether other feature of the item, such as perceptual details,
can be recollected. In this paradigm correct responses require the ability to form
categorical or associate lists. For instance, in one condition, participants are asked
to only accept semantically related items that were not earlier presented. This abil-
ity was shown to undergo considerable qualitative and quantitative developmental
change between 5, 7, and 11 years of age (Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; M. C. Wim-
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mer & Howe, 2009). Thus, it is not entirely clear whether age related differences in
recollection and familiarity measured within the conjoint-recognition paradigm, are
due to real differences in processes underlying recognition memory or whether this
is caused by a maturing semantic network.
Another method to measure components of recognition memory is the
exclusion task (for evidence in adults see Jacoby, 1991; for developmental evidence
see Czernochowski et al., 2005). In a study by Czernochowski et al., (2005) 6- to
8-year-olds, 10- to 12-year-olds and young adults studied a list of pictures and a
list of words before participating in an exclusion task. Participants were instructed
to accept targets (e.g., previously studied pictures) and exclude (reject) non-targets
(e.g., previously studied words) as well as new items. The ability to discriminate
between old and new items (item memory) as well the ability to discriminate between
targets and non-targets (source memory) increased up to young adulthood. Item
memory was used as proxy for familiarity; source memory was used as proxy for
recollection.
However, item and source memory cannot be used as a proxy for famil-
iarity and recollection, respectively because recollection and familiarity might both
contribute to item and source memory. Thus item and source memory are not
process pure measures of processes underlying recognition memory (Diana et al.,
2008; Mollison & Curran, 2012; Yonelinas et al., 2010). This is important because
if both recollection and familiarity contribute to item- and source judgments, then
age-related changes in source memory can be a result of an increase in recollection,
familiarity, or both (see also above).
Czernochowski et al., (2005) collected ERPs alongside the behavioural data.
Activation in parietal regions associated with recollection was found from the age of 6.
Activation in mid-frontal regions associated with familiarity was only evident around
the age of 10. The authors concluded that children are more conservative and only
give an old-response when recollection was successful. They argue that children rely
mainly on recollection to make their memory judgements (see also Friedman et al.,
2010). Adults are more flexible than children can thus apply a more liberal response
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criterion which leads to recollection and familiarity based recognition. Importantly,
this absence of familiarity in children is inconsistent with behavioural evidence where
familiarity based responding was evident earlier than recollection (Czernochowski
et al., 2005) and dual-process theory where familiarity is assumed to be available
earlier and more automatic (cf. Anooshian, 1999). However, this neuroscientific
evidence of differing activation for familiarity and recollection supports the idea
that recollection and familiarity can be dissociated (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).
Finally, a well-established method assessing recollection and familiarity in
adults without introspective report on memory is the process dissociation paradigm
(PDP, Jacoby, 1991).
1.4.1 The Process Dissociation Paradigm
In the process dissociation paradigm (PDP, Jacoby, 1991) participants encode a
series of items presented either, for example, at the top or the bottom of the screen.
At recognition participants are presented with a series of old (presented at the top or
the bottom of the screen during encoding) and new words. Recognition consists of
two conditions: In inclusion participants are instructed to say “yes” (accept) to all
earlier presented words, regardless of whether an item was presented at the top or the
bottom of the screen and reject new words. In the exclusion condition participants
are instructed to accept only items from the target group (e.g., presented at the top
of the screen) and exclude (reject) new items and non-targets (e.g., presented at the
bottom of the screen).
Familiarity and recollection parameters can be derived by contrasting per-
formance in the exclusion and the inclusion condition (see Jacoby, 1991). In the
inclusion condition yes-responses to targets (e.g., presented at the top during study)
and non-targets (e.g., presented at the bottom during study) are classified as correct
responses. In the exclusion condition yes-responses to targets (e.g., presented at the
top) are correct whilst yes-responses to non-targets (e.g., presented at the bottom)
and new items are incorrect responses. Yes-responses to non-targets in inclusion
and exclusion are used to estimate recollection and familiarity parameters in the
PDP. The PDP is based on the idea that recollection and familiarity contribute
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independently to memory performance (Jacoby, 1991). Correct yes-responses to
non-targets in inclusion can reflect familiarity (F ) or recollection (R) processes (as
shown in equation 1). In other words, to give a correct yes-response in inclusion,
participants may only remember that an item was presented (familiarity) or they
remember criterion-based details about the item (i.e., recollection). In contrast, an
incorrect yes-response to non-targets in exclusion indicates that participants are un-
able to recollect criterion-based details (i.e., top vs. bottom of the screen) about the
presented item and recollection failed. This indicates that incorrect yes-responses
are based on familiarity (as shown in equation 2). Thus, recollection is calculated
by subtracting yes-responses to non-targets in exclusion from yes-responses to non-
targets in inclusion (as shown in equation 3). Familiarity estimates are based on
recollection estimates. As mentioned above, an incorrect yes-response in exclusion
to a non-target is based on familiarity. An incorrect yes-response in exclusion indi-
cates that participants remember that an item was earlier studied; however, they are
unable to recollect the criterion-based details (i.e. top vs. bottom of the screen). To
control for recollection this value is divided by 1− recollection meaning that famil-
iarity is calculated from estimates of recollection (as shown in equation 4) (Jacoby,
1991).
1. “Yes” Inclusionnon−target = R + F − F ∗R
2. a. “Yes” Exclusionnon−target = F − F ∗R
b. “Yes” Inclusionnon−target = R+“Yes” Exclusionnon−target
3. R = “Yes” Inclusionnon−target−“Yes” Exclusionnon−target
4. F = “Yes” Exclusionnon−target/(1−R)
The PDP was adapted in a few developmental studies (Anooshian, 1999;
Holliday & Hayes, 2000, 2001; Holliday et al., 2002). A series of studies by Hol-
liday and Hayes (2000, 2001; 2002) used the PDP to investigate how recollection
and familiarity are linked to the acceptance of misinformation. Here, 5- to 9-year-
old children were first presented with a picture story. Afterwards they were given
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a summary of this story that contained misleading details. These details were ei-
ther read to children or self-generated by children (e.g. kitchen was replaced with
bathroom). In the recognition phase children first had to accept earlier presented
pictures (inclusion). In the second part children had to exclude items from either
the first or the second version of the story (exclusion). Findings revealed that both
recollection and familiarity contribute to the acceptance of misinformation where
the latter decreased with age (Holliday & Hayes, 2000). They also showed that in
contrast to familiarity, recollection based responding to misinformation was stronger
after self-generated misinformation items than after read items (Holliday & Hayes,
2000; Holliday et al., 2002). Thus, misinformation elicits both a feeling of familiarity
and recollection, which contribute with a different magnitude to the acceptance of
misinformation.
Additionally, in a study by Anooshian (1999), 5-year-olds and adults first
studied a list of pictures accompanied by a story. Then they were presented with
another list of pictures which were part of the same story but not presented earlier.
The recognition phase consisted of an inclusion (accept all earlier seen pictures) and
an exclusion phase (accept only pictures from the second list). Importantly, 5-year-
olds as well as adults accepted more non-targets (second list) in inclusion than in
exclusion. This finding suggests that participants followed the instructions, thus
recollection and familiarity could be assessed appropriately. Using this list-based
design Anooshian (1999) found that adults showed higher levels of recollection than
5-year-olds whereas familiarity did not differ between the two age groups.
The Anooshian (1999) study examined familiarity and recollection in a
list-based design where the recollective criterion was whether items were presented
in the first or the second list. Thus, remembering qualitative details of the items
themselves (i.e., colour of the item) did not aid recollection. Therefore, in the cur-
rent research the PDP (Jacoby, 1991) was adapted to measure processes underlying
recognition in an item-based design. This allows examining directly whether partic-
ipants can recollect a perceptual characteristic of a specific item, such as number
of representations or location of an item (used previously with adults, Wais & Gaz-
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zaley, 2011). For example, a series of pictures with either one or two objects were
presented during encoding (e.g., two alligators, one glass). Thus, the number of pre-
sented objects was used as the criterion for recollective information. Importantly,
the PDP does not require subjective reports about memory states and thus, allows
examination of recollection and familiarity across a wide age range independent of
the accuracy of metamemory reports. However, even though the PDP is well estab-
lished in the adult literature and seems to be well suited for developmental research,
it has been critiqued for several reasons (e.g., Curran & Hintzman, 1997). These
criticisms will be discussed in the next section.
Critical underlying assumptions. First, in the PDP parameter estimates
are derived according to the assumption that familiarity and recollection contribute
independently to recognition memory performance (Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997).
However, violations of this independence assumption might lead to an underesti-
mation of familiarity and thus to artifactual dissociations of recollection and famil-
iarity (Curran & Hintzman, 1997). Curran and Hintzman (1997) showed positive
correlations between recollection and familiarity and concluded a violation of the
independence assumption. However, these correlations were found after aggregating
across items and do thus not tell whether recollection and familiarity contribute
independently to the recognition of an individual item (Jacoby et al., 1997). There-
fore, correlating aggregate data over items or participants is not informative about
process independence (Jacoby et al., 1997). The use of a hierarchical PDP mod-
elling approach, where aggregation across items or participants was not necessary,
allowed testing the independence assumption directly (Rouder, Lu, Morey, Sun, &
Speckman, 2008) and revealed a dissociation of recollection and familiarity after
an encoding time manipulation (recollection was more affected than familiarity).
Second, a correlation of recollection and familiarity across items but no correlation
across participants was demonstrated. This shows that participants with higher rec-
ollection do not have a higher tendency for higher familiarity. Thus, Curran and
Hintzman’s (1997) critique of the independence assumption does not hold and the
PDP can be used as a measure of recognition memory.
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The second assumption is that participant’s probability to make a yes-
response does not differ as a function of test instructions (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012).
Specifically, if participants are more liberal in the inclusion condition, where both
recollection and familiarity contribute to correct memory performance than in the
exclusion condition, where familiarity contributes to incorrect memory performance,
then this core assumption is not met. In this case, familiarity and recollection values
may reflect changes in response bias rather than differing remembering phenomenol-
ogy (Curran & Hintzman, 1997). Thus, it is important that yes-responses to new
items (i.e., base rates) do not differ between the inclusion and the exclusion con-
ditions or age groups. Whether participants respond more liberal in one condition
than in the other can be seen in differences in bases rates to new item in inclusion
and exclusion. Differences in base rates to new items in inclusion and exclusion
may result in distorted parameter estimates (Graf & Komatsu, 1994) and should
thus be incorporated when recollection and familiarity are estimated (Jacoby, 1998).
Different methods were proposed to compensate for this difference in base rates to
new items between inclusion and exclusion (for a multinomial processing tree ap-
proach see Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995, for a signal-detection
based approach see Yonelinas, Regeher, & Jacoby, 1995). The dual-process signal
detection model (DPSD) provided the most unbiased estimates for incorporating
base rates to new items (Yonelinas et al., 1996) and was thus used throughout this
dissertation to estimate recollection and familiarity.
Dual-Process Signal Detection model (DPSD). Signal Detection Theory
(SDT, Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) was proposed as an approach to control for
potential shifts in base rates to new items between inclusion and exclusion in the
PDP. A short introduction to SDT follows before details about the DPSD model
are explained. Here SDT is treated as a general method for making uncertain bi-
nary judgements, whereas above we discussed the specific instantiations for various
memory paradigms. In a typical experiment on human recognition memory, partici-
pants are presented with a list of studied (old) and new items with varying memory
strength. If a participant accepts most of the old items (hit) and accepts only few
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of the new items (false alarm), then this is indicative of high memory sensitivity.
However, if a participant accepts most of the old items and also most of the new
items, this results in poor memory sensitivity. In other words, memory sensitivity is
described by the distance between the old and the new item distribution (Figure 1.3).
False alarms and hits are reported as probabilities which need to be transformed into
a standardised z-score. Then memory sensitivity (d′) can be calculated by subtract-
ing z-scores of false alarms from z-scores of hits (d′ = z(Hits)− z(FalseAlarms)).
A tendency to accept (yes-responses) items regardless of the underlying
memory sensitivity is known as liberal responding, whereas the tendency to reject
(no-response) items is known as conservative responding. In SDT terms this ten-
dency to prefer a “yes” or “no” response is called response bias. The degree of
response bias is located at the distance between the relative response criterion (c;
red line in Figure 1.3) and the optimal response criterion (black dashed vertical
line line in Figure 1.3). If the memory strength of an item exceeds the response
criterion (c), a yes-response follows; otherwise a no-response follows (see Figure 1.3).
Response bias (c) can be calculated as c = −0.5 ∗ ((z(H) + z(F )) (Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005).
SDT assumes that memory sensitivity and response bias can vary inde-
pendently and thus, allows disentangling response bias from memory sensitivity.
Whereas in standard SDT, recollection and familiarity cannot be distinguished, in
the PDP recollection and familiarity can be torn apart. Thus, to account for shifts
in response bias, the PDP was extended using SDT resulting in the DPSD (Yoneli-
nas, Regehr, & Jacoby, 1995). The DPSD model is a hybrid model assuming that
recognition memory is based on two distinct processes. It incorporates an indepen-
dent threshold recollection process and a signal detection-based familiarity process.
Specifically, recollection is assumed to be an all-or-none process where participants
accept an item if they recollect the details which they were instructed to remember
(e.g. number or location of items). If recollection fails, participants fall back on famil-
iarity (d′) which is assumed to be a continuous process as described by the distance
between the equal-variance Gaussian strength distributions for old and new items.
1.4. RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY IN CHILDREN 35
Figure 1.3. The distance between the new and old item distribution represents
memory sensitivity (d′). Items exceeding the response criterion c(red line) lead
to yes-responses. The shaded area underlying the old item distribution exceeding
the response criterion (c) represents familiarity in PDP terms. The area in grey
underlying the new item distribution exceeding the response criterion represents the
false alarm rate.
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If the memory strength of an item exceeds the response criterion c (red vertical line
in Figure 1.3), a yes-response follows, otherwise a no-response follows (Yonelinas,
1994). Familiarity as defined in the PDP paradigm that is the probability that an
old item exceeds the response criterion c (shaded area in Figure 1.3; Yonelinas et al.,
1995) is described by the term ϕ((d′/2)−c). Note that ϕ is defined as the cumulative
standard normal distribution. Algebra shows that substituting false alarms in the re-
sponse criterion formulae (c = −0.5((z(Hit)+z(FalseAlarms)() with −d′+z(Hits)
derived from the memory sensitivity formulae (d′ = z(Hits)− z(FalseAlarms)) re-
sults in this familiarity term ϕ((d′/2)− c) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
Importantly, as outlined above, if participants are liberal in inclusion and
conservative in exclusion (or vice versa), then this can result in distorted recollection
and familiarity parameters. Whether a participant’s response criterion changes from
liberal to conservative across conditions can be seen in base rates to new items in
inclusion and exclusion. To take these potential differences in base rates to new
items into account, responses to new items in inclusion and exclusion are used for
parameter estimation in the DPSD in addition to acceptance rates of non-targets.
Throughout this dissertation differences in base rates to new items between inclusion
and exclusion were examined for each participant individually. If the difference
between inclusion and exclusion was higher than .20, two criteria were estimated
(Ci and Ce), one criterion for inclusion (Ci) and one criterion for exclusion (Ce). If
the difference in base rates to new items was below .20, one criterion was estimated
(C).2 However, note that a different cut-off point or even the use of a two criteria
model throughout this dissertation would not have changed our conclusions.
To incorporate base rates to new items to estimate recollection and fa-
miliarity the response criterion c was included. In SDT terms the probability of a
new item exceeding the response criterion c and stands for the false alarm rate and
can be described by the term ϕ((−d′/2) − c) (grey area in Figure 1.3; Macmillan
2Simulations were performed to determine a cut-off point to decide whether one (C) or two
criteria (Ci and Ce) were calculated. We simulated criteria for inclusion (Ci) and exclusion (Ce).
Based on an assumed d’ rate of 1 these criteria were transformed into proportion of yes-responses
to new items in inclusion and exclusion. The 95% confidence interval of the differences between
alarm rates in inclusion and exclusion ranged from -.20 to .20. Thus, an absolute difference between
to new items in inclusion and exclusion above .20 was considered as a shift in response bias (see
Appendix for R code).
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& Creelman, 2005). Algebra shows that substituting hits in the response criterion
formulae (c = −0.5[(z(Hit) + z(FalseAlarms)]) with d′ + z(FalseAlarms) derived
from the memory sensitivity formulae (d′ = z(Hits) − z(FalseAlarms)) results in
the term ϕ(−d′/2− c). Now the familiarity term in the original PDP equations can
be substituted with the SDT familiarity term (ϕ((d′/2)− c).
5. “Yes” Inclusionnon−target = R + ϕ((d′/2)− Ci)−R ∗ ϕ((d′/2)− Ci)
6. “Yes” Exclusionnon−target = ϕ((d′/2)− Ce)−R ∗ ϕ((d′/2)− Ce)
This familiarity term will be reported throughout this dissertation. Thus
both recollection and familiarity are reported as proportions to enable direct com-
parison between recollection and familiarity (see also Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996).
Further, to adjust for differences in base rates to new items, responses to new items
were taken into account by adding the term ϕ((−d′/2) − C). As explained above,
if base rates differed between conditions, two criteria, one for inclusion (Ci; see
equation 7) and one for exclusion (Ce; see equation 8) were taken into account.
7. “Yes” Inclusionnew = ϕ(−d′/2− Ci)
8. “Yes” Exclusionnew = ϕ(−d′/2− Ce)
However, if base rates did not differ, then response criteria in inclusion and
exclusion were assumed to be identical resulting in one criterion (see equation 9).
9. “Yes”new = ϕ(−d′/2− C)
These four equations (5-8) lead to two outcome variables of interest per
participant: Recollection (R) is, as in the traditional PDP, a probability, thus a
number between 0 and 1. Using the above explained equation ϕ((d′/2)−Ci), famil-
iarity is calculated from d’ which ranges from 0 to 4 and the response criteria (Ci
and Ce; C) ranging between -5 and 5 (for the parameter boundaries see also Ghetti
and Angelini (2008). Rather than calculating recollection parameters, familiarity pa-
rameters and response criteria manually using the PDP equations (see equations 5 -
9), they were derived by fitting the DPSD model using a combination of maximum
38 CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW
likelihood and the “simplex” algorithm of Nelder and Mead (1965) in R (MPTinR
package).
1.5 Motivation for this dissertation
In sum, different methods have been used to measure the development of processes
underlying recognition memory in childhood (Anooshian, 1999; Billingsley et al.,
2002; Brainerd et al., 2004; Czernochowski et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2010; Ghetti
& Angelini, 2008; Ghetti et al., 2008, 2011; Holliday et al., 2002; Mecklinger et al.,
2011). In general, it seems to be an accepted view that recollection develops into the
adolescent years, whereas familiarity shows comparatively little, or no, developmen-
tal change after 6-8 years of age (Ghetti & Lee, 2014). However, specific age-related
increases in recollection and familiarity seem to differ across studies. Nevertheless,
all developmental studies interpret their findings within the dual-process framework
of recognition memory.
There are two reasons for this inconsistency in developmental patterns of
recollection and familiarity across studies. First, it might be due to the different
methods used to assess recognition memory. As outlined above, some methods
might not be suitable for research in children because they require semantic networks,
metamemory or the ability to report memory strength, thus abilities which develop
across childhood. The second reason for this inconsistency might lie in the age
range. Developmental evidence comes from studies which focused on children older
than 8 years (e.g., Billingsley et al., 2002) or studies which have not examined age
groups between age 5 and adulthood (e.g., Anooshian, 1999). However, it is of
particular interest to examine recognition memory phenomenology in children after
the age of 4 years, once they have acquired an understanding of their own and others’
mental states (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; H. Wimmer & Perner, 1983), during their
important “5- to 7-year” developmental memory shift (Sameroff & Haith, 1996) and
“postmetamemory” (8 years; Ghetti, 2003) compared with adults. Therefore, to get
a complete picture of recognition memory development throughout childhood, it
is crucial to investigate the full age range between 5 years up to young adulthood
using a measurement method which is suitable for young children. Therefore, in this
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dissertation recognition memory was examined in 5-, 7-, 11-year-olds and adults.
Further, most developmental studies interpreted distinct developmental
trends of recollection and familiarity as evidence for two distinct processes without
systematically testing dual-process theory (e.g., Friedman et al., 2010; Mecklinger
et al., 2011). Instead of simply assuming a dual-process framework, an experimen-
tal test of whether single- or dual-process models are more suitable to describe
recognition memory is needed. Only Ghetti and Angelini (2008) tried to actively
dissociate processes underlying recognition memory. They showed that varying en-
coding time affected familiarity rather than recollection and this was the case across
all age groups. This dissociation provided first evidence in favour of the notion
that recollection and familiarity are distinct processes in childhood. Further pre-
liminary support in line with dual-process theory comes from ERP studies showing
differing activation patterns for familiarity and recollection in children and adults
(Czernochowski et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2010; Mecklinger et al., 2011). How-
ever, the absence of behavioural data and the divergence of behavioural data and
cortical activation patterns make interpretation difficult. Thus, additional devel-
opmental research which specifically aims to investigate manipulations resulting in
dissociations, is needed. Therefore, in this dissertation we aimed to investigate how
recollection and familiarity change as a function of development and theoretically
based experimental manipulations (i.e., Chapter 2: limited response time during re-
trieval, Chapter 3: repeated item presentation during encoding, Chapter 4: semantic
vs. perceptual encoding).
Once the approach is empirically validated, the PDP can be used to ex-
amine whether the semantic to perceptual shift (e.g., Bach & Underwood, 1970;
Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004) is reflected in familiarity and recollection. Familiarity
was shown to be enhanced to a similar extent after semantic compared to percep-
tual encoding while for recollection benefits of semantic compared to perceptual
encoding increase with age (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Thus, we aimed to examine
whether the perceptual to semantic shift is directly reflected in recollection and fa-
miliarity. Moreover, it was shown that recollection consistently contributes to the
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acceptance of misinformation whereas the contribution of familiarity to misinfor-
mation decreases with age (Holliday & Hayes, 2000). Thus, we aimed to examine
whether semantic false memories are linked to familiarity or recollection and whether
this changes across childhood.
To summarize, this dissertation had three main aims. First, we aimed to
investigate how processes underlying recognition develop across childhood. To do
so, the PDP was adapted to be used across a wide age range of 5-, 7-, 11-years and
adults. Second, we aimed to systematically apply well-established manipulations
from the adult literature, such as limited response time during recognition and
repeated item presentation during encoding to examine whether recollection and
familiarity can be dissociated in childhood. This will allow the investigation of
whether these processes are distinct during childhood. This will provide insight
into what factors affect the development of recollection and familiarity (see also
Ghetti & Lee, 2014). This dissertation can contribute to the discussion of whether
it is necessary to assume two processes or whether a single-process is sufficient to
explain recognition memory by showing different developmental trajectories and by
dissociation recollection from familiarity on the basis of experimental manipulations.
Third, we aimed to use the PDP to investigate whether the change of recollection and
familiarity over childhood can explain the developmental shift from perceptual to
semantic processing and whether semantic false memories are linked to recollection
and familiarity.
1.6 Statistical note
Each results section in this dissertation will follow the same basic structure. First,
in the preliminary results it will be reported how many participants were removed
from the subsequent analysis based on below chance performance. Across all eight
experiments in this dissertation participants who were unable to repeat the exclu-
sion or inclusion rules or performed below chance were removed from the analyses.
Chance performance was based on the binomial distribution. For instance, for a
chance calculation on 120 recognition test trials given a 50% probability of correct
responding, 69 correct trials lead to a performance above chance (p = .041). In con-
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trast, if only 68 trials were answered correctly, performance is at chance (p = .060).
Hence, 69 correct trials (i.e. .575%) indicate above chance performance (p < .05).
Chance criterion will be reported in each experimental chapter. Note that analyses
where participants performing below chance were not removed led to similar results
and did not change the conclusions. Further, order effects of whether inclusion or
exclusion was presented first will be analysed.
Second, an ANOVA will be performed on hits and false alarms as a function
of condition (inclusion vs. exclusion) and age group (5-, 7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults).
This will show how acceptance rates changed across age and condition, whether
participants were able to understand and follow the instructions and provide infor-
mation about changes in base rates to new items. Base rates to new items will be
reported for completeness, in line with traditional PDP research. Potential differ-
ences in base rates to new items between inclusion and exclusion or age groups will
be controlled for by applying the DPSD model. In sum, this section will outline
whether the assumptions underlying the PDP are met.
Third, we will present an analysis of parameter estimates where we test for
the absence of recollection and familiarity as well as for age related increases in these
processes. If recollection does not differ from zero, then this equals to an absence of
recollection (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). Note that in the DPSD model recollection
is restricted to range from 0 to 1. Thus, unless most recollection values equal zero,
recollection will always significantly differ from zero, thus this does not provide a
fair test of whether recollection is present or absent. To establish a fair comparison
criterion, we ran simulations to determine a critical baseline value that would not
yield a significant difference from zero. This critical baseline value is .11 which is
the upper limit of the confidence interval given the mean of zero (see Appendix for
R code). If recollection differs significantly from the critical baseline value of .11,
then recollection is present, otherwise recollection is absent.
Additionally, mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age
group and item type (targets, non-targets and new items) for inclusion and exclusion
conditions as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection will be
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presented in a table. Bonferroni post-hoc and confidence interval adjustments will
be used throughout the whole dissertation.
1.7 Dissertation Structure
In the first chapter we have outlined why investigating the development of recogni-
tion memory is of importance. There is a debate of whether a single- or dual-process
theory is more appropriate to describe recognition memory. Due to methodological
difficulties only few studies used process pure measures of recollection and familiarity
thus far (e.g., Anooshian, 1999). Chapter 2 establishes that the Process Dissocia-
tion Paradigm (Jacoby, 1991) can be used from the age of 5 onwards to measure
recollection and familiarity. Systematic experimental manipulations result in a dis-
sociation of recollection and familiarity which is interpreted within the dual-process
framework of recognition memory. Specifically, we demonstrate in Chapter 2 that
limiting response time reduces recollection whereas familiarity was unaffected across
all age groups. In Chapter 3 repeated item presentation differentially boosts rec-
ollection and familiarity differently across age. These experimental dissociations
show that a dual-process theory is favourable over a single-process theory. Chapter
4 presents an application of the PDP to investigate the underlying processes of a
memory phenomenon in developmental research, the developmental shift from per-
ceptual to semantic processing across childhood. Chapter 5 presents a meta-analysis
of the development of recollection and familiarity as well as a discussion of previous
chapters in light of the presented literature.
Chapter 2
Effects of limited response time
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 provides an extensive overview of methods used to measure recollection
and familiarity in children. To summarize, thus far the remember-know procedure
(Billingsley et al., 2002), the ROC method (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008), the conjoint
recognition paradigm (Brainerd et al., 2004) and the process dissociation paradigm
(Anooshian, 1999) have been used to investigate the development of recognition
memory in children. As outlined in Chapter 1 the PDP seems to be most suitable
to be used in young children because it does not require subjective reports about
memory states and thus, allows examination of recollection and familiarity across a
wide age range independently of the accuracy of metacognitive reports.
This is of importance because up to date no study examined the whole
development of recognition memory starting from age 5, including intermediate age
groups, up to adulthood. Instead recognition memory has only been examined in
children older than age 9 (Billingsley et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2010), 5-year-olds
vs. adults (Anooshian, 1999) or child age groups without an adults comparison group
comparing them to adults (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Thus, no firm conclusions
about developmental trends between the ages of 5 and adulthood can be drawn yet.
It is of particular interest to examine recognition memory development in children
after the age of 4, once they have acquired an understanding of their own and others’
mental states (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; H. Wimmer & Perner, 1983), during their
important “5- to 7-year” developmental memory shift (Sameroff & Haith, 1996) and
“post-metamemory” (8 years) (Ghetti, 2003) compared to adults. Therefore, further
research in intermediate age groups is crucial in assessing developmental trajectories.
Thus, throughout this dissertation recognition memory was examined in 5-, 7- 11-
year-olds and adults.
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A further advantage of the PDP is that it allows examining the source of
recollection. Previous developmental research (Anooshian, 1999) examined familiar-
ity and recollection in a list-based design where recollection was measured as the
ability to discriminate between a first and second studied list. This design does not
allow examination of which information has been used for recollection, that is, the
criterion-based details of the items themselves. Therefore, in the current study the
PDP (Jacoby, 1991) was adapted to measure processes underlying recognition mem-
ory in an item-based design. This allows examining directly whether participants
can recollect a characteristic of a specific item such as number of presented items
(previously used in adults by Wais & Gazzaley, 2011). Thus, in this chapter we will
introduce two different experimental designs that can be used to examine recogni-
tion of different types of criterion-based item-details, that is, number of objects and
spatial information such as above or below.
2.1.1 Dissociating recollection from familiarity
Once a paradigm to examine recognition memory is established and can be used in
children, it is of specific interest whether there is developmental evidence in line with
dual-process theory of recognition memory. To do so, we will focus on developmental
trajectories of recollection and familiarity. Further we want to systematically apply
manipulations, such as limited response time during recognition, to investigate what
factors affect the development of these processes. This might allow addressing the
questions of whether these processes are distinct during childhood.
There are a number of developmental findings to date that indicate that
familiarity and recollection may be two independent processes. Specifically, whilst
both recollection and familiarity were found to increase during early childhood, fa-
miliarity seems to stabilize earlier than recollection which is thought to develop until
adulthood (Anooshian, 1999; Brainerd et al., 2004; Friedman et al., 2010; Ghetti
& Angelini, 2008). Evidence of different developmental trajectories for recollection
and familiarity is in line with a dual process assumption. Now it is of particular
interest which conditions affect the developmental trajectories of these processes.
To specifically test what factors affect developmental trajectories of recol-
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lection and familiarity, manipulations which are known to lead to a dissociation of
recognition memory (i.e., manipulations which have an influence on one process but
not on the other Jacoby, 1998; for an overview see Yonelinas, 2002) in adults were
applied. In adults it has been shown that limiting response time during recognition
leads to a reduction of recollection without affecting familiarity (Benjamin & Craik,
2001). This dissociation indicates that familiarity is a faster process than recollection
(Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994) and thus favours a dual-process model, indicating that
familiarity and recollection are independent processes (Yonelinas, 2002). To exam-
ine whether familiarity and recollection are distinct processes underlying recognition
memory from an early age onwards, response time was limited during recognition
using an age-appropriate deadline procedure (Experiment 2 and 4). The extent to
which the deadline procedure provides a selective impairment of recollection rather
than familiarity provides a strong test of the developmental estimates of recollection
and familiarity. One possible outcome of Experiments 1 and 3 is that above-chance
recollection is observed in all groups. This could reflect genuine recollection in all
age groups, or a failure of the underlying assumptions (in one or more groups). If
the latter is the case, then the deadline procedure should not produce a clear dis-
sociative effect between the estimates of recollection and familiarity (Experiment 2
and 4). Conversely, if the deadline influences the estimate of recollection rather than
familiarity in all age groups, then this provides additional support for the validity
of the underlying assumptions of dual-process theory.
The first set of studies had two main aims. The first aim was to establish
two basic paradigms which are suitable to examine the nature of recollection and
familiarity across a wide age range from 5-, 7-, 11-years to adults (Experiment 1,
Experiment 3). Our priority was to ensure that young children are able to under-
stand and follow instructions given throughout the task. These two basic paradigms
will allow us to investigate what characteristics of a specific item can be used for
criterion based recollection. In Experiments 1 and 2 number of presented items, in
Experiment 3 and 4 location of presented items was used as the basis for criterion
based recollection. These two paradigms will allows us to investigate how different
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factors such as limiting response time during recognition affect recognition memory.
The second aim was to test the dual-process model of recognition by manipulating
response time during recognition. To do so we compared parameter estimates ob-
tained under self-paced response time during recognition (Experiment 1 and 3) with
those under limited response time (Experiment 2 and 4). If familiarity and recol-
lection are independent processes from age 5 onwards, then recollection is expected
to decrease more than familiarity as a function of the response time limit across all
age groups. However, if familiarity and recollection can better be explained by a
single-process model, then the magnitude of limiting response time is expected to be
comparable for recollection and familiarity. To our knowledge no research to date
has used the PDP to investigate recollection and familiarity across childhood into
adulthood and tested its dual-process assumption developmentally.
2.2 Experiment 1
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to establish a method to investigate recognition
memory from the age of 5 onwards. We used an item-based design. Here participants
had to encode a series of pictures with either one or two objects presented (e.g., one
crocodile, two cakes). Two recognition phases followed. In the inclusion phase
earlier presented items had to be accepted and new items had to be rejected. In
the exclusion phase only, for example, single object items had to be accepted, pairs
of object-items and new items had to be excluded. Thus, the number of presented
objects was used as the basis for criterion based recollection.
2.2.1 Method
Participants. A total of 107 children and adults (62.6 % female) took part;
26 5-year-olds (M = 5.1 years, SD = 3 months), 25 7-year-olds (M = 7 years, SD =
4 months), 26 11-year-olds (M = 11 years, SD = 5 months) and 30 adults (M = 20.5
years, SD = 5 years). In this and all subsequent experiments children were recruited
from a primary school in Plymouth with a predominantly Caucasian middle class
intake. All children were tested following parental consent and their own assent on
the day of testing; they received a small present. Adult participants were psychology
students from Plymouth University recruited via the university’s online system; they
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received course credit for their participation.
Materials and Procedure. Participants using on a laptop presented with
one study phase followed by a recognition phase consisting of inclusion and exclusion
conditions.
In total 130 coloured drawings from Rossion and Pourtois (2004) were
used, originally based on Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) line drawings (e.g.,
animals, food, furniture, etc…). Ten of these items were used during practice (eight
presented as pictures during the study practice phase, and an additional two during
the recognition practice phase), 80 items were used for study (presented as pictures)
and recognition (presented auditorily and as written words) (40 target, 40 non-target
items). Additional 40 non-studied items served as distractors during recognition
(presented auditorily and as written words) (see Figure 2.1).
Each participant received a practice trial, four study blocks (20 items each)
and two recognition blocks (60 items each). Block order was counterbalanced be-
tween participants and items appeared in random order within each block. The
blocks in study and recognition as well as item type were matched for word frequen-
cies (Stuart, Dixon, Masterson, & Gray, 2003), familiarity and name agreement
norms (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) (see Table 2.1).
Study phase. The study phase started with four practice trials. First,
participants judged whether the item (e.g., cake) is typically found indoors or out-
doors and visual feedback on accuracy was given (happy or sad smiley). If partici-
pants failed the first four practice trials (2 cakes, 1 car, 2 bananas and 1 crocodile),
another set of four practice trials was presented. None of the participants failed the
practice test more than two times.
After completion of practice, the study phase started and participants were
instructed to remember as many items as possible. Figure 2.1 illustrates the method.
Participants were shown a series of pictures, each presented for three seconds. Half
of the items displayed one object, the other half two copies of the same object. After
each item a blank screen appeared until participants judged whether the object is
more typically found indoors (half of items per block) or outdoors (the other half
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Table 2.1
Mean (SD) word norms of study block 1 – 4, recognition block 1 and 2 and item type.
Study N items
Word frequency
(Stuart et al., 2003)
Familiarity
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980)
Name agreement %
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980)
Block A 20 315.21(468.01) 3.13 (.84) 89.15 (9.81)
Block B 20 203.74 (251.54) 3.35 (.90) 88.60 (10.25)
Block C 20 224.11 (360.32) 3.16 (.79) 84.10 (13.23)
Block D 20 196.06 (272.58) 3.05 (.93) 90.45 (7.97)
Effect
F(3, 70) = .464,
p = .708, ηp2 = .02
F(3, 76) = .42,
p = .737, ηp2 = .02
F(3, 76) = 1.39,
p =.253, ηp2 = .05
Recognition
Block A 60 150.46 (285.15) 3.08 (.83) 88.48 (10.35)
Block B 60 216.51 (308.56) 3.23 (.85) 88.46 (10.73)
Effect
F(1, 107) = 1.46,
p = .230, ηp2 = .01
F(1, 118) = .94,
p = .333, ηp2 = .01
F(1, 118) = .01,
p = .931, ηp2 = .01
Item type A 40 86.27 (122.55) 3.12 (.82) 89.55(10.42)
Item type B 40 220.80 (358.08) 3.37 (.85) 85.85 (11.81)
Item type C 40 206.70 (292.53) 2.97 (.82) 90.30 (8.74)
Effect
F(2, 106) = 2.65,
p = .075, ηp2 = .05
F(2, 117) = 2.39,
p = .102, ηp2 = .04
F(1, 117) = 2.10,
p = .127, ηp2 = .04
Note. Item type A, B, C refers to target, non-target, new-items which were counterbalanced between participants.
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per block). After a block of 20 items a star appeared as a filler picture. Once all
four study blocks were presented a final star appeared and the recognition phase
followed immediately.
Figure 2.1. Method outline for Experiment 1 and 2.
Recognition phase. Recognition consisted of an inclusion and an exclu-
sion phase. Each phase was preceded by a practice phase. Whether inclusion or
exclusion came first was counterbalanced across participants.
During practice for inclusion participants were again shown the four items
from the study practice phase and told, “Remember, in the beginning we saw those
objects. We saw a cake, a car, a banana and a crocodile.” Then during recognition
earlier one object items (e.g. “cake”), two object items (e.g. “car”) and new items
(e.g. “glass”) were presented as words both auditorily and visually. Participants were
instructed to respond “yes” to items that had been presented before and respond
no to new items. After each response visual feedback on accuracy was given (happy
or sad smiley) and for children an explanation of why the answer was correct or
incorrect was provided. The practice procedure was repeated until participants
responded correctly to each of the 4 items (maximum number of repetition was
three times) and participants were able to explain the instructions.
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The inclusion test condition followed the inclusion practice procedure. In-
structions were the same as for practice but no feedback was provided. Inclusion
consisted of 60 items in total, presented in random order, 20 target words (presented
during study), 20 non-target words (presented during study), and 20 new words (not
previously presented). Here, a correct response was “yes” to both targets and non-
targets and “no” to new items.
In the practice phase for exclusion the same items as in inclusion practice
were used. While looking at the pictures from the practice study phase participants’
attention was drawn to the number of presented objects and they were told, “Re-
member, in the beginning we saw either one or two objects. We saw two cakes, one
crocodile, one car and two bananas.” Then recognition started and the first item
was presented auditorily and visually as written word (e.g., “banana”). They were
told, “Say “yes” if you saw 1 object of it earlier. Say “no” if you saw 2 objects of it
earlier. And say “no” if you did not see the object earlier.” After the participants’
response visual feedback on accuracy was provided. All children were able to com-
plete 4 correct practice trials after a maximum of 3 repetitions. Whether 1 object
items or 2 objects items were the target group was counterbalanced between partic-
ipants. Then the exclusion test condition followed, containing 60 items (20 targets,
20 non-targets, 20 new items). Here, participants’ correct response was “yes” to
targets, “no” to both non-targets and new items.
After completing exclusion, participants were instructed to repeat the ex-
clusion rules. Ten participants were unable to repeat the instructions and were
therefore excluded (five 5-year-olds, three 7-year-olds and 2 adults).
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group and item type for
inclusion and exclusion conditions as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and
recollection are shown in Table 2.2.
Preliminary analysis. If participants had given a correct response to 69 or
more out of the 120 recognition trials, their performance differed significantly from
chance (p = .041). We excluded participants who reached an overall accuracy below
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Table 2.2
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion con-
ditions as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection across age
groups in Experiment 1.
5-year-olds
n = 21
7-year-olds
n = 22
11-year-olds
n = 26
Adults
n = 28
Exclusion
New items 0.13 (.13) 0.07 (.08) 0.05 (.07) 0.10 (.15)
Non-targets 0.33 (.22) 0.32 (.25) 0.26 (.23) 0.28 (.22)
Targets 0.50 (.20) 0.56 (.26) 0.66 (.22) 0.80 (.15)
Inclusion
New items 0.11 (.14) 0.10 (.09) 0.08 (.08) 0.09 (.10)
Non-targets 0.57 (.14) 0.79 (.13) 0.87 (.10) 0.89 (.06)
Targets 0.57 (.19) 0.76 (.11) 0.86 (.13) 0.89 (.06)
Parameter estimates
Recollection 0.28 (.25) 0.47 (.30) 0.62 (.25) 0.61 (.23)
Familiarity 0.39 (.18) 0.52 (.28) 0.56 (.32) 0.65 (.19)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Note that in inclusion yes-responses
to targets (e.g., one object items) and non-targets (e.g., two object items) are
classified as correct responses. In contrast, in exclusion yes-responses to targets (e.g.,
one object items) are correct whilst yes-responses to non-targets (e.g., two object items)
and new items are incorrect responses.
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.575 from the subsequent analysis in all experiments. All participants responded
above chance in the current experiment, thus no participants were removed.
For recollection there were no order effects of whether exclusion or inclusion
was presented first, F(1, 89) = 1.35, p = .248, ηp2 = .01. The same was the case
for familiarity, F(1, 89) = .23, p = .636, ηp2 = .01, and this was the case across all
age groups as there was no significant interaction (Recollection: F(3, 89) = .24, p =
.871, ηp2 = .01, Familiarity: F(3, 89) = .35, p = .791, ηp2 = .01). Therefore, order
was not included as an analysis factor.
Hits and False alarms. First, to check whether the assumptions underlying
the PDP were met, acceptance rates were entered into a 3 (item type: news vs. non-
targets vs. targets) x 2 (test condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-,
7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA with item type and test condition as
within-subjects variable and age group as between subjects variable.
There was a main effect of age, F(3, 93) = 11.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .27,
where 5-year-olds gave fewer yes-responses than 11-year-olds and adults (ps < .001)
and 7-year-olds also differed from adults (p = .013). There was also a main effect
of test condition, F(1, 93) = 200, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, where more yes-responses
were given in inclusion than in exclusion. There was a main effect of item type, F(2,
93) = 979.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .91 where more yes-responses were given in response
to targets than to non-targets and in turn to new items (ps < .001). All these
effects interacted. First, all age groups gave more yes-responses in inclusion than in
exclusion (ps < .003) but yes-responses only increased with age in inclusion, not in
exclusion, as shown by the age condition interaction, F(3, 93) = 6.45, p = .001, ηp2
= .17. Second, as shown by the item type x age group interaction, F(6, 93) = 14.24,
p < .001, ηp2 = .32, whereas responses to new items did not differ between the age
groups (ps > .226), responses to targets and non-targets increased with age. Third,
whereas in exclusion more yes-responses were given to targets than to non-targets
than in turn to new items (ps < .001), in inclusion only new items differed from
both, targets and non-targets (p < .001) as shown by the condition by the item type
interaction, F(6, 93) = 6.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Further, whilst yes-responses to
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new items did not differ between inclusion and exclusion, more yes-responses were
given to both targets and non-targets in inclusion than in exclusion. Additionally,
age group, test condition and item type interacted, F(6, 93) = 6.62, p < .001, ηp2 =
.18. Briefly, this was driven by increases of yes-responses to non-targets in inclusion
(hit) but not in exclusion with age (false alarm, all ps = 1).
Importantly, all age groups gave more yes-responses to both targets and
non-targets than to new items in inclusion (all ps < .001) and to targets than to
non-targets and in turn to new items in exclusion (all ps < .009). This latter finding
suggests that all age groups, even the 5-year-olds were able to distinguish targets
from new items, indicating that they understood the instructions. Additionally, all
age groups gave equal amounts of yes-responses to new items in inclusion and ex-
clusion and yes-responses to new items did not differ as a function of age. This
suggests that participants did not change response criterion from liberal to conser-
vative across inclusion and exclusion and age groups. Given that base rates did not
differ, the original PDP could have been used to get parameter estimates. However,
as outlined in the introduction, for means of consistency, the DPSD was used for
parameter estimation throughout this whole dissertation.
Familiarity and Recollection. To examine how recollection and familiarity
develop across age, two one-way ANOVAs were conducted with recollection and
familiarity estimates as dependent variables and age group (age group: 5- vs. 7-
vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) as the independent variable.
Recollection increased with age, F(3, 93) = 9.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, where
5-year-olds used less recollection than both 11-year-olds (p < .001) and adults (p
< .001), the other age groups did not differ. To test whether recollection was used
in all age groups, recollection values were compared to the critical criterion of .11
(see Chapter 1). One-sample t-tests revealed that recollection in all age groups
was above the critical value indicating that participants across all age groups used
recollection to make their memory judgements (5-year-olds, t(20) = 3.03, p = .007;
7-year-olds, t(21) = 5.72, p < .001; 11-year-olds, t(25) = 10.39, p < .001 and adults,
t(27) = 11.64, p < .001). Thus, even 5-year-olds used recollection for their memory
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judgements.
Familiarity increased also with age, F(3, 93) = 4.42, p = .006, ηp2 = .13,
where 5-year-olds used less familiarity than adults (p = .003). The remaining age
groups did not differ. Familiarity estimates in all age groups were above the critical
value of .11 (5-year-olds, t(20) = 7.37, p < .001; 7-year-olds, t(21) = 6.79, p < .001;
11-year-olds, t(25) = 7.24, p < .001 and adults, t(27) = 15.29, p < .001), again
showing familiarity based remembering across all age groups.
Importantly, all age groups, even 5-year-olds used both familiarity and
recollection to recognize items as indicated by their above zero parameter estimates.
Specifically, this shows that already 5-year-olds can recollect number of items. This
is in line with previous work by Brainerd et al. (2004). Second, both recollection
and familiarity are available at age 5. However, recollection increases throughout
childhood, especially between 5 and 11-years of age and does not increase from
age 11 onwards. This is in line with findings by Ghetti and Angelini (2008) who
also found developmental increases up to the age of 11. Familiarity differed only
between 5-year-olds and adults, but does not differ across childhood after the age
of 5. This latter finding contrasts with Anooshian’s study (1999) where familiarity
did not differ between 5-year-olds and adults. One possible explanation could be
that a list based design used in Anooshian’s study is easier and therefore, does not
sufficiently discriminate familiarity between children and adults. The current item-
based design allowed directly examining whether the criterion for recollection (one
versus two objects) is remembered and at what age number can be used as the basis
for criterion based recollection. This provides insight into the nature of criterion
based recollection independent of memory for list membership.
The differences in age trends in familiarity and recollection values may indi-
cate that familiarity and recollection are independent processes and thus, supports
dual-process theory previously proposed in adult research (e.g. Yonelinas, 2002).
Thus, in Experiment 2, to further test the dual-process model of recognition mem-
ory in childhood, a well-established manipulation from the adult literature, limiting
response time during recognition, was used to investigate developmental trajectories
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of familiarity and recollection.
2.3 Experiment 2
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to test the dual-process model of recognition.
In the following experiment manipulations (i.e., limiting response time during recog-
nition) previously used in research with adults were implemented to further test
process independence in childhood. Specifically, a well-established finding in the
adult literature is that familiarity is a faster process which occurs earlier (between
900 and 1100 ms after the object has been presented) than recollection (between
1300 and 1500 ms) (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994). However, in the developmental
literature there is no behavioural evidence for effects of limiting response time dur-
ing retrieval. Developmental ERP evidence shows differing activation patterns for
familiarity and recollection in both 8- and 10-year-ods (Czernochowski et al., 2005;
Friedman et al., 2010; Mecklinger et al., 2011). These findings provide preliminary
support for a dual-process model of recognition memory. However, the absence of
behavioural data and divergence of behavioural data and cortical activation patterns
make interpretation difficult.
Thus, in the second experiment we limited response time to examine
whether this reduces the use of recollection as a basis for responding (see Yoneli-
nas & Jacoby, 1994). To establish adequate response limits for the according age
groups, response deadlines were based on the mean response times of inclusion and
exclusion per age group from Experiment 1 (mean− 1standarddeviation).
If familiarity is a faster acting process than recollection, recollection is
expected to be reduced to a lager extent than familiarity when a deadline is imposed.
Crucially, the extent to which this pattern is seen across age groups provides a strong
test of the claim that the pattern seen in Experiment 1 reflects the availability of
recollection across all age groups. If, for whatever reason, the parameter estimates
do not reflect separable memory outcomes in the younger age groups then the clear
prediction is that these groups would show a reduction in both recollection and
familiarity with faster responding, rather than the selective effect that is expected
in adults.
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2.3.1 Method
Participants. A total of 100 children and adults (68 % female) participated;
23 5-year-olds (M = 5.3 years, SD = 3 months), 24 7-year-olds (M = 7.3 years, SD
= 3 months), 21 11-years-olds (M = 11.3 years, SD = 3 months) and 32 adults (M
= 21 years, SD = 5 years).
Materials and Procedure. These were identical to Experiment 1 with the
exception that during recognition participants were required to make a decision
within a limited time period. Response time deadlines were set at one SD below
mean response times per age group in Experiment 1, resulting in deadlines of 3397
ms for 5-year-olds, 2954 ms for 7-year-olds, 2258 ms for 11-year-olds and 1238 ms for
adults. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
If participants did not respond within the deadline, an alarm tone sounded and the
message “too slow” appeared in red letters on the screen and child participants were
auditorily reminded to respond as quickly as possible for the next trials. Twelve
participants were excluded from the analysis (one 5-year-old, one 11-year-old and ten
adults) because they were unable to repeat the instructions in the end of exclusion.
Only responses within the response deadline were analyzed.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group and item type for
inclusion and exclusion condition as well as parameter estimates are shown in Table
2.3.
Preliminary analysis. Ten 5-year-olds and two 7-year-olds were removed
because they performed below chance indicating that they did not follow the instruc-
tions or engage with the task.
To verify that test order of whether inclusion or exclusion was presented
first did not affect performance, recollection and familiarity were entered into two
one-way ANOVAs with age group (5-, 7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) and test order
as between subject variables. As in experiment 1, for recollection there were no
order effects of whether exclusion or inclusion was presented first, F(1, 68) = 2.33,
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Table 2.3
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion in-
structions as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection across age
groups in Experiment 2.
5-year-olds
(n = 12)
7-year-olds
(n = 22)
11-year-olds
(n = 20)
adults
(n = 22)
Exclusion
New item 0.10 (.11) 0.09 (.11) 0.14 (.14) 0.12 (.10)
Non-target 0.30 (.24) 0.30 (.26) 0.39 (.26) 0.40 (.23)
Target 0.36 (.24) 0.45 (.26) 0.54 (.22) 0.58 (.18)
Inclusion
New item 0.24 (.29) 0.10 (.12) 0.12 (.14) 0.16 (.12)
Non-target 0.55 (.19) 0.70 (.17) 0.75 (.09) 0.79 (.12)
Target 0.63 (.23) 0.65 (.17) 0.76 (.12) 0.81 (.13)
Parameter estimates
Recollection 0.19 (.18) 0.32(.25) 0.37 (.27) 0.37 (.24)
Familiarity 0.39 (.21) 0.44 (.29) 0.55 (.24) 0.63 (.25)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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p = .132, ηp2 = .03. The same was true for familiarity, F(1, 68) = .28, p = .589,
ηp2 = .01, and this was the case across all age groups as there was no interaction
(Recollection: F(3, 68) = .87, p = .462, ηp2 = .03, Familiarity: F(3, 68) = 1.01, p
= .393, ηp2 = .04). Therefore, order was not included as an analysis factor.
Hits and False alarms. First, to check whether the assumptions underlying
the PDP were met, acceptance rates were entered into a 3 (item type: news vs. non-
targets vs. targets) x 2 (test condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-,
7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA with item type and test condition as
within-subjects variable and age group as between subjects variable.
There was a main effect of age, F(3, 72) = 4.64, p = .005, ηp2 = .16,
where 5- (p = .024) and 7-year-olds (p = .024) gave fewer yes-responses than adults.
There was also a main effect test condition, F(1, 72) = 99.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .58,
where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion. There was a
main effect of item type, F(2, 72) = 392.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .85 where more yes-
responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn to new
items (ps < .001). There was an item type x age group interaction, F(6, 72) = 4.13,
p = .001, ηp2 = .15, where responses to new items did not differ between the age
groups (ps > .405), whereas responses to targets and non-targets increased with age.
The condition by the item type interaction, F(2, 72) = 48.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .40
revealed that whereas in exclusion more yes-responses were given to targets than
to non-targets than in turn to new items (ps < .001), in inclusion only new items
differed from both targets and non-targets (p < .001). Further, more yes-responses
were given to new items, targets and non-targets in inclusion than in exclusion. Age
group, test condition and item type interacted, F(6, 72) = 2.04, p = .064, ηp2 = .09.
This interaction revealed that more yes-responses were given to targets than to new
items and this was the case in inclusion and exclusion (all ps < .001). Importantly,
due to limited response time 5-year-olds were unable to discriminate between targets
and non-targets (p > .999) whereas older age groups were able to do so (all ps <
.013).
In sum, hits increased with age whereas false alarms did not differ between
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age groups. Second, even under limited response time participants across all age
groups, including 5-year-olds were able to discriminate between seen and unseen
items, showing that they were able to follow the instructions. However, 5-year-
olds were unable to access the to-be recollected detail (i.e., number of items) to
discriminate between seen items. In contrast, all older age groups were able to
access the criterion based detail for recollection under limited retrieval time. Third,
base rates to new items differed between inclusion and exclusion suggesting that
the response criterion changed from liberal to conservative across inclusion and
exclusion.
Recollection and Familiarity. Recollection and familiarity parameters
were used as dependent variables in two one-way ANOVAs to examine age effects
(5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults).
Recollection did not differ between age groups, F(3, 72) = 1.62, p = .191,
ηp2 = .06. One-sample t-tests revealed that recollection was absent in 5-year-olds,
t(11) = 1.43, p = .181, but was above the critical baseline value of .11 in older age
groups: 7-year-olds, t(21) = 3.98, p < .001; 11-year-olds, t(19) = 6.05, p < .001 and
adults t(21) = 4.90, p < .001).
There was a main effect of age on familiarity, F(3, 72) = 3.32, p = .025,
ηp2 = .12, which was mainly caused by 5-year-olds who used less familiarity than
adults (p = .056), the other age groups did not differ. Familiarity estimates were
above the critical baseline value in all age groups (5-year-olds, t(11) = 4.49, p <
.001; 7-year-olds, t(21) = 5.31, p < .001; 11-year-olds, t(19) = 7.92, p < .001 and
adults, t(21) = 9.58, p < .001).
In sum, under limited response time recollection did not increase with age,
whereas familiarity increased with age. Interestingly, when the response time was
self-paced (Experiment 1) older children and adults are able to recollect more de-
tails than younger children. In contrast, under limited response time recollection
does not differ between age groups. However, limiting response time eliminated
recollection in 5-year-olds. This suggests that quickly responding hinders recollec-
tion. Familiarity improved even under limited response time between children and
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adults. Thus, familiarity increased regardless of whether recognition was limited
or self-paced. This indicates that under limited response time 5-year-olds rely ex-
clusively on familiarity to make their memory judgements, whereas older children
also made use of recollection. This implies in line with dual-process theory that
recollection is more effortful and less robust than familiarity which was affected less
by the response time than recollection and supports the notion that familiarity is a
faster acting process than recollection (Yonelinas, 2002).
Timed out responses. Participants missed their response deadlines very
rarely; 5-year-olds timed out on 7% of trials, 7-year-olds on 4%, 11-year-olds on 4%
and adults on 3%. A one-way ANOVA revealed that timed out responses differed
as a function of age, F(3, 72) = 4.74, p = .004, ηp2 = .17, where 5-year-olds missed
their responses deadlines more often than 7-year-olds (p = .014) and adults (p =
.003). There were no other differences in missing responses between the other age
groups. To explore whether these differences in response time limit played a role
in the pattern of memory performance, we re-analysed the data using a sample of
5-year-olds that did not differ from the other age groups in timed out responses.
Removing the poorest performing two children, resulted in a sample of 10 5-year
olds with a timed-out rate of 5.42%, which did not differ from the rate observed in
the other samples, F(3, 70) = 1.83, p = .150, ηp2 = .07. This made no difference to
the pattern of data reported above: the recollection parameter estimate was M =
.21, for matched sample; M = .19, for whole sample, and the familiarity parameter
was M = .40, for matched sample, M = .39, for whole sample, and all main effects
and interaction terms remained unchanged. Thus a potentially more stringent time
limit did not change the conclusion.
2.4 Comparison between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
Next, to specifically test for the effects of limiting response time, we compared
Experiment 1 with Experiment 2. This is a crucial test for dual-process theory of
recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2002) because recollection is assumed to be a slower
process than familiarity.
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2.4.1 Recollection and Familiarity
To examine how recollection and familiarity were affected by limited response time
two ANOVAs were conducted with recollection and familiarity estimates as depen-
dent variable and response time (self-paced vs. limited response time) and age group
(age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) as between participant factors.
Recollection was lower under limited (M = .31) than under self-paced
response time (M = .50), F(1, 165) = 21.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. This was the case
for all age groups as shown by the non-significant age x experiment interaction, F(3,
165) = .93, p = .429, ηp2 = .02. Recollection increased with age, F(3, 165) = 8.27,
p < .001, ηp2 = .13, where 5-year-olds obtained lower recollection values than all
older age groups (ps < .035) who did not differ (ps > .474).
Familiarity did not differ between self-paced (M = .53) and limited (M =
.50) response time, F(1, 165) = .23, p = .876, ηp2 = .01 and this was the case for
all age groups as indicated by the non-significant age x experiment interaction, F(3,
165) = .23, p = .876, ηp2 = .01. Familiarity increased with age, F(3, 165) = 7.07, p
< .001, ηp2 = .11, where familiarity was lower in both 5- (p < .001) and 7-year-olds
(p = .014) than in than adults and lower in 5-year-olds than in 11-year-olds (p =
.039) (see Figure 2.2).
Overall, limiting response time selectively reduced recollection rather than
familiarity, indicating that familiarity is available earlier than recollection. Impor-
tantly, these effects were found across all age groups. These findings suggest that
familiarity and recollection may be independent processes already during childhood,
providing evidence for a dual-process theories of memory (Jacoby, 1998), where fa-
miliarity is a faster process than recollection (Toth, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). These
findings provide first behavioural evidence to support dual-process theory during
recognition from age 5 onwards.
2.5 Experiment 3
Experiment 1 showed that even 5-year-olds are able to recollect items on the basis of
number of presented items. Experiment 2 investigated whether there is evidence in
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Figure 2.2. Parameter estimates as a function of response time and age group. The
top panel shows recollection estimates, the bottom panel familiarity estimates.
2.5. EXPERIMENT 3 63
line with the idea that there are two processes underlying recognition in childhood.
However, different attributes of items can contribute to criterion based recollection.
Specifically, contextual information, such as temporal order of items in a wordlist,
spatial location on the screen or visual appearance such as size of the item can be
recollected (Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996).
Experiment 3 had three aims. First, we wanted to further investigate the
nature of recollection and familiarity by investigating whether 5-year-olds can also
make use of other contextual information than number of presented items, specif-
ically spatial location, to recollect items. Using spatial location of items as the
criterion for recollection is of particular interest because the ability to remember lo-
cation of objects in relation to surrounding space was found to increase throughout
childhood up to the age of 11 (Hund & Plumert, 2002; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, &
Sandberg, 1994; Spencer & Hund, 2003). In these studies the locations of objects in
a small model house had to be learned. In a test phase children had to replace the
objects in their initial location (Spencer & Hund, 2003). These studies focused on
the development of location memory. However, as all objects in the test phase were
presented earlier it could not be examined whether children remembered seeing spe-
cific items. Thus, it is still an unanswered question how recollection and familiarity
contribute to remembering the location of objects.
The second aim was to find evidence converging with the previous two
experiments. We expected that recollection and familiarity are available from the
age of 5 onwards and that they increased at different rates across childhood. Ma-
nipulationg response time was expected to lead to a dissociation of recollection and
familiarity.
Finally, to investigate manipulations which are known to affect recognition
memory, a procedure that does not rely on number of presented items as the basis
for criterion based recollection might be of advantage in future studies. For instance,
when investigating the effects of repeated item presentation during encoding, a de-
sign that requires recollecting number of presented items might lead to confusion.
Participants might mistakenly exclude items that were only presented once, instead
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of excluding one object items. As in the first two experiments, an item- rather than
a list-based design was used to measure familiarity and recollection. Items were
presented either in the top or bottom half of the screen (e.g., “crocodile” at the top
half of the screen, “cake” at the bottom half of the screen). Thus, in experiment
3 spatial location was used as the basis for criterion based recollection instead of
number of presented item.
2.5.1 Method
Participants. A total of 100 children and adults (57% female) took part;
24 4-5-year-olds (M = 5.1 years, SD = 6 months), 23 6-7-year-olds (M = 7 years,
SD = 4 months), 25 10-year-olds (M = 10.7 years, SD = 4 months) and 28 adults
(M = 19 years, SD = 1 year).
Materials and Procedure. Figure 2.3 outlines the method of Experiments
3 and 4. The material and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with two ex-
ceptions. First, in the study phase half the objects were presented in the top half
of the screen (above the black line), the other half of the objects in the bottom half
(below the black line). In contrast to the first two experiments where number of
objects was used as the basis for criterion based recollection, in the current experi-
ment items had to be excluded on the basis of location of objects. Consequently, the
second distinction emerged in the instructions of exclusion where participants were
told, “Say yes if the object was presented in the top half of the screen (above the
line). Say”no” if the object was presented in the bottom half of the screen (below
the line). Say “no” if the object was not presented before.”
Two adult participants were unable to repeat the instructions and were
therefore removed.
2.5.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group and item type for
inclusion and exclusion condition as well as parameter estimates are shown in Table
2.4.
Preliminary analysis. All participants performed above chance.
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Table 2.4
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion condi-
tion as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection across age groups
in Experiment 3.
5-year-olds
(n = 24)
7-year-olds
(n = 23)
10-year-olds
(n = 25)
adults
(n = 26)
Exclusion
New item 0.11 (.12) 0.09 (.11) 0.05 (.08) 0.14 (.20)
Non-target 0.34 (.16) 0.40 (.16) 0.44 (.17) 0.32 (.13)
Target 0.46 (.15) 0.52 (.19) 0.63 (.16) 0.60 (.15)
Inclusion
New item 0.15 (.12) 0.11 (.10) 0.08 (.09) 0.08 (.09)
Non-target 0.58 (.16) 0.74 (.11) 0.82 (.11) 0.83 (.14)
Target 0.60 (.16) 0.70 (.13) 0.84 (.10) 0.83 (.14)
Parameter estimates
Recollection 0.24 (.18) 0.34 (.16) 0.38 (.19) 0.53 (.24)
Familiarity 0.46 (.17) 0.60 (.15) 0.71 (.18) 0.70 (.18)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Figure 2.3. Method outline for Experiment 3 and 4.
To check for order effects of completing inclusion or exclusion first, recol-
lection and familiarity were entered into two two-way ANOVAs with age group (5-,
7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) and test order (inclusion vs. exclusion presented first) as
between subject variable. In contrast to the two previous experiments, recollection
was higher when inclusion was presented first (M = .43) than when exclusion was
presented first (M = .32), F(1, 90) = 7.81, p = .006, ηp2 = .08, and this was the
case across all age groups as there was no significant interaction, F(3, 90) = .57, p
= .635, ηp2 = .02. However, for familiarity there were no order effects of whether
exclusion or inclusion was presented first, F(1, 90) = .05, p = .824, ηp2 = .01, and
this was the case across all age groups as there was no significant interaction, F(3,
90) = 1.22, p = .307, ηp2 = .04. As overall accuracy (F(1, 90) = .51, p = .478, ηp2
= .01) as well as familiarity were not influenced by order of condition, order was not
included as an analysis factor.
Hits and False alarms. A 3 (item type: new items vs. non-targets vs. tar-
gets) x 2 (test condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-, 7-, 11-year-olds
vs. adults) mixed ANOVAs with item type and test condition as within-subjects
variable and age group as between subjects variable revealed a main effect of age,
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F(3, 94) = 10.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, where 5-year-olds gave fewer yes-responses
than 11-year-olds and adults (ps < .001). The other ages did not differ (ps > .084).
There was also a main effect of test condition, F(1, 94) = 279.99, p < .001, ηp2
= .75, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion. There
was a main effect of item type, F(2, 94) = 892.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .91 where more
yes-responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn to
new items (ps < .001). All these effects interacted. First, all age groups gave more
yes-responses in inclusion than in exclusion (ps < .001) but yes-responses only in-
creased with age in inclusion, not in exclusion, as shown by the age by condition
interaction, F(3, 94) = 2.98, p = .036, ηp2 = .09. Second, as shown by the item
type x age group interaction, F(6, 94) = 10.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, responses to
new items did not differ between the age groups (ps > .223) whereas responses to
targets and non-targets increased with age. Third, whereas in exclusion more yes-
responses were given to targets than to non-targets than in turn to new items (ps <
.001), in inclusion only new items differed from both, targets and non-targets (p <
.001) as shown by the condition by the item type interaction, F(6, 94) = 6.62, p <
.001, ηp2 = .18. Further, whilst yes-responses to new items did not differ between
inclusion and exclusion (p = .705), more yes-responses were given to both targets
and non-targets in inclusion than in exclusion (p < .001). Additionally, age group,
test condition and item type interacted, F(6, 94) = 6.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .17.
Recollection and Familiarity. To examine how recollection and familiarity
develop across age two one-way ANOVAs were conducted with recollection and
familiarity estimates as dependent variables and age group (5- vs. 7- vs. 10-year-
olds vs. adults) as the independent variable.
Recollection increased with age, F(3, 94) = 9.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, where
5- (p < .001), 7- (p = .006), and 10-year-olds (p = .045) showed lower recollection
estimates than adults. Recollection did not differ between child age groups. One-
sample t-tests revealed that recollection was above the critical baseline in all age
groups (5-year-olds, t(23) = 3.35, p = .003; 7-year-olds, t(22) = 6.58, p < .001; 10-
year-olds, t(24) = 6.87, p < .001 and adults, t(25) = 8.94, p < .001). This suggests
68 CHAPTER 2. EFFECTS OF LIMITED RESPONSE TIME
even 5-year-olds relied on recollection for their memory judgements.
Familiarity increased with age, F3, 94) = 11.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, where
5-year-olds made fewer familiarity based memory judgements than 7- (p = .029),
10-year-olds (p < .001) and adults (p < .001) who all did not differ. Familiarity
estimates were above the critical baseline in all age groups (5-year-olds, t(23) =
9.85, p < .001; 7-year-olds, t(22) = 15.41, p < .001; 10-year-olds, t(24) = 16.44, p
< .001 and adults t(25) = 16.90, p < .001).
In sum, as in Experiment 1 recollection and familiarity are both present
from age 5 onwards. Both recollection and familiarity develop throughout child-
hood. However, the exact developmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity
differ from Experiment 1 and may be due to differences in task difficulty across
experiments. An ANOVA on overall accuracy revealed that overall accuracy in Ex-
periment 1 (M = .78) was significantly higher than in Experiment 3 (M = .74; F(1,
187) = 16.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .08) and this was the case in all age groups (F(3, 187)
= 1.68, p = .172, ηp2 = .03). This suggests that for all age groups it was easier to
recollect the number of presented items (Experiment 1) than the spatial location of
items (Experiment 3). Thus, developmental trajectories may depend on task diffi-
culty caused by the criterion that has to be recollected (i.e., location vs. number of
items).
In the current experiment, recollection for spatial location did not increase
between child age groups but was significantly higher in adults than in all child age
groups. Familiarity estimates increased with age between 5 and 7 but not thereafter
(see also Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). These different developmental trajectories for
familiarity and recollection support a dual-process framework of recognition memory.
2.6 Experiment 4
We replicated Experiment 2 to further investigate the dual-process model of recog-
nition memory from a developmental perspective. Note that limited response time
compared to self-paced response time during recognition is expected to lead to a
greater reduction of recollection whilst affecting familiarity less (Yonelinas & Ja-
coby, 1994). Based on the two previous experiments we expected a dissociation
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of recollection and familiarity after limiting response time across all age groups.
Specifically, recollection was expected to be more reduced in a limited response time
condition than familiarity and this pattern is expected across all age groups. This
finding would be in line with the idea that recollection and familiarity are separable
memory processes and show that this is already the case in early childhood.
2.6.1 Method
Participants. A total of 93 children and adults (48% female) took part; 25
4-5-year-olds (M = 5.1 years, SD = 4 months), 24 7-year-olds (M = 7.7 years, SD
= 2 months), 24 10-11-year-olds (M = 10.8 years, SD = 4 months) and 20 adults
(M = 22 years, SD = 7 years).
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to
the ones used in Experiment 3, where location of presented items was used as the
basis for criterion based recollection. Participants were required to respond within
a limited time period during recognition. Response time deadlines were set at one
SD below mean response times in inclusion and exclusion condition per age group
in Experiment 3, resulting in deadlines of 3416 ms for the 5-year-olds, 3186 ms for
the 7-year-olds, 3005 ms for the 11-year-olds and 1169 ms for the adults. Only
responses within the response deadline were included in the subsequent analysis.
Seven participants were excluded from the analysis (two 5-year-olds, one 11-year-
old and four adults) because they were unable to the repeat instructions.
2.6.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group and item type for
inclusion and exclusion condition as well as parameter estimates are shown in Table
2.5.
Preliminary analysis. Five 5-year-olds and one adult were removed be-
cause their overall accuracy was below chance indicating that they did not follow
the instructions or engage with the task (see Table 2.5).
To check for order effects, recollection and familiarity were entered into
two two-way ANOVAs with age group (5-, 7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) and test
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Table 2.5
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion condi-
tion as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection across age groups
in Experiment 4.
5-year-olds
(n = 18)
7-year-olds
(n = 24)
10-year-olds
(n = 23)
adults
(n = 15)
Exclusion
New item 0.13 (.18) 0.14 (.12) 0.07 (.10) 0.14 (.16)
Non-target 0.36 (.17) 0.40 (.17) 0.37 (.18) 0.43 (.23)
Target 0.39 (.17) 0.51 (.22) 0.61 (.15) 0.62 (.20)
Inclusion
New item 0.21 (.15) 0.19 (.18) 0.09 (.07) 0.21 (.15)
Non-target 0.57 (.16) 0.72 (.14) 0.76 (.13) 0.84 (.07)
Target 0.55 (.17) 0.73 (.16) 0.79 (.15) 0.79 (.16)
Parameter estimates
Recollection 0.16 (.16) 0.26 (.20) 0.40 (.21) 0.33 (.24)
Familiarity 0.44 (.20) 0.60 (.18) 0.60 (.18) 0.67 (.19)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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order (inclusion vs. exclusion presented first) as between subject variables. Neither
recollection, F(1, 72) = 2.19, p = .143, ηp2 = .03 nor familiarity, F(1, 72) = .07, p
= .789, ηp2 = .01 were affected by test condition order and this was the case across
all age groups as indicated by the non-significant interactions (Recollection: F(3,
72) = .36, p = .783, ηp2 = .01, Familiarity: F(3, 72) = 2.16, p = .100, ηp2 = .08).
Therefore, order was not included in the main analysis.
Hits and False alarms. First, to check whether the assumptions underlying
the PDP were met, acceptance rates were entered into a 3 (item type: news vs. non-
targets vs. targets) x 2 (test condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-,
7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA with item type and test condition as
within-subjects variable and age group as between subjects variable.
There was a main effect of age, F(3, 76) = 5.62, p = .002, ηp2 = .18, where
only 5- year-olds and gave fewer yes-responses than 7-year-olds (p = .046) and adults
(p = .001). There was also a main effect of test condition, F(1, 76) = 166.41, p <
.001, ηp2 = .69, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion.
There was a main effect of item type, F(2, 76) = 528.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .87 where
more yes-responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn
to new items (ps < .001). There was an item type x age group interaction, F(6, 76)
= 9.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, where responses to new items did not differ between the
age groups (ps > .099), whereas responses to targets and non-targets increased with
age. The condition by the item type interaction, F(2, 76) = 48.50, p < .001, ηp2 =
.39 revealed that whereas in exclusion more yes-responses were given to targets than
to non-targets than in turn to new items (ps < .001), in inclusion only new items
differed from both targets and non-targets (p < .001). Further, more yes-responses
were given to new items, targets and non-targets in inclusion than in exclusion (ps
< .001). There was an age group by test condition by item type interaction, F(6, 76)
= 2.22, p = .044, ηp2 = .08 which was driven by the 5-year-olds who were unable to
differentiate between targets and non-targets (p > .999) whereas older children and
adults gave more yes-responses to targets than to non-targets in exclusion (all ps =
.032). Importantly, more yes-responses were given to targets than to new items in
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both exclusion and inclusion and this was the case for all age groups (all ps < .001).
To summarize, these results replicate the results of Experiment 2. First,
hits increased with age whereas false alarms did not differ between age groups. Sec-
ond, even under limited response time participants across all age groups, including
5-year-olds were able to discriminate between seen and unseen items, showing that
they were able to follow the instructions. However, 5-year-olds were unable to ac-
cess the to-be recollected detail (i.e., number) to discriminate between seen items.
In contrast, all older age groups were able to access the criterion based detail for
recollection under limited retrieval time. Third, base rates to new items differed be-
tween inclusion and exclusion. This indicates that the DPSD is a more favourable
approach to estimate parameters than the PDP.
Recollection and Familiarity. To investigate the effects of limiting re-
sponse time during recognition on different age groups, two one-way ANOVAs were
conducted with recollection and familiarity estimates as dependent variables and age
group (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 10-year-olds vs. adults) as the independent variable.
Recollection increased with age, F(3, 76) = 5.27, p = .002, ηp2 = .17, where
5-year-olds recollection values were lower than 10-year-olds (p = .002), whereas all
other age groups did not differ. One-sample t-tests comparing recollection to the
critical baseline value (.11) revealed that recollection was absent in 5-year-olds, t(17)
= 1.13, p = .273, but older age groups were able to use recollection: 7-year-olds ,
t(23) = 3.65, p = .001; 10-year-olds, t(22) = 6.52, p < .001 and adults, t(14) = 3.67,
p = .003.
Familiarity increased with age, F(3, 76) = 4.72, p = .004, ηp2 = .16, where
5-year-olds’ familiarity estimates were lower than 7- (p = .058), 10-year-olds (p =
.044) and adults (p = .004), all older age groups did not differ. Familiarity estimates
in all age groups were above the critical baseline value of .11 (5-year-olds, t(17) =
6.95, p < .001; 7-year-olds, t(23) = 13.26, p < .001; 10-year-olds, t(22) = 12.68, p <
.001 and adults t(14) = 11.37, p < .001) demonstrating familiarity based responding.
In line with findings from Experiment 2, 5-year-olds did not have sufficient
time to make use of recollection, leading to purely familiarity based responses. Older
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children and adults are able to use recollection.
Timed out responses. Participants timed out rarely; 5-year-olds timed out
on 6% of trials, 7-year-olds on 6%, 11-year-olds on 4% and adults on 7%. Missing
responses did not differ between age groups, F(3, 76) = 1.41, p = .248, ηp2 = .05,
suggesting that response deadlines were equally strict across age groups.
2.7 Comparison between Experiment 3 and Experiment 4
2.7.1 Recollection and Familiarity
Recollection and familiarity estimates were entered into two ANOVAs with response
time (self-paced vs. limited response time) and age group (age group: 5- vs. 7-
vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) to investigate the effects of speeding response time during
recognition.
For recollection there was a main effect of age, F(3, 170) = 11.29, p < .001,
ηp2 = .17, where recollection was lower in 5-year-olds (M = .20) than in 10-year-
olds (M = .39, p < .001) and adults (p < .001), and also lower in 7-year-olds (M
= .30) than in adults (M = .42, p = .020) whereas the other age groups did not
differ. Recollection was significantly reduced under limited (M = .29) compared to
self-paced response time (M = .37), F(1, 170) = 7.61, p = .006, ηp2 = .04. This
was the case for all age groups as indicated by the non-significant interaction, F(3,
170) = 2.09, p = .104, ηp2 = .04.
For familiarity there was a main effect of age, F(3, 170) = 14.42, p < .001,
ηp2 = .20, where familiarity was lower in 5-year-olds (M = .45, p = .001) than in 7-
(M = .60, p < .001), 10-year-olds (M = .66, p < .001) and adults (M = .69, p < .001).
The other age groups did not differ (see Figure 2.4). Familiarity was not affected by
limiting response time during recognition (self-paced (M = .62), limited response
time (M = .58)), F(1, 170) = 2.13, p = .147, ηp2 = .01 and this was the case for
all age groups as indicated by the non-significant age x experiment interaction, F(3,
170) = .80, p = .496, ηp2 = .01.
To summarize, as in the comparison of Experiment 1 and 2, here we again
find recollection to be significantly reduced under limited response time whilst famil-
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Figure 2.4. Parameter estimates as a function of response time and age group. The
top panel shows recollection estimates, the bottom panel familiarity estimates.
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iarity was left widely unaffected. This was the case across all age groups indicating
two separable processes to be available from early childhood onwards. Note that
although there is no interaction between age group and limited response time in-
dicating a dissociation of recollection and familiarity across all age groups, Figure
2.4 shows that 11-year-olds’ recollection is not reduced by limiting response time.
This finding might by due to sampling and will be revisited in the meta-analysis in
Chapter 5.
2.8 General Discussion
The aim of this first experimental chapter was to examine familiarity and recollec-
tion across childhood using the PDP. We developed an item-based paradigm where
recollection was based on perceptual details (i.e., number of items and spatial loca-
tion on the screen). The ability to discriminate different item types across all age
groups shows that the PDP is suitable for examining recognition memory processes
across a wide age range, including children as young as 5-years old. Furthermore,
recollection for spatial location of objects on the screen and number of items is
already available at the age of 5. This suggests that children can recollect list
membership (Anooshian, 1999) as well as perceptual details of items. Recollection
and familiarity increase throughout childhood. These increases occurred at differ-
ent ages for recollection than familiarity. These different developmental trajectories
may provide an indirect test of the dual-process assumption (Ghetti & Angelini,
2008). Finally, limiting response time during recognition provides a direct test of
process independence of recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). Specifically,
limiting response time resulted across two experiments in reductions on recollection
while leaving familiarity unaffected. Importantly, this dissociation of recollection
and familiarity was already the case at the age of 5. This provides novel evidence
in favour of the independence assumption of familiarity and recollection from early
childhood on.
We will now turn to an evaluation of assumptions underlying the PDP. The
PDP has been criticized for a number of reasons. One concern was the difficulty of
instructions in the exclusion condition (Curran & Hintzman, 1997; Graf & Komatsu,
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1994). In the present research we took a number of steps to make sure that partic-
ipants understood the task and followed the instructions. First, before starting a
new phase practice examples were provided to ensure that participants understood
the instructions. Furthermore, participants were required to repeat instructions at
the end of the recognition conditions. Participants who were unable to do so were
excluded from the analyses. Finally, the data provides strong evidence that partici-
pants understood and followed the instructions successfully. Specifically, in all four
experiments all participants were able to discriminate between previously presented
and new items. Moreover, participants accepted more non-targets in inclusion than
in exclusion, demonstrating they understood that non-targets in inclusion require a
yes-response whereas non-targets in exclusion require a no-response. This is a clear
indicator that participants were able to distinguish between the different item types
proving that they understood and followed the instructions (Anooshian, 1999; J. P.
Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1995).
The PDP was also criticized for being negatively affected by potential re-
sponse bias shifts across conditions. Experiment 1 revealed no shift in response
bias, as indicated by the lack of differences in false alarm rates to new items be-
tween inclusion and exclusion. Thus, familiarity and recollection estimates do not
reflect changes in response bias but recognition memory performance (Jacoby, 1998;
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) suggesting that the PDP is suitable to be used to mea-
sure recollection and familiarity in children aged 5. However, false alarms to new
items differed between inclusion and exclusion for 5-year-olds (Experiments 2 and
4) and adults (Experiment 3). To account for those potential shifts in response bias
as a function of test instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) or age group, the DPSD
(Yonelinas, 1994) was applied across all experiments. As outlined in chapter 1, the
DPSD is a formal modelling approach which deals with those response bias shifts
by taking responses to new items into account.
An advantage of the PDP is that it allows us to investigate which details
participants can use to recollect items. Using the current item-based design, we
established that participants cannot only recollect an item by identifying the list
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it was presented in (i.e. list-based design), but are able to recollect details about
the item itself. Specifically, in Experiment 1 and 2 we investigated whether partic-
ipants were able to recollect items on the basis of number of presented objects. In
Experiments 3 and 4 spatial location of items (i.e., item presented on the top or the
bottom of the screen) had to be recollected. In line with previous findings, demon-
strating that 5-year-olds are able to recollect list membership of an item (Anooshian,
1999), we demonstrate that they were also able to recollect specific details. In other
words, not only are 5-year-olds able to indicate the source of item presentation, they
also recollect criterion-based details about an item itself such as number or location.
Thus, this modified version of the PDP provides novel findings on the nature of
recollection.
With regards to developmental trajectories, both recollection and familiar-
ity were found to develop during childhood although improvements in these processes
seem to occur at different ages. In Experiment 1 where number of items had to be
recollected, recollection increased throughout childhood up to the age of 11. Famil-
iarity only differed between 5-year-olds and adults. In Experiment 3 where location
of objects had to be recollected, recollection increased up to adulthood whereas
familiarity did not increase after the age of 7. In sum, whereas recollection contin-
ues to increase throughout childhood, familiarity did not increase after the age of 7.
Different developmental trajectories for recollection and familiarity across childhood
were also found in previous research where different methodological approaches were
used (Billingsley et al., 2002; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). However, developmental
trajectories found when number of items had to be recollected (Experiment 1), were
not fully replicated when location of items had to be recollected (Experiment 3).
One possible explanation for the divergence in developmental trends between ex-
periments is task difficulty. An ANOVA on overall accuracy revealed that overall
accuracy in Experiment 1 (M = .78) was significantly higher than in Experiment
3 (M = .74; F(1, 187) = 16.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .08) and this was the case in all
age groups (F(3, 187) = 1.68, p = .172, ηp2 = .03). This suggests that for all age
groups it was easier to recollect the number of presented items (Experiment 1) than
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the spatial location of items (Experiment 3). Thus, developmental trajectories seem
to depend at least in part on the difficulty of the task which is here determined by
the criterion that has to be recollected (i.e., location vs number of items). These
developmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity will be reanalysed in a
meta-analysis in Chapter 5.
As mentioned earlier, differences in developmental trajectories provide an
indirect test of the dual-process assumptions of recognition memory (Ghetti & An-
gelini, 2008). To test the independence assumptions directly by dissociating recol-
lection from familiarity a response time limit condition was implemented in the test
phase (Experiments 2 and 4). This revealed three key findings. First, in adults
limiting response time led to a significant decrease in recollection whilst leaving fa-
miliarity unaffected. This is a replication of a well-known dissociation from the adult
literature (Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Yonelinas, 2002) and serves as a manipulation
check.
Second, limiting response time reduced recollection to zero in 5-year-olds.
This corresponds to a total absence of recollection (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). Thus,
5-year-olds relied exclusively on familiarity. These findings may suggest that recollec-
tion is less robust in 5-year-olds compared to older children and adults. Experiment
2 showed that under limited response time recollection did not differ between age
groups, indicating that fast responding reduces recollection to the same level across
all age groups. Limiting response time led to an age increase of familiarity where
5- and 7-year-olds made fewer familiarity-based responses than adults. Experiment
4 showed that under limited response time recollection increased between 5- and
10-years only. 5- year-olds used less familiarity than 7-, 10-year-olds and adults.
This suggests that under limited response time recollection is comparable between
the different age groups whereas familiarity increases with age. These different age
trends for recollection and familiarity are in line with dual-process theory.
A comparison of unspeeded and speeded conditions shows that limiting
response time had no differential effect on familiarity whereas recollection was re-
duced when participants were forced to respond quickly. This pattern of results
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was found in both versions of the modified PDP, the number of objects as well as
the location paradigm. This finding supports the notion that familiarity is a faster
acting process than recollection (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Yonelinas, 2002). Impor-
tantly, this favours dual-process theory, assuming that recollection and familiarity
are independent processes underlying recognition memory (for a review, see Yoneli-
nas, 2002). This assumption is supported if a manipulation affects one but not
the other processes (Jacoby, 1998). Interestingly already 5-year-olds’ recollection
was reduced under limited response times whereas familiarity was unaffected. This
finding provides support for separable processes already at 5 years.
One limitation of this interpretation may be that the response deadlines
(1 SD below the mean per age group) were not equally strict across age groups. As
5-year-olds timed out more often than older children and adults, it is possible that
the response deadline in Experiment 2 was more stringent for 5-year-olds. To rule
out this possibility we conducted further analyses on a sample matched by timed
out responses showing that all reported effects stay the same. This demonstrates
that the ability to respond within the deadline does not appear to mediate the
lager decrease of recollection than familiarity as a function of the response time
limit across all age groups. The strictness of the response time limit differing as a
function of age will be of importance again in Experiment 6 (Chapter 3). We will
return to this important point in Chapter 3 and in the general discussion in Chapter
5.
The primary aim of this chapter was to establish a paradigm which allows
the investigation of processes underlying recognition memory during childhood. The
PDP allowed the investigation of the development of recognition memory from 5-
years of age up to adulthood with small age intervals. We show that children can use
item specific details such as location and number of items as the basis for recollection
from the age of 5 onwards. Both recollection and familiarity are available at the age
of 5. However, recollection and familiarity have different developmental trajectories.
These different developmental trajectories provide an indirect test of the dual-process
assumptions. Further, limiting response time allows directly testing the dual-process
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account of recognition memory and shows that recollection decreased more than
familiarity as a function of the response time limit. This dissociation of recollection
and familiarity after limiting response time is consistent with dual-process theory.
However, a number of manipulations have been implemented to test for the
dual-process account showing differential benefits on recognition memory through-
out the lifespan (Yonelinas, 2002). One such manipulation is repeating items (Ben-
jamin & Craik, 2001; Jacoby, 1999; Light, Patterson, Chung, & Healy, 2004). Specif-
ically, when items are repeatedly presented during encoding it has been found that
familiarity was boosted across all age groups whereas recollection was only boosted
in young adults not in older adults. This demonstrates in line with dual-process
theory that encoding manipulations seem to boost recollection and familiarity to a
different extent across the lifespan. Therefore, in the next experiments we will fur-
ther explore developmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity after repeated
item presentation.
Chapter 3
Effects of repetition and limited re-
sponse time
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we established a new developmental method to investigate the dual pro-
cess theory of recognition memory. Using this new method we demonstrated greater
developmental changes for recollection than familiarity. Different developmental tra-
jectories are consistent with dual-process theory because familiarity is assumed to be
more automatic than recollection (Yonelinas, 2002). Further, consistent with a dual-
process framework a response time limit reduced recollection more than familiarity
in Experiments 1 to 4. Interestingly, this dissociation was present even at age 5.
However, one potential alternative explanation for this finding is that recollection is
simply a more sensitive measure than familiarity. To provide a stronger test of dual
process theory, in the current chapter we aimed to provide evidence for a double dis-
sociation. We used a repetition during encoding manipulation. Repetition has been
shown to increase recollection more than familiarity in adults (PDP: Benjamin &
Craik, 2001; Jacoby, 1999; the remember know-procedure: Jacoby, Jones, & Dolan,
1998). Repetition during encoding combined with limited response time during re-
trieval has been shown to affect familiarity more than recollection. Alternatively, if
both manipulations only affect recollection but not familiarity, then this might be
explained by a difference in sensitivity of measures (Henson, 2006).
Specifically, Jacoby (1999) examined the effects of repetition in adults us-
ing an exclusion test. Here, visually studied words always had to be excluded (i.e.,
non-target) and auditory studied words always had to be included (i.e., target).
After encoding items twice or thrice, the hit rate increased (yes-responses to tar-
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gets) and exclusion errors decreased (incorrect yes-responses to non-targets in the
exclusion condition) compared to single item presentation. Exclusions errors were
driven by increased familiarity and an absence of recollection. In line with this, the
PDP measures showed that repetition led to slightly higher increases for recollection
than familiarity (Jacoby, 1999). This may imply that the potential for boosts in
recollection is larger than the potential for boosts in familiarity because the latter
is already at ceiling due to its automatic effortless nature. Further, under limited
response time during recognition, repeated item presentation led to more exclusion
errors than single item presentation (Jacoby et al., 1998). The increase in exclusion
errors suggests that when recollection is hindered by a response deadline, repetition
boosts familiarity more than recollection. Importantly, in that study recollection
and familiarity were not measured. More benefits of repetition on recollection under
self-paced conditions combined with more benefits on familiarity under limited re-
sponse time are consistent with dual-process theory and cannot simply be explained
by differences in the sensitivity of measures.
Manipulating encoding strength is of specific interest from a developmen-
tal perspective because benefits of encoding manipulations differ across the lifespan.
Specifically, findings from the aging literature (exclusion paradigm: Benjamin &
Craik, 2001; Jacoby, 1999; Light et al., 2004; but see remember-know procedure for
diverging findings: Perfect, Williams, & Anderton-Brown, 1995), as well as devel-
opmental findings (ROC method: Ghetti & Angelini, 2008) show that after deep
compared to shallow encoding familiarity is boosted across all age groups (children,
young and older adults), whereas recollection is only boosted in young adults, not
in any other age group. Thus, encoding strength affects children’s and old adults’
recollection and familiarity estimates differently to that of young adults.
Repetition increased exclusion errors in older adults and reduced them
in young adults. Increases in correct responses were found in older and young
adults. This is reflected in recollection and familiarity parameters. Recollection
increased more in young than in older adults, whereas increases in familiarity were
comparable across groups (Jacoby, 1999). The increase in exclusion errors in older
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adults suggests that repetition did not enhance the encoding of details but only
increased memory strength (Benjamin & Craik, 2001). In sum, if recollection is
hindered, either because of a response deadline or an impaired recollective system,
(aging population) then boosts of repetition are more pronounced for familiarity
than for recollection.
Ghetti and Angelini (2008) investigated how varying encoding strength
(shallow vs. deep encoding; Experiment 1) and encoding duration (short vs. long item
presentation; Experiment 2) affects the developmental trajectories of recollection
and familiarity in 6 to 18-year-old children using the ROC method. To investigate
the effects of encoding strength, participants had to either state the colour (red
or blue) of the presented item (shallow encoding) or make a semantic judgement
depending on the colour of objects (for objects presented in red participants had
to state whether an item was soft or hard, for items in blue whether it was heavy
or light; deep encoding). Both recollection and familiarity were higher after deep
than after shallow encoding. However, increases after deep encoding were larger
for recollection in 11-, 14- and 18-year-olds than in 6- and 8-year-olds, but did
not differ across age groups for familiarity. Additionally, whereas long encoding
duration resulted in higher familiarity than short encoding duration, recollection
was unaffected and this was the case for all age groups (i.e. 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds)
(Ghetti & Angelini, 2008).
In sum, this demonstrates that certain encoding manipulations can boost
processes underlying recognition differently across childhood. First, after deep en-
coding, recollection increases with age. Under shallow encoding recollection did not
differ across age. Familiarity increases with age after both deep and shallow encod-
ing. Second, after long item presentation age related increases for recollection were
found. Familiarity was stable across age (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). This suggests
that recollection is more affected by development in childhood than familiarity and
indicates that recollection is effortful and requires deep encoding. It also shows that
developmental changes of familiarity across age are highly dependent on the encod-
ing conditions (i.e., encoding duration and encoding strength). These dissociative
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effects of recognition memory are not compatible with a single-process model where
a similar advantage of encoding manipulations would be expected on recollection
and familiarity. Instead different developmental patterns of recollection and famil-
iarity as well as the developmental dissociation after deep vs. shallow encoding are
consistent with a dual-process framework.
However, so far no study investigated the effects of repetition on recollec-
tion and familiarity from early childhood to adulthood. Thus, in this chapter we
used a repeated item presentation manipulation during encoding to test dual-process
theory. Thus, Chapter 3 had two aims. First, to test the dual-process assumptions
underlying recognition memory we applied an encoding (i.e. repetition; Experiment
5) and an encoding combined with a retrieval (i.e. repetition and response deadline;
Experiment 6) manipulation. Given that according to dual-process theory familiar-
ity is more automatic than recollection, (Yonelinas, 2002) single presentation should
result in higher baseline levels of familiarity than recollection. This implies that in
adults the increase on familiarity after repetition should be lower than the increase
on recollection, because the latter has a higher potential to benefit from interven-
tions, such as repetition, than the former (Experiment 5). In contrast, according to
a single-process account, familiarity and recollection are two manifestations of the
same underlying fundamental process. Thus, there seems to be no a priori reason to
predict a dissociative effect of repetition on development of recollection and familiar-
ity. Further, according to dual-process theory recollection is slower than familiarity
(Chapter 2; Yonelinas, 2002). This implies that recollection should be more affected
by limiting response time during recognition than familiarity (Experiment 6). Given
that recollection is impaired, repetition should lead to higher boosts in familiarity
than recollection.
Second, we aimed to investigate how repetition affects recollection and fa-
miliarity developmentally. Chapter 2 showed different developmental trajectories
for recollection than familiarity. To test this idea further, the effect of repetition
on the development of recollection and familiarity can be examined. If children’s
potential for recollection is comparable to that of adults, then repetition should in-
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crease recollection to a similar extent across all age groups. However, if children’s
potential for recollection is lower than adults’, then repetition should boost recollec-
tion less in children than in adults. The same logic applies to the effect of repetition
on familiarity. Based on Chapter 2 where recollection is lower in children than in
adults, we expected more increases in recollection after repetition in older children
and adults than in younger children. Familiarity was expected to benefit equally
from repetition across age groups (Friedman et al., 2010; see also Ghetti & Angelini,
2008; Jacoby, 1999). If the advantage of repetition is larger on recollection than on
familiarity in older children and adults but larger on familiarity than on recollection
in younger children, then this is compatible with a dual-process account. Alterna-
tively, if the advantage of repetition on recollection and familiarity is comparable
within each age group, then these processes seem to be equally sensitive to repetition
and, thus, compatible with a single-process model.
3.2 Experiment 5
Experiment 5 aimed to investigate how manipulating memory strength during encod-
ing affects recollection and familiarity throughout childhood. Repetition has been
shown to result in more exclusion errors (incorrect yes-response to a non-target in
exclusion) in older adults but fewer errors in young adults (Jacoby, 1999). We
aim to investigate how exclusion errors are affected by repeated item presentation
throughout childhood. We expect more exclusion errors after repetition in younger
children but not in older children and adults. Exclusion errors are driven by a lack
of recollection combined with increased item familiarity. Repeated item presenta-
tion increases the memory strength of items. Increased memory strength may result
in more hits and/ or more exclusion errors. If hits and exclusion errors increase
after repetition, then this may be driven by increased familiarity. However, if only
yes-responses to targets but not to non-targets increase after repetition, then this
might be driven by increases in familiarity and recollection (i.e., memory for details).
If, as it is assumed in children, recollection has a lower potential to increase than
familiarity, then exclusion errors occur. However, if recollection has a similar po-
tential to increase as familiarity, increased item familiarity after repetition can be
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inhibited by recollection. Thus, acceptance rates to targets and non-targets should
be reflected in recollection and familiarity.
Repetition was expected to result in differential boosts as a function of age
on recollection and familiarity and different developmental trajectories. Based on
Chapter 2, in the current experiment, particularly after repeated item presentation,
familiarity was expected to be comparable to adults at an earlier age than recol-
lection. Different developmental trajectories for familiarity and recollection are not
compatible with a single-process model and are instead in line with a dual-process
model of recognition memory.
We again included 5-, 7-, 11-year-old children and adults as participants
for this study, as the first four experiments revealed increases in recollection and
familiarity between these age groups. The location-paradigm (Experiment 3) was
used instead of the number-of-items paradigm to avoid confusion about number of
presented items and number of repetition during the test phase. The paradigm was
identical to that in Experiment 3 with the only difference that items were presented
once or three times during the study phase.
3.2.1 Method
Participants. A total of 112 children and adults (57% female) took part;
27 5-year-olds (M = 5.3 years, SD = 4 months), 26 7-year-olds (M = 7.3 years, SD
= 4 months), 28 11-year-olds (M = 11.3 years, SD = 3 months) and 31 adults (M
= 22 years, SD = 3.8 years).
Materials and Procedure. The same materials and procedure were used
as in Experiment 3 where participants had to recollect spatial location of earlier
presented items (top or bottom of the screen). A total of 94 items from the Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) data base were used. The study phase started with four
practice trials where participants judged whether the item (e.g., cake) is typically
found indoors or outdoors. If participants failed the first four practice trials, another
set of four practice trials was presented. None of the participants failed the practice
test more than two times. The study phase consisted of four study blocks (14 items
each). Half of the items were presented at the top and half presented at the bottom
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of the screen: 14 items which were presented at the top (bottom) of the screen
were presented once, the other 14 items were presented thrice (location of individual
items did not change between trials) leading to a total of 112 study trials. To ensure
that there were between 10 and 18 items intervening between repetitions of any
particular item, study presentation order was fixed. Once all items were presented
the recognition phase followed immediately.
The recognition phase started with a practice phase. Participants were re-
minded of the four items from the study practice phase before a recognition practice
phase followed. The recognition phase consisted of 28 targets, 28 non-targets and
28 new words presented in one inclusion and one exclusion block. The procedure
was otherwise identical to that of Experiment 3. In exclusion participants were in-
structed to accept items presented in the top half of the screen (above the line) and
reject items that were presented in the bottom half of the screen (below the line) as
well as items that were not presented before. In inclusion all presented items had to
be accepted, new items had to be rejected.
The blocks in study and recognition as well as the two repetition conditions
(once vs. thrice) were matched for word frequencies (Stuart, Masterson, Dixon, &
Quinlan, 2003), familiarity and name agreement norms (Snodgrass & Vanderwart,
1980) (Table 3.1). One adult participant was removed because he was unable to
repeat the instructions after completing exclusion or inclusion.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group, repetition (once
vs. thrice presented) and item type for inclusion and exclusion condition as well as
parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection are shown in Table 3.2.
Preliminary analysis. One 5-year-old performed below chance (fewer than
50 correct trials out of the 84, overall accuracy below .595) and was hence removed.
For recollection there were no effects of whether exclusion or inclusion
were completed first (Recollection “once”, F(1, 102) = .51, p = .475, ηp2 = .01;
Recollection “thrice”, F(1, 102) = .88, p = .351, ηp2 = .01). The same was true
for familiarity (Familiarity “once”, F(1, 102) = .30, p = .584, ηp2 = .01; Familiarity
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Table 3.1
Means (SD) word norms of study block 1 – 4 and recognition block 1 and 2.
N items word frequency familiarity
name
agreement %
Study
Block A 14 207.00 3.19 .37
Block B 14 230.46 3.22 .42
Block C 14 230.08 2.40 .65
Block D 14 383.67 3.13 .39
Effect
F(3, 50) = .65,
p = .589
F(3, 55) = .21,
p = .889
F(3, 55) = 1.46,
p = .237
Recognition
Block A 42 172.33 3.17 .41
Block B 42 263.05 3.22 .48
Effect
F(1, 76) = 1.71,
p = .195
F(1, 83) = .07,
p = .789
F(1, 83) = .61,
p = .439
Repetition
once 28 444.80 3.25 .53
3 times 28 207.12 3.22 .39
Effect
F(1, 76) = 2.22,
p = .143
F(1, 55) = .02,
p = .892
F(1, 55) = 1.53,
p =.221
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“thrice”, F(1, 102) = .11, p = .747, ηp2 = .01) and this was the case across all
age groups as there was no significant interaction (Recollection “once”, F(3, 102) =
1.73, p = .166, ηp2 = .05; Recollection “thrice”, F(3, 102) = .24, p = .868, ηp2 =
.01; Familiarity “once”, F(3, 102) = .11, p = .952, ηp2 = .01; Familiarity “thrice”,
F(3, 102) = .86, p = .465, ηp2 = .02). Therefore, exclusion/inclusion order was not
included as an analysis factor.
Table 3.2
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion condi-
tion as well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection as a function of
age and repetition in Experiment 5.
5-year-olds
(n = 26)
7-year-olds
(n = 26)
11-year-olds
(n = 28)
Adults
(n = 30)
Once Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice
Exclusion
New items .05 (.08) .04 (.06) .03 (.04) .05 (.07)
Non-targets .35 (.26) .43 (.24) .26 (.21) .21 (.15) .26 (.22) .21 (.22) .25 (.22) .23 (.25)
Targets .52 (.24) .59 (.25) .54 (.18) .68 (.27) .66 (.22) .86 (.18) .64 (.26) .74 (.26)
Inclusion
New items .08 (.09) .04 (.06) .03 (.07) .03 (.05)
Non-targets .70 (.22) .87 (.14) .78 (.17) .92 (.10) .89 (.13) .94 (.10) .84 (.16) .94 (.08)
Targets .71 (.19) .85 (.16) .76 (.19) .92 (.12) .86 (.14) .94 (.09) .86 (.13) .92 (10)
Parameter estimates
Recollection .37 (.30) .44 (.28) .53 (.25) .71 (.21) .60 (.27) .71 (.27) .61 (.25) .71 (.26)
Familiarity .49 (.28) .77 (.20) .51 (.29) .70 (.26) .63 (.33) .66 (.36) .64 (.30) .70 (.28)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Hits and False alarms. To examine whether assumptions underlying the
PDP were met, acceptance rates to once and thrice presented items were used as the
dependent variables in two 3 (item type: news vs. non-targets vs. targets) x 2 (test
condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-, 7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults)
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repeated measures with item type and test condition as within-subjects variables
and age group as between subjects variable. Two separate ANOVAs were conducted
because there was only one type of new items.
For once presented items there was a main effect of test condition, F(1, 106)
= 344.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .77, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than
in exclusion. There was a main effect of item type, F(2, 106) = 950.42, p < .001, ηp2
= .90 where more yes-responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets
and in turn to new items (ps < .001). Further, there was a main effect of age, F(3,
106) = 3.27, p = .024, ηp2 = .25, where 5-year-olds gave fewer yes-responses than
11-year-olds (p = .076) whereas all other age groups did not differ (all ps > .147).
This was qualified by an interaction with item type, F(2, 106) = 3.65, p = .002, ηp2
= .09, where acceptance rates to new items and non-targets did not differ between
age groups (ps > .227) whereas yes-responses to targets increased between 5- and
11-year-olds (p = .004) and adults (p = .008). This indicates no shift in base rates to
new items with age. The significant age by test condition by item type interaction,
F(6, 106) = 3.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .10 showed that 5-year-olds but not any other
age groups gave more yes-responses to new items in inclusion than in exclusion (p
= .038). This indicates that in 5-year-olds base rates to new items differed between
inclusion and exclusion. Further, in exclusion all age groups gave more yes-responses
to targets than to non-targets than in turn to new items (ps < .011). In inclusion,
more responses to non-targets and targets did not differ but were significantly higher
than responses to new items (ps < .001). Thus, participants across all age groups
were able to understand and follow instructions in inclusion as well as in exclusion.
For thrice presented items, there was a no main effect of age, F(3, 106) =
1.73, p = .166, ηp2 = .05, and a main effect of test condition, F(1, 106) = 472.09 p <
.001, ηp2 = .82, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion.
There was a main effect of item type, F(2, 106) = 1479.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .93,
where more yes-responses were given to targets than non-targets and in turn to new
items (ps < .001). This was qualified by an age x item type interaction, F(6, 106)
= 7.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, where yes-responses to new items did not differ across
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age (ps > .227) whereas yes-responses to non-targets were higher in 5- than in 7-
year-olds (p = .032) (other age groups did not differ; p > .113) and yes-responses
to targets were higher in 11-year-olds (p < .001) and adults (p = .025) than in
5-year-olds (other ages did not differ; p > .053). A significant age x test condition
x item type interaction, F(6, 106) = 7.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .18 revealed that only
5-year-olds gave more yes-responses to new items in inclusion than in exclusion (p
= .038), whereas yes-responses to new items did not differ in the older age groups.
Thus, again, base rates to new items did not differ across age but did differ between
inclusion and exclusion in 5-year-olds. Moreover, importantly in exclusion more yes-
responses were given to targets than to non-targets and in turn to new items and
this was the case for all age groups (ps < .039). In inclusion fewer yes-responses
were given to new items than to both targets and non-targets (ps < .039) which
did not differ. This indicates that participants across all age groups were able to
understand and follow instructions in inclusion as well as in exclusion.
Next, to allow for comparison with previous work which often did not
provided recollection and familiarity estimates (Jacoby, 1999), we examined the
effects of repetition on exclusion errors and hits. A 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-
year-olds vs. adults) x 2 (repetition: once vs thrice) x 2 (item type: target vs
non-targets) AVOVA on acceptance rates in exclusion was performed. There was
a main effect of item type, F(1, 106) = 227.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, where more
yes-responses were given to targets than to non-targets. This was qualified by an
interaction with age, F(3, 106) = 9.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, showing that ability
to discriminate between targets and non-targets increased between 5-year-olds and
older age groups. Importantly, participants across all age groups, including 5-year-
olds, were able to discriminate between targets and non-targets (p < .002). This
demonstrates that participants were able to follow the instructions (see also analyses
above). There was a main effect of repetition, F(1, 106) = 12.52, p =.001, ηp2 = .11,
where acceptance rates were higher after repeated than after single item presentation.
This was modified by an interaction with item type, F(1, 106) = 18.33, p < .001, ηp2
= .15, where repetition only led to increases in correct yes-responses to targets (hit,
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p < .001) but did not affect incorrect yes-responses to non-targets (exclusion errors,
p = .787). An item type x repetition x age group interaction, F(3, 106) = 3.10,
p = .030, ηp2 = .08, revealed that 7-, 11-year-olds and adults gave more correct
yes-responses to targets after repeated than after single item presentation (ps <
.035), in 5-year-olds correct yes-responses did not change after repetition (p = .133).
Exclusion errors were not affected by repetition in 7-, 11-year-olds and adults (ps >
.258). This shows that older children and adults benefit from repetition, resulting in
more hits but no increase in exclusion errors. Interestingly, 5-year-olds made more
exclusion errors after repeated than after single item presentation (p = .050). Thus,
in 5-year-olds repetition seems to increase familiarity of items which results in more
exclusion errors. No other effects were significant.
In sum, whilst in older children and adults only correct responses increase
with repetition, in 5-year-olds only false alarms increased with repetition. This is
consistent with the aging literature where older adults but not young adults made
more exclusion errors after repeated than after single item presentation (Jacoby,
1999). The increase in exclusion errors after repetition may be driven by increases
in familiarity without increases in recollection. To explore this idea further we will
next investigate whether this is reflected in parameter estimates.
Familiarity and Recollection. First, to test whether recollection and fa-
miliarity were used in all age groups, parameter estimates were compared to the
critical baseline value of .11 (see Chapter 1). Second, to examine the effects of repe-
tition on the developmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity, recollection
and familiarity estimates were entered in two 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds
vs. adults) x 2 (repetition: once vs thrice) ANOVAs with age group as between
subjects factor and repetition as within subjects variable.
Recollection for both once and thrice presented items was above the base-
line in all age groups (5-year-olds: once, t(25) = 4.49, p < .001; thrice, t(25) = 6.08,
p < .001; 7-year-olds: once, t(25) = 8.45, p < .001; thrice, t(25) = 14.75, p < .001;
11-year-olds: once, t(27) = 9.85, p < .001; thrice, t(27) = 11.80, p < .001; adults:
once, t(30) = 11.67, p < .001; thrice, t(30) = 13.30, p < .001), demonstrating that
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participants across all age groups made recollection based responses. Recollection
increased with age, F(3, 106) = 7.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, where recollection values
were lower in 5-year-olds (M = .41) than in 7- (M = .62, p = .006), 11-year-olds
(M = .66, p = .001) and adults (M = .66, p < .001) who all did not differ. For
recollection there was a main effect of repetition, F(1, 106) = 22.74, p < .001, ηp2
= .18, where recollection was higher for items presented thrice (M = .65) than for
items presented once (M = .53). This was the case for all age groups as indicated
by the non-significant interaction, F(3, 106) = .77, p = .516, ηp2 = .02.
Familiarity based recognition was evident across all age groups (5-year-olds:
once, t(25) = 6.99, p < .001; thrice, t(25) = 16.76, p < .001; 7-year-olds: once, t(25)
= 6.99, p < .001; thrice, t(25) = 11.38, p < .001; 11-year-olds: once, t(27) = 8.38,
p < .001; thrice, t(27) = 8.24, p < .001; adults: once, t(30) = 9.08, p < .001; thrice,
t(30) = 11.01, p < .001). Familiarity did not differ as a function of age, F(3, 106) =
.40, p = .756, ηp2 = .01. There was a main effect of repetition, F(1, 106) = 12.76,
p = .001, ηp2 = .11, where familiarity was higher when items were presented three
times (M = .71) than when presented once (M = .57). Interestingly, the age group
by repetition interaction approached significance, F(3, 106) = 2.29, p = .083, ηp2
= .06, were familiarity only increased in 5- (Mdiff = .29, p = .001) and 7-year-olds
(Mdiff = .19, p = .021) but not for 11-year-olds (Mdiff = .03, p = .659) and adults
(Mdiff = .05, p = .489) (see Figure 3.1).
In summary, regardless of encoding conditions (once vs. thrice presented)
familiarity did not increase with age, whereas recollection increased between 5-year-
olds and all older age groups. These different developmental trajectories, where
recollection increased with age whereas no age differences were found for familiarity,
are consistent with a dual-process model of memory. Different developmental tra-
jectories are in line with findings from Chapter 2 and previous research (for studies
concerning child development see Anooshian, 1999; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; for
studies concerning aging see Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Koen & Yonelinas, 2014).
This indicates that the ability to recollect undergoes more development than famil-
iarity.
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Figure 3.1. Parameter estimates as a function of repetition and age group in Exper-
iment 5. The top panel shows recollection estimates, the bottom panel familiarity
estimates.
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Further, repetition increased correct yes-responses in 7, 11-year-olds and
adults but did not affect 5-year-olds. In contrast, repetition increased exclusion er-
rors (incorrect yes-responses) only in 5-year-olds, not in older age groups. Exclusion
errors are driven by increased familiarity and an absence of recollection (for similar
findings in the aging literature see Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Light et al., 2004). This
pattern, in which repetition only led to increased exclusion errors in 5-year-olds but
in no other age groups, is also reflected in the analysis of recollection and familiarity.
Our predictions for the effect of repetition were based on developmental
trajectories in Chapter 2. Differences across age in familiarity were lower than
differences in recollection. We predicted higher increases for recollection in older
children and adults than for younger children. Further, familiarity was predicted to
benefit equally from repetition across age groups.
Recollection increased after repetition across all age groups (indicated by
the non-significant interaction). However, separate t-tests for each age group com-
paring recollection after single and repeated item presentation did not reveal in-
creases for recollection after repeated item presentation in 5-year-olds (t(25) = -1.35,
p = .190), but revealed increases for all older age groups (all ps = .025). Familiarity
was only boosted in 5- and 7-year-olds, but not in 11-year-olds and adults. In adults
and 11-year-olds repetition led to higher increases in recollection than in familiarity.
For adults and 11-year-olds this may imply that recollection has the potential to
benefit more from interventions than familiarity and might suggest that familiarity
is already at ceiling. In 5- and 7-year-olds repetition boosted familiarity more than
recollection. This is further evidence showing that young children’s recollective sys-
tem is not quite yet at the level of older children and adults’ recollective system.
However, children’s familiarity is comparable to adults’.
Consistent with a dual-process model of recognition memory familiarity
reached the maximum adult level earlier than recollection. Converging evidence
originates from differential advantages of repetition on recollection and familiarity
across childhood (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Jacoby, 1999).
In Experiment 6 we aim to investigate whether these beneficial effects of
96CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF REPETITION AND LIMITED RESPONSE TIME
repetition hold after limiting response time during recognition. This is interesting
because a comparison of recollection and familiarity under limited and self-paced
response time can provide a test of dual-process theory. Further, increases of exclu-
sion errors after repetition have previously been shown in older adults but also in
young adults under limited response time conditions (Jacoby, 1999). Thus, in the
following experiment the effects of limiting response time after repeated item pre-
sentation on exclusion errors as well as on recollection and familiarity as a function
of age will be investigated.
3.3 Experiment 6
Experiment 6 had three aims. The first aim was to investigate how limiting response
time during recognition affects hits and exclusion errors in response to earlier once
or repeatedly presented pictures. Research with adults has shown that in a limited
response time condition repeated item presentation results in an increase of both
hits and exclusion errors (Jacoby, 1999). Thus, in line with these findings we pre-
dict an increase of hits and exclusion errors after repeated compared to single item
presentation under speeded conditions in all age groups.
An increase of exclusion errors after repeated item presentation is driven
by higher familiarity for repeatedly than for once presented items. If this is true,
then familiarity estimates should be higher after repeated than after single item pre-
sentation. Given that this was the case in 5-year-olds in Experiment 5, we expected
increases of familiarity to be particularly pronounced in older children and adults.
Thus, the second aim was to investigate the effects of repetition on recollection and
familiarity when responses had to be made under limited response time.
A further aim was to examine how limiting response time affects the de-
velopmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity. In the previous experiment
recollection increased with age, whereas familiarity did not differ across age. How-
ever, given that familiarity is thought to be a faster process than recollection, a
different developmental pattern might emerge when participants are asked to re-
spond as quickly as possible. One possible option is that similarly to Experiment 2
recollection might not differ between age groups, whereas familiarity might increase
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with age. Alternatively, both recollection and familiarity might increase with age
(see Experiment 4). Additionally, a comparison of Experiment 5 and Experiment
6 provides experimental evidence of whether recollection and familiarity are inde-
pendent processes. Specifically, if recollection decreases more than familiarity under
limiting response time, then this favours dual-process theory. However, if recollec-
tion and familiarity are affected to the same extent, then this favours a single-process
model. In sum, this experiment will provide insight on how repetition in combination
with limited response time affects developmental trajectories of processes underlying
recognition across childhood.
3.3.1 Method
Participants. In total 118 children and adults (55.9% female) participated
in this experiment; 26 5-year-olds (M = 4.9 years, SD = 3 months), 27 7-year-olds
(M = 7.4 years, SD = 3 months), 27 11-year-olds (M = 10.7 years, SD = 3 months)
and 38 adults (M = 21 years, SD = 4.3 years).
Materials and Procedure. The same materials and procedure were used
as in Experiment 5, but participants were required to respond within a limited time
period during recognition. Response time deadlines were set at one SD below mean
response times per age group in inclusion and exclusion in Experiment 5, resulting
in deadlines of 3751 ms for 5-year-olds, 3248 ms for 7-year-olds, 2293 ms for 11-
year-olds and 1096 ms for adults. Only responses within the response deadline were
included for subsequent analyses. Further, nine participants were excluded (four
5-year-olds, and five adults) because they were unable to repeat the instructions
after completing inclusion and exclusion.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
Acceptance rates as a function of age groups, repetition, item type and test condition
are displayed in Table 3.3.
Preliminary analysis. Two 5-year-olds and four adults performed below
chance (fewer than 50 correct trials out of the 84, overall accuracy below .595) and
were thus removed.
98CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF REPETITION AND LIMITED RESPONSE TIME
For recollection there were no order effects of whether inclusion or exclu-
sion was presented first (Recollection “once”, F(1, 94) = .74, p = .391, ηp2 = .01;
Recollection “thrice”, F(1, 94) = .01, p = .912, ηp2 = .01). The same was true
for familiarity estimates (Familiarity “once”, F(1, 94) = .21, p = .646, ηp2 = .01;
Familiarity “thrice”, F(1, 94) = .16, p = .686, ηp2 = .01) and this was the case for
all age groups (Recollection “once”, F(3, 94) = .65, p = .583, ηp2 = .02; Recollection
“thrice”, F(3, 94) = 1.04, p = .378, ηp2 = .03; Familiarity “once”, F(3, 94) = 1.50, p
= .221, ηp2 = .05; Familiarity “thrice”, F(3, 94) = .08, p = .970, ηp2 = .01). Thus,
presentation order was not included in the analyses.
Table 3.3
Mean proportions of “yes” responses for item type in inclusion and exclusion as
well as parameter estimates for familiarity and recollection as a function of age and
repetition in Experiment 6.
5-year-olds
(n = 19)
7-year-olds
(n = 27)
11-year-olds
(n = 27)
Adults
(n = 29)
Once Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice
Exclusion
New items .13 (.20) .11 (.12) .11 (.13) .06 (.06)
Non-targets .26 (.24) .26 (.19) .38 (.27) .31 (.27) .48 (.23) .33 (.24) .30 (.23) .37 (.27)
Targets .33 (.27) .42 (.28) .61 (.21) .70 (.22) .67 (.25) .78 (.17) .45 (.24) .64 (.26)
Inclusion
New items .14 (.13) .16 (.13) .09 (.07) .07 (.07)
Non-targets .65 (.19) .74 (.20) .76 (.20) .87 (.12) .82 (.19) .89 (.10) .70 (.17) .88 (.13)
Targets .68 (.18) .81 (.14) .79 (.10) .86 (.14) .81 (.13) .92 (.16) .76 (.18) .85 (.16)
Parameter estimates
Recollection .37 (.25) .45 (.31) .39 (.31) .53 (.28) .37 (.24) .57 (.26) .41 (.27) .50 (.30)
Familiarity .39 (.25) .50 (.27) .59 (.28) .64 (.28) .75 (.23) .70 (.34) .49 (.26) .69 (.27)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Hits and False alarms. Acceptance rates to once and thrice presented
items were entered into two 3 (item type: news vs. non-targets vs. targets) x 2 (test
condition: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 4 (age group: 5-, 7-, 11-year-olds vs. adults)
mixed ANOVAs.
For once presented items there was a main effect of age, F(3, 98) = 11.49, p
< .001, ηp2 = .26, where 5-year-olds and adults gave fewer yes-responses than 7- and
11-year-olds (ps < .009), the other age groups did not differ. There was a main effect
of condition, F(1, 98) = 173.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, with higher acceptance rates
in inclusion than in exclusion, and a main effect of item type, F(2, 98) = 507.79,
p < .001, ηp2 = .84, where more yes-responses were given in response to targets,
than to non-targets and in turn to new items (ps < .001). This was qualified by an
interaction with condition, F(2, 98) = 65.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .40 where in exclusion
more targets than non-targets than in turn new items were accepted (ps < .001). In
inclusion acceptance rates did not differ between targets and non-targets (p = .701)
but were significantly higher than responses to new items (ps < .001). This shows
that even under limited response time participants across all age groups successfully
discriminated between new items, non-targets and targets, suggesting that they
were able to follow the instructions. Further, whilst more yes-responses were given
in inclusion than exclusion in response to targets (p < .001) and non-targets (p <
.001), acceptance rates to new items did not differ (p = .525).
There was an item type by age group interaction, F(6, 98) = 5.83, p <
.001, ηp2 = .15, which was mainly caused by the 7-year-olds who accepted more new
items in inclusion than exclusion (p = .042). Thus, base rates to new items differed
only in 7-year-olds between conditions. No other effects reached significance.
For thrice presented items there was a main effect of age, F(3, 98) = 6.89,
p < .001, ηp2 = .17, where only 5-year-olds differed from the older age groups (ps
< .040), a main effect of condition, F(1, 98) = 268.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .73, where
acceptance rates were higher in inclusion than in exclusion, a main effect of item
type, F(2, 98) = 668.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .87, where more yes-responses were given
in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn to new items (ps < .001).
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There was a significant item type by age interaction, F(6, 98) = 5.63, p < .001, ηp2
= .15 where yes-responses to non-targets were lower in 5-year-olds than in adults
(p = .022) and yes-responses to targets lower in 5-year-olds than in all older age
groups (ps < .014). There was a condition by item type interaction, F(2, 98) =
131.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .57 caused by higher acceptance rates to targets (p < .001)
and non-targets (p < .001) in inclusion than in exclusion whereas responses to new
items did not differ (p = .525). Further there was a significant age by condition by
item type interaction, F(6, 98) = 2.90, p = .010, ηp2 = .08 which was mainly caused
by the 7-year-olds who showed higher false alarm rates in inclusion than exclusion
(p = .042), whereas all other age groups did not differ in false alarm rates (p >
.103). Importantly, in exclusion more correct yes-responses were given to targets
than to non-targets and in turn to new items (5-year-olds difference between targets
and non-targets, p = .097). In inclusion more correct yes-responses were given to
both targets and non-targets than to new items (ps < .001). Thus, after repeated
item presentation and under limited response time participants across all age groups
successfully discriminated between new items, non-targets and targets, suggesting
that they were able to follow the instructions.
Next, to examine how repetition affected hits (target) and exclusion errors
(non-targets) a 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2 (repetition:
once vs. thrice) x 2 (item type: target vs. non-targets) AVOVA on acceptance rates
in exclusion was performed. There was a main effect of item type, F(1, 98) = 77.92,
p < .001, ηp2 = .44, where more yes-responses were given to targets (M = .58) than
to non-targets (M = .34). This was the case for all age groups but the difference
increased between 5-year-olds and older age groups as indicated by the age group x
item type interaction, F(3, 98) = 2.73, p = .048, ηp2 = .08. There was a main effect
of repetition, F(1, 98) = 6.08, p = .015, ηp2 = .06, where acceptance rates were
higher after repeated (M = .48) than after single item presentation (M = .44). This
was qualified by an interaction with item type, F(1, 98) = 19.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .16,
showing that repetition only led to increases hits (targets, p< .001) but did not affect
exclusion errors (non-targets, p = .149). There was a repetition by age interaction,
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F(3, 98) = 4.40, p = .006, ηp2 = .12, where repetition only increased yes-responses
in adults (p < .001), not in the child age groups (ps > .262). Thus, only adults gave
more yes-responses to targets and non-targets after repeated item presentation than
after single item presentation. This is in line with Jacoby’s findings (1999) where in
adults exclusion errors increased after repeated item presentation. However, in child
age groups exclusion errors were unaffected by repeated item presentation. This is
in contrast to our predictions where across all age groups more exclusion errors were
expected under limited response time after repeated item presentation. No other
main effects or interactions reached significance.
In sum, repetition under limited response time only significantly increases
yes-responses in adults but in no other age group. Next we investigated how repeti-
tion affects recollection and familiarity under limited response time.
Familiarity and Recollection. First, to test whether recollection and fa-
miliarity were used in all age groups, parameter estimates were compared to the
critical baseline value of .11 (see Chapter 1). Second, to examine the effects of repe-
tition and limited response time on the development of recollection and familiarity,
recollection and familiarity estimates were entered in two 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7-
vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2 (repetition: once vs thrice) ANOVAs with age group
as between subjects factor and repetition as within subjects variable.
Participants across all age groups engaged in recollection based recognition
(5-year-olds: once, t(18) = 4.67, p < .001; thrice, t(18) = 4.83, p < .001; 7-year-olds:
once, t(26) = 4.79, p < .001; thrice, t(26) = 7.77, p < .001; 11-year-olds: once, t(26)
= 5.70, p < .001; thrice, t(26) = 9.32, p < .001; adults: once, t(28) = 6.41, p < .001;
thrice, t(28) = 7.47, p < .001). Recollection did not differ between age groups, F(3,
98) = .26, p = .852, ηp2 = .01. Repeated item presentation (M = .51) increased
recollection compared to single item presentation (M = .39), F(1, 98) = 14.73, p
< .001, ηp2 = .13 and this was the case for all age groups as there was no age x
repetition interaction, F(3, 98) = .72, p = .542, ηp2 = .02.
Familiarity based responding was evident across all age groups (5-year-olds:
once, t(18) = 4.97, p < .001; thrice, t(18) = 6.36, p < .001; 7-year-olds: once, t(26)
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= 9.06, p < .001; thrice, t(26) = 9.83, p < .001; 11-year-olds: once, t(26) = 14.53, p
< .001; thrice, t(26) = 8.26, p < .001; adults: once, t(28) = 11.74, p < .001; thrice,
t(28) = 7.47, p < .001). For familiarity there was a main effect of age, F(3, 98) =
6.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, where familiarity was lower in 5- (M = .45) than in 7- (M
= .62, p = .057) and 11-year-olds (M = .73, p < .001). The other age groups did not
differ (p > .091). Further, there was a main effect of repetition, F(1, 98) = 5.53, p =
.021, ηp2 = .05, where familiarity was higher after repeated item presentation (M =
.64) than after single item presentation (M = .55). This was qualified by a marginal
significant interaction with age, F(3, 98) = 2.37, p = .076, ηp2 = .07, showing that
repeated item presentation only increased familiarity in adults (p = .002) but not in
any other age group (ps > .159). Further, after single item presentation 11-year-olds’
familiarity was higher than 5-year-olds (p < .001) and adults’ (p = .001) whereas
after repeated item presentation familiarity did not differ (p = .144) (see Figure
3.2).
In summary, first, after both single and after repeated item presentation
recollection and familiarity based recognition was evident in all age groups, includ-
ing 5-year-olds. This suggests that recollection and familiarity are available at the
age of 5 even under limited response time. In contrast, in Experiments 2 and 4
recollection was absent in 5-year-olds under limited response time. This might be
due to differences in task difficulty between experiments. Specifically, the current
experiment might have been easier because only 56 items instead of 80 items (Ex-
periments 1 to 4) had to be encoded. A t-test in 5-year-olds comparing overall
accuracy across experiments revealed higher accuracy in the current experiment (M
= .68) than in the other two experiments under limited response time (Experiment
2 (M = .65), t(29) = -1.80, p = .083; Experiment 4 (M = .64), t(35) = -3.17, p
= .003), suggesting that the current experiment is easier than Experiments 2 and
4. To explore whether difficulty caused this different pattern of results, we rerun
our analyses with a sample of 5-year-olds from Experiment 2 and 4 matched with
the 5-year-olds from Experiment 6 on overall accuracy. Removing 5-year-olds with
the lowest accuracy of Experiments 2 and 4 resulted in a sample of 15 5-year-olds
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Figure 3.2. Parameter estimates as a function of repetition and age group in Exper-
iment 6. The top panel shows recollection estimates, the bottom panel familiarity
estimates.
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with an overall accuracy of M = .67, which did not differ from overall accuracy of
Experiment 4, t(1, 32) = -.82, p = .417. The sample of 5-year-olds of Experiments
2 and 4 matched by accuracy was able to use recollection, t(14) = 2.46, p = .027.
This replicates findings of the current experiment and shows that the ability to rec-
ollect seems to be caused by task difficulty. Specifically, if a task is easy, due to, for
example, encoding fewer items or due to repetition, then even 5-year-olds are able
to recollect details under limited response time.
Second, there are different developmental trajectories for recollection and
familiarity. Under limited response time it appears that there are no differences
between age groups’ ability to recollect and this was the case single and repeated
item presentation. This is in line with Experiment 2 and suggests that under limited
response time recollection is hindered, leading to no differences between age groups’
recollection. After single item presentation familiarity was higher in 11-year-olds
than in 5-year-olds and adults. Higher familiarity in 11-year-olds than in adults
seems to be caused by the low level of familiarity in adults compared to 11-year-olds
(see Figure 3.2). After repeated item presentation familiarity did not improve with
age. In sum, under limited response time familiarity increases more with age than
recollection but under self-paced response time recollection increases more with age
then familiarity. Further, accuracy seems to be higher without response deadline
than with response deadline indicating differences in task difficulty across experi-
ments. This might suggest that developmental trajectories are mediated by task
difficulty. Specifically, if the task is easy, then familiarity is comparable to an adult
level earlier than recollection. On the contrary, if the task is hard, then even adults
have to rely more on familiarity which results in larger differences across age in
familiarity than recollection.
Under speeded conditions we predicted an increase of exclusion errors af-
ter repeated compared to single item presentation in all age groups (Jacoby, 1999).
Somewhat surprisingly, exclusion errors only increased in adults, not in children.
In children no effects of repetition were found in acceptance rates. Thus, in chil-
dren limited response time appears to eliminate significant effects of repetition on
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acceptance rates. The increase of exclusion errors in adults was reflected in famil-
iarity. Specifically, under limited response time repetition only increased familiarity
in adults but boosted recollection across all age groups.
In sum, against our predictions, repetition did not result in more exclusion
errors and thus, increased familiarity across all age groups. This was only the
case in adults. To ensure that these different effects of repetition under limited
response time on children and adults are not due to a stricter response time limit in
adults additional analyses were performed. First, we determined whether timed out
responses differed between age groups (this method was also applied in Chapter 2).
Timed out responses. Overall, 5-year-olds timed out on 11.79% of trials, 7-
year-olds on 4.63%, 11-year-olds on 2.56% and adults on 7.34%. A one-way ANOVA
revealed that missed responses differed across age, F(3, 98) = 13.16, p < .001, ηp2
= .29 where 5-year-olds missed their responses deadlines more often than 7- (p <
.001), 11-year-olds (p < .001) and adults (p = .017). Adults missed their response
deadline more often than 11-year-olds (p = .007). The other age groups did not
differ. To explore whether this played a role in the pattern of memory performance,
we decided to rerun our analyses with a group of 5-year-olds and adults matched
with the 7-and 11-year-olds on the rate at which they were able to respond within
the deadline. Removing the poorest performing participants resulted in a sample of
seven 5-year-olds with a failure rate of 5.43% and 18 adults with a failure rate of
3.94, which did not differ from the rate observed in the other samples, F(3, 75) =
2.60, p = .058, ηp2 = .09. Due to the small sample size in 5-year-olds recollection
and familiarity estimates of the reduced sample cannot be interpreted. However,
as our main reason for this analysis is to explain the pattern of results in adults
we will now focus on the adults data. Removing adult participants who timed out
most often, made no difference to the pattern of data reported above (see Table 3.4).
Specifically, as in the whole sample, adults’ familiarity after single item presentation
was comparable to that of 5-year-olds and lower than 11-year-olds. Thus, these age
effects cannot be explained by a too strict time limit in adults.
However, there was more evidence suggesting that the response time limit
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was stricter in adults than in 11-year-olds. The response time limit in Experiment 6
is based on the mean response times of Experiment 5 (unspeeded). The high variance
of the response time in adults in Experiment 5 led to a strict response deadline of
1096 ms. To get a more lenient response deadline, outliers of the response times in
Experiment 5 were determined using boxplots. Outliers were excluded and a new
response deadline was calculated (one standard deviation below the mean response
time). We recruited an additional independent sample of 25 adult participants (M
= 24 years, SD = 5 years) of whom 3 had to be excluded because they were unable
to repeat the instructions. The procedure only differed in the deadline which was
more lenient (1205 ms). The lenient response deadline led to an identical pattern
of results as the strict deadline (see Table 3.4), where all the main effects and
interaction terms stayed unchanged. Thus, this provides further evidence that the
strict response deadline is not the cause for this pattern of results.
Table 3.4
Parameter estimates of familiarity and recollection in Experiment 5 and Experiment
6 (strict deadline, poorest performers were excluded, lenient deadline) as a function
of repetition in adults
Unspeeded
Experiment 5
Strict
deadline Experiment 6
Poorest
performers excluded
Lenient
deadline Experiment 6
Recollection
Once .61 (.25) .41 (.27) .41 (.27) .40 (.30)
Thrice .72 (.26) .50 (.30) .56 (.34) .46 (.25)
Familiarity
Once .62 (.32) .49 (.26) .46 (.27) .52 (.29)
Thrice .67 (.29) .69 (.27) .70 (.33) .80 (.24)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Another way to investigate the drop in familiarity in adults compared to
11-year-olds is by post-hoc applying a stricter response time limit to data of 11-
year-olds. To include only very fast response comparable to responses given by
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adults with in the strict deadline of 1096 ms, we only analysed responses given
within 1500 ms. Using this limit still there were still sufficient items per cell to
estimate recollection and familiarity (this was not the case with the deadline of
1096 ms). However, this did not change 11-year-olds parameter estimates (1500
ms: Familiarity for once presented items, .78; thrice presented items, .71; 2293 ms:
Familiarity for once presented items, .75; thrice presented items, .70) and shows that
the increase in familiarity after repeated item presentation under limited response
time was not apparent in 11-year-olds under a lenient or strict response deadline.
To summarize, under limited response time repetition was expected to
increase exclusion errors across all ages, driven by higher boosts in familiarity than
recollection. This pattern was only found in adults, not in any other age group.
One possible explanation is that the response deadline was stricter in adults than
in any other age group. This possibility was ruled out in three different analyses
methods. First, even though the response deadline was stricter in adults than in
11-year-olds, removing participants who timed out most often did not change the
pattern of results. Second, an additional experiment using a more lenient deadline
revealed comparable boosts in familiarity as under a strict deadline. Thus, it is
unlikely that this effect is due to a sampling error. Finally, no increase of familiarity
after repetition was found even when a strict response deadline was applied to 11-
year-olds’ data.
In Experiment 6, in children acceptance rates did not differ for once and
thrice presented items. This might suggest that during childhood the effects of rep-
etition appear to be eliminated by limiting response time. Only in adults repetition
increased exclusion errors and thus familiarity. This is in line with findings by Ja-
coby and colleges (1998) who demonstrated similar findings in adults. The adult
results, where repetition boosts familiarity more than recollection, are highly similar
to the pattern of 5-year-olds in Experiment 5. In Experiment 5, 5-year-olds commit-
ted more exclusion errors after repetition resulting in higher increases for familiarity
than recollection. This might suggest that if recollection cannot be accessed, that
may be due to a response time limit (see adults in Experiment 6) or a less developed
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recollective system itself (in 5-year-olds in Experiment 5), and then repetition is
more likely to increase familiarity more than recollection.
Next, parameter estimates under self-paced (Experiment 5) and limited re-
sponse time (Experiment 6) across all age groups were compared. In line with Chap-
ter 2, recollection was expected to be significantly reduced under limited response
time whereas familiarity was expected to widely unaffected. We were specifically
interested in the effects of limiting response time after repeated compared to single
item presentation.
3.4 Comparison between Experiment 5 and Experiment 6
3.4.1 Recollection and Familiarity
To investigate the effects of limiting response time recollection and familiarity esti-
mates were entered into two 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2
(Experiment: self-paced vs. limited response time) x 2 (repetition: once vs. thrice)
ANOVAs with age group and condition as between-subjects variable and repetition
as within-subjects variable.
For recollection there was a main effect of limiting response time, F(1,
204) = 18.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, where recollection was significantly reduced
under response time limit (M = .59) compared no limit (M = .45). Repeated item
presentation (M = .58) increased recollection compared to single item presentation
(M = .46), F(1, 204) = 36.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. There was a significant main
effect for age group, F(3, 204) = 4.92, p = .003, ηp2 = .07, where recollection based
responses were lower in 5-year-olds (M = .41) than in all other age groups (7-year-
olds, M = .54, p = .034; 11-year-olds, M = .56, p = .005; adults, M = .56, p = .006)
which all did not differ. No significant interactions were found.
There was no main effect of limiting response time on familiarity, F(1, 204)
= 1.96, p = .163, ηp2 = .01. This however, was qualified by an interaction with age,
F(3, 204) = 3.67, p = .013, ηp2 = .05, where familiarity did not differ between
age groups when there was no response deadline, but was higher in 7- (M = .62,
p = .051) and 11-year-olds (M = .73, p < .001) than in 5- year-olds (M = .45)
under speeded conditions. Further, whereas limiting response time did not affect
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familiarity in the older age groups (p > .140), it reduced familiarity in 5-year-olds (p
< .004). There was a main effect of repetition, F(1, 204) = 17.64, p < .001, ηp2 =
.08, (familiarity higher after repeated (M = 67) than after single item presentation
(M = .60)) and a main effect of age (familiarity increased between age 5 and 11 (p =
.004)), F(3, 204) = 3.97, p = .009, ηp2 = .06 which was qualified by an age group x
repetition interaction, F(3, 204) = 2.48, p = .063, ηp2 = .04, where after single item
presentation familiarity increased with age between 5- and 11-year-olds (p < .001)
but did not increase with age after repeated item presentation (p > .999). In all age
groups apart from the 11-year-olds (p = .944) familiarity based recognition increased
after repeated item presentation (all ps < .021). No other significant interactions
were found.
Overall, recollection decreased more than familiarity as a function of the
response deadline. This is in line with previously reported experiments in Chapter
2 and findings from the adult literature (Toth, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). Further,
recollection increased with age whereas familiarity only increased across age under
limited but not under self-paced response time conditions. Additionally, familiarity
increased after repeated item presentation in 5-, 7-year-olds and adults but not in
11-year-olds.
3.5 General Discussion
The aim of the current chapter was to examine how repetition during encoding and a
response deadline during recognition affect developmental trajectories of recollection
and familiarity. More specifically, we investigated the effects of single vs. repeated
item presentation at encoding and limiting response time at retrieval using the PDP.
In brief there were two main findings. First, repeated item presentation led to quan-
titative (acceptance rates) and qualitative memory changes (recollection and famil-
iarity). Specifically, under self-paced response time repetition boosted recollection
in older children and adults but not in 5-year-olds, whilst familiarity was boosted
in 5- and 7-year-olds but not in 11-year-olds and adults (Experiment 5). Under lim-
ited response time single item compared to repeated presentation resulted in lower
recollection values in all age groups, whilst repetition boosted familiarity in adults
110CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF REPETITION AND LIMITED RESPONSE TIME
(Experiment 6). Second, we found different developmental trajectories for processes
underlying recognition memory where under self-paced response time (Experiment
5) recollection increased between 5-year-olds and the older age groups whereas famil-
iarity did not differ between age groups. Under limited response time (Experiment
6), the developmental pattern reversed and familiarity increased between 5-year-olds
and the older age groups whilst age differences in recollection were removed. These
two experiments provide experimental (i.e., encoding and recognition manipulation)
and developmental evidence (i.e., developmental trajectories) consistent with dual-
process theory.
In Experiment 5 repetition led to better memory performance, that is more
hits whilst exclusion errors were unaffected. This was the case for 7-, 11-year-olds
and adults. Interestingly, in 5-year-olds repetition also increased exclusion errors
(i.e., incorrect yes-responses to non-targets in exclusion). Previous research indicates
that different mechanisms, such as metamemory rejection strategies (Ghetti, 2008)
help to counteract monitoring errors. These strategies are not in place in 5-year-
olds yet (Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2010). Further, increases in exclusion errors
after repetition have also been shown in older adults as well as in young adults under
limited response time during recognition (Jacoby, 1999). Recollection and familiarity
parameters reflect this pattern. Exclusion errors are driven by familiarity and an
absence of recollection (Jacoby, 1999). Repeated item presentation mainly boosted
familiarity in young children, and boosted recollection in older children and adults.
Specifically, the finding, that repetition boosts recollection less in younger
children than in older children and adults, suggests that younger children’s potential
for recollection is lower than older children’ and adults’. These findings are compara-
ble to findings from deep vs. shallow encoding conditions (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008).
Here, only after deep, not after shallow encoding age differences for recollection
emerged. This suggests that recollection depends on rich and elaborate encoding.
The finding, showing that repetition increases familiarity more in younger children
than in older children and adults, suggests that children’s familiarity can be boosted
to an adult level. This implies that children’s potential for familiarity is comparable
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to adults’. This is comparable to previous developmental findings and shows that
after elaborate encoding familiarity reaches the same level in children as in adults.
Specifically, Ghetti and Angelini’s study (2008) showed that age differences in fa-
miliarity can be overcome after a long encoding duration. This indicates that whilst
familiarity is fairly automatic in adults, this might not be the case yet in children.
Thus, effects of repetition seem to be comparable to findings from as long
study duration in children and deep encoding in adults. One possible explanation
might be that in younger children repetition simply increases memory performance
by increasing familiarity whereas in older children and adults repetition leads to
rich encoding resulting in increases in recollection. Parkin, Gardiner and Rosser
(1995) showed that repetition affects recollection and familiarity differently based
on whether repetition is spaced or massed: Spaced repetition is found to increase rec-
ollection, whereas massed repetition (i.e., repeated items follow each other) is found
to increase familiarity. They suggest that similar to deep encoding, spaced repeti-
tion seems to promote elaborative encoding. Experiment 5 shows that this seems to
only be the case in older children and adults. In younger children spaced repetition
seems to have similar effects as massed repetition in adults and simply supports
maintenance of the stimuli without encouraging further elaborative encoding.
In Experiment 6 participants had to make their memory judgments under
limited response time after repeated item presentation. We aimed to investigate
whether the beneficial effects of repetition hold under response deadline. Based on
previous research (Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Jacoby, 1999) and 5-year-olds’ pattern
of results in Experiment 5, we expected more exclusion errors after repetition than
after single item presentation across all age groups. Given that exclusion errors are
driven by increased familiarity, we predicted increased familiarity after repetition
across all age groups. Surprisingly, repetition only resulted in increased exclusion
error rates in adults but not in child participants. In children exclusion errors were
unaffected by repeated item presentation. This might indicate that in children the ef-
fects of repetition were eliminated by the response time limit. Exclusion errors were
also reflected in the parameter estimates. Only in adults, not in children, familiarity
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was boosted by repetition. Further, repetition led to increases in recollection across
all age groups. Importantly, these lager increases of familiarity than recollection
after repetition were found in both 5-year-olds without a response deadline (Exper-
iment 5) and in adults with a response deadline (Experiment 6). It appears that if
recollection cannot be accessed, either due to lower potential for recollection or a
response deadline, then familiarity based responding takes over.
Evidence for different developmental trajectories of familiarity and recol-
lection across age are in line with dual-process theory. In Experiment 5 and 6 both
recollection and familiarity were available at the age of 5. Without a response dead-
line, recollection increased between 5 and 7 years whereas familiarity did not differ
between age groups. This is in line with dual-process theory where familiarity is
thought to be faster and more automatic than recollection (Yonelinas, 2002). The
finding that familiarity did not increase with age is in contrast to our previous ex-
periments (1 and 3) where both recollection and familiarity increased with age. In
Experiment 1 recollection increased mainly between age 5 and 7, familiarity only be-
tween 5-year-olds and adults, in Experiment 3 recollection increased mainly between
age 11 and adulthood, familiarity mainly between age 5 and 7. One possible expla-
nation is that the current experiment was, due to item repetition and a shorter study
list, easier than Experiments 1 and 3 resulting in no age differences for familiarity.
To explore this we conducted an ANOVA comparing overall accuracy between ex-
periments with long (80 items) and shorter study list (56 items). This shows that
long study lists (Experiment 1, M = .78, F(1, 199) = 6.73, p = .010, ηp2 = .03;
Experiment 3, M = .74, F(1, 200) = 44.20, p = .001, ηp2 = .18) resulted in lower
overall accuracy than shorter study lists (Experiment 5, M = .81). This implies that
Experiment 5 is easier than Experiment 1 and 3. To explore whether the difference
in developmental changes across age for familiarity is caused by task difficulty, we
rerun our analyses on data from Experiments 1 and 3 matched with Experiment
5 on overall accuracy. Removing participants with the lowest accuracy in Experi-
ments 1 and 3 resulted in an accuracy rate (Experiment 1, M = .83; Experiment 3,
M = .80) which did not differ from the rate observed in Experiment 5 (Experiment
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1 vs. Experiment 5, F(1, 178) = .10, p = .750; Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 5,
F(1, 154) = .81, p = .369). The matched sample showed the same developmental
trajectory for familiarity as the one observed in Experiment 5. Specifically, as in
Experiment 5, familiarity did not differ across age (matched sample Experiment 1,
F(3, 71) = 2.31, p = .083, ηp2 = .09; matched sample Experiment 3, F(3, 52) =
2.34, p = .084, ηp2 = .11). Thus, absolute age differences seem to be dependent
on the difficulty of the task and should thus be carefully interpreted. Importantly,
developmental trajectories do match our predictions based on dual-process theory
and show different developmental trajectories for recollection and familiarity.
Interestingly, under limited response time the opposite developmental
trends were found. Here, recollection did not differ between age groups whereas
familiarity increased between age 5 and 7 (Experiment 6). Thus, in line with Ex-
periment 2, limited response time eliminated age differences in recollection. Instead
older children and adults rely more on familiarity, resulting in increased familiarity.
In sum, whereas under limited response time only familiarity changed across age,
under self-paced response time only recollection changed across age. Again, devel-
opmental trajectories appear to be mediated by task difficulty. Specifically, if the
task is easy (no response deadline), then differences across age seem to be larger in
recollection than in familiarity. In contrast, if the task is hard (response deadline),
then differences across age seem to be larger in familiarity than in recollection.
These different developmental trajectories of recollection and familiarity add to the
evidence favouring dual-process theories of recognition memory and suggest that
the two processes may undergo different rates of developmental change.
A comparison of parameter estimates between the limited and self-paced
response time condition revealed a greater reduction on recollection than on famil-
iarity after limited response time. This replicates previously reported experiments
(Chapter 2) and findings from the adult literature (Toth, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). In
conclusion, both the different developmental trajectories of recollection and famil-
iarity as well as differential effects of repetition add to the idea that recollection and
familiarity are two processes underlying recognition memory already in childhood.
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One potential limitation of this interpretation might be that adults and 5-year-olds
timed out more often than the other age groups, suggesting that the time limit was
more stringent for them than for the other age groups. However, a series of addi-
tional analyses revealed that a less stringent response time would not have changed
the reported pattern of results for adults. Moreover, even though 5-year-olds and
adults timed out more often than 7- and 11-year-olds, they were still able to use
recollection.
In sum, in Chapter 2 we showed that manipulating memory at recognition
by limiting response time leads to a dissociation of recognition memory across all age
groups. In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that manipulating memory by repeatedly
presenting items at encoding results in differential benefits on recollection and famil-
iarity across childhood. Across both chapters different developmental trajectories
were found for recollection and familiarity. These differential benefits as well as the
different developmental pattern for recollection and familiarity are consistent with
a dual-process account of memory. We now turn to Chapter 4 in which we inves-
tigated whether a developmental memory phenomenon, the perceptual-conceptual
shift, can be explained by developmental of recollection and familiarity.
Chapter 4
The perceptual to semantic shift
4.1 Introduction
The previous two experimental chapters demonstrated that the PDP is an appro-
priate method to investigate the development of recognition memory. Across six
experiments we demonstrated that even 5-year-olds understood the instructions and
are able to recollect items on the basis of number and location. The dissociation of
recollection and familiarity in all age groups after a response time limit as well as
the distinct developmental trajectories with increase of recollection with age (Experi-
ments 1, 3 and 5) combined with either no differences between age groups’ familiarity
(Experiment 5) or increases at a different rate than recollection (Experiment 1 and
3) are consistent with dual-process theory.
Now, the PDP will be used to investigate the shift from perceptual to
semantic processing. A change from perceptual to semantic processing has been
reported to occur gradually during childhood (Bach & Underwood, 1970; Dewhurst
& Robinson, 2004; Hasher & Clifton, 1974; Holliday & Weekes, 2006; Maril et al.,
2011). That is, younger children seem to focus more on perceptual features of items
whereas older children and adults more likely form concepts and categories. The next
section will provide a short overview of literature on the perceptual to conceptual
shift.
4.1.1 The perceptual to semantic shift across childhood
The earliest work demonstrating a developmental shift from perceptual to seman-
tic processing across childhood stems from Bach and Underwood (1970). Primary
school children encoded a wordlist and were presented with a forced-choice recogni-
tion test consisting of one earlier presented word, one phonologically related word,
one semantically related word and one unrelated word. The developmental percep-
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tual to semantic shift became evident in the pattern of errors. Specifically, younger
children incorrectly accepted more phonologically related words than semantically
related words; the opposite was true for older children.
Similarly, Hasher and Clifton (1974) presented 7-, 11-year-olds and adults
with word lists words containing sequences of rhyming, semantically related and
unrelated words. In a free recall task 7-year-olds recalled more rhyming than seman-
tically related or unrelated words, 11-year-olds recalled more semantically related
than rhyming or unrelated words and adults recalled rhyming and semantically re-
lated words equally well. It was concluded that for 7-year-olds phonological features
are more salient than semantic information, whereas for 11-year-olds semantic infor-
mation is more salient than phonological features.
The developmental shift from perceptual to semantic processing was also
observed using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) (McDermott & Roediger,
1998; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm (Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004). In
the DRM procedure participants first study a list of semantically related words (e.g.
“thread, pin, eye, sewing”). This is followed by either a free recall test or a recognition
memory test. Here, many participants report not only studied words but also the
unpresented “critical lure” which is related to all earlier presented words (“needle”).
Typically, false memories for critical lures increase with age (e.g.; Brainerd, Reyna,
& Forrest, 2002; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Howe, 2005, 2006b; Howe, Wimmer,
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Lampinen, Leding, Reed, & Odegard, 2006, for a review
see Brainerd, Reyna & Ceci, 2008).
Dewhurst and Robinson (2004) presented 5-, 8-, and 11-year-olds with
DRM lists where each item had at least one possible rhyming word. In a free recall
task, 5-year-olds were more likely to falsely recall words that were phonologically
(rhyming words) than semantically related to encoded words, whereas the oppo-
site pattern was found in 11-year-olds. 8-year-olds were equally likely to falsely
recall semantic, phonological or unrelated words. This is in line with the above
outlined studies (Bach & Underwood, 1970; Hasher & Clifton, 1974) and suggests
that younger children rely more on phonological features of items, whereas adults
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rely more on semantic features.
Similar findings were demonstrated when 8-, 11-, and 13-year-olds encoded
a typical semantic DRM list and a list of phonological related (e.g., pole, bowl, hole)
words (Holliday & Weekes, 2006). Here, in a later recognition test phonologically
related false memories (e.g., roll) decreased with age, semantically related false mem-
ories increased with age.
Importantly, in contrast to the above reported studies Maril and colleagues
(2011) used visual instead of phonological features to manipulate perceptual infor-
mation. In an fMRI study 8- to 11-year-old children and adults were presented with
a word (e.g., apple) and a colour splatter (e.g., red). Participants created a mental
image of these combinations and judged whether a colour-word combination was
congruent (e.g., red apple) or incongruent with real life (e.g. blue strawberry) before
completing a recognition test. Both children and adults showed higher memory ac-
curacy for congruent than for incongruent items. Interestingly, fMRI data showed
that during encoding areas associated with perception were activated in children,
whereas in adults areas associated with semantic processing were activated. Thus,
although both children and adults remembered more congruent images, fMRI data
suggests that they focused on different features (perceptual versus semantic) when
encoding information (Maril et al., 2011).
Further, previous studies examined the effect of directing attention towards
perceptual and semantic features of objects during encoding on recollection and
familiarity. Ghetti and Angelini (2008) showed that semantic encoding is more
beneficial for later recollection and familiarity than perceptual encoding. Benefits of
semantic encoding on familiarity are comparable across all age groups. Importantly,
in line with the developmental shift, benefits of semantic encoding on recollection
are larger in older children and adults than in younger children. Similarly, Ghetti et
al. (2011) presented 6-, 9-, 12- and 17-year-olds with pictures. Participants had to
name the colour of the picture and answer one of four semantic question (e.g., “Is this
heavy or light?”) before completing a remember-know procedure where perceptual
(colour) and semantic details (what question was asked) about the item had to
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be retrieved. Interestingly, subjective familiarity judgements based on perceptual
features decreased with age. Further, subjective recollection was based on perceptual
features in younger children but on semantic features in older children.
In sum, developmental evidence suggests that young children engage more
in perceptual processing, which shifts throughout childhood towards more semantic
processing. This results in increasing semantic and decreasing perceptual false mem-
ories with age (Bach & Underwood, 1970; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Holliday &
Weekes, 2006), differences in neuronal patterns across age (Maril et al., 2011), as
well as in differences of memory processes with age (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Ghetti
et al., 2011). Perceptual processing was shown on a phonological level as well as on
a visual one. Semantic processing was shown via category lists, DRM lists as well as
via semantic encoding. Importantly, the only two studies which have investigated
whether the perceptual to semantic shift is reflected in recollection and familiarity
parameters used methods that require accurate self-report of memory experience
(i.e., the remember-know paradigm; Ghetti et al., 2011) or the ability to monitor
memory strength (i.e., the ROC method; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Thus, recol-
lection and familiarity values might reflect changes in children’s ability to monitor
memory states instead of changes in memory processes.
This chapter aimed to investigate whether the developmental shift from
perceptual to semantic processing is reflected in objective recollection and familiar-
ity estimates. First, we expect more perceptual than semantic based processing
in young children, and more semantic than perceptual based processing in older
children and adults (e.g., Ghetti et al., 2011). Whenever perceptual processing is
encouraged, benefits should be more pronounced in younger children than in older
children and adults. In contrast, whenever semantic processing is encouraged, bene-
fits should be more pronounced in older children and adults than in younger children.
Further, recollection is assumed to be more sensitive to semantic encoding, whereas
familiarity is assumed to be more sensitive to perceptual manipulation (Yonelinas,
2002). Specifically, whereas semantic compared to perceptual encoding leads to
more benefits for recollection than familiarity, different modalities between encod-
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ing (i.e., visual) and test (i.e., auditory) affect familiarity more than recollection.
However, both processes can be sensitive to conceptual fluency (for a review see
Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, it follows that changes in recollection after semantic manip-
ulations are expected to increase with age. Similarly, changes in familiarity after
perceptual manipulations are expected to decrease as a function of age.
The second aim was to investigate age-related changes in false memories
to semantically related distractors. This is a very robust finding which has been
demonstrated in free recall as well as in recognition memory tests (e.g., Carneiro,
Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Lampinen et al., 2006), with words as
well as pictures as stimuli (Howe, 2008) and with lists of associatively as well as
categorically related items (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Research in adults using
DRM lists (Gallo, 2010; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and categorized lists (Knott
& Dewhurst, 2007) demonstrated that semantic false memories are accompanied
by remember-responses (i.e., recollection). Brainerd, Wright, Reyna and Mojardin
(2001) demonstrated using a modelling approach that in adults phantom recollection
(i.e., conscious experience of encoding a non-studied item) and familiarity contribute
to false memory formation. Developmental evidence, however, is sparse. Thus, using
the PDP we aimed to investigate whether false memories are more associated with
recollection or familiarity and whether that changes across childhood.
Finally, we predicted that familiarity reaches an adult level earlier than
recollection. Together with dissociations of recollection and familiarity after per-
ceptual and semantic manipulations, this would provide evidence consistent with
dual-process theory.
4.2 Experiment 7
The main aim of Experiment 7 was to investigate whether the developmental shift
from perceptual to conceptual processing is reflected in recollection and familiarity
estimates using the PDP. We presented material encouraging semantic and percep-
tual processing without directing attention towards either perceptual or semantic
features. Semantic processing was fostered by presenting uncategorized (e.g., guitar,
tree, balloon) and categorized encoding lists (e.g., dog, crocodile, bear). Encoding
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categorized lists resulted in more semantically related false memories than encoding
uncategorized lists (e.g., Lampinen et al., 2006, for a review see Brainerd et al.,
2008). The perceptual manipulation was based on Maril et al.’ (2011) congruency
manipulation. Items were either presented up-side-down (incongruent with the real
world) or in upright orientation (congruent with the real world). The recognition
test consisted of semantically related but unpresented distractors, unrelated distrac-
tors and earlier encoded items. This allowed examining semantic false memories.
The number of presented objects was used as the basis for criterion based recol-
lection (see also Experiment 1). This is an advantage to previous studies where
the attention was directed towards the later to-be recollected item during encoding.
This avoided confounds of the measures. A further advantage of the PDP is that it
provides process pure measures of recollection and familiarity instead of relying on
subjective reports (Ghetti et al., 2011).
The developmental shift from perceptual to semantic processing might be
reflected in recollection and familiarity estimates. Developmentally we expect that
if for younger children, perceptual features are indeed more salient than semantic
features, then later memory performance should benefit more from perceptual than
from semantic encoding. If for older children and adults, semantic features are more
salient than perceptual features, then increases in later memory performance should
be higher after semantic than after perceptual encoding. From dual-process the-
ory we know that semantic manipulations affect recollection more than familiarity
(Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, given the perceptual to semantic shift, changes in recollec-
tion after semantic manipulations are expected to increase with age. In contrast,
more effects of perceptual manipulations are expected on familiarity than on recol-
lection (Yonelinas, 2002). Again, given the perceptual to semantic shift, changes in
familiarity after perceptual manipulations are expected to decrease as a function of
age.
Further, this study design allows the investigation of how recollection and
familiarity are related to false memories and whether that changes across develop-
ment. The two types of distractors, semantically related vs. unrelated distractors,
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allow calculating a false memory rate (difference between false alarms to semanti-
cally related and unrelated distractors). Semantic false memories are expected to
increase with age (for a review see Brainerd et al., 2008) and are typically accom-
panied by remember-responses, as opposed to a feeling of familiarity (e.g., Gallo,
2010). Based on previous work, we expected correlations between false memories
and recollection.
Finally, familiarity was expected to reach an adult level earlier than recol-
lection. These distinct trajectories, together with a dissociation of recollection and
familiarity after the perceptual and semantic manipulations, are consistent with
dual-process theory.
We will first check whether the assumptions underlying the PDP are met,
then examine the development of false memories, present parameter estimates as a
function of age and semantic vs. perceptual manipulations and finally investigate
whether false memories are linked to familiarity and recollection.
4.2.1 Method
Participants. A total of 116 children and adults (63% female) took part;
35 5-year-olds (M = 5.5 years, SD = 4 months), 23 7-year-olds (M = 7. 5 years, SD
= 4 months), 25 10-year-olds (M = 10.6 years, SD = 4 months) and 33 adults (M
= 21 years, SD = 4 years).
Materials and Procedure. The procedure followed Experiment 1 where
participants had to recollect number of earlier presented items (see Figure 4.1). A
total of 126 items from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) database were used in
this experiment.
Study phase. The study phase consisted of 80 colourful drawings which
formed 5 category lists (i.e., animals, food, kitchen utensils, furniture and transporta-
tion) where items were presented in categorized lists (e.g., dog, crocodile, bear) and
5 uncategorized lists containing items which were not part of the categorized lists
(e.g., guitar, tree, balloon) (semantic manipulation).
Note that the number of category members of the Snodgrass & Vanderwart
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) dataset did not allow forming enough categories
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Figure 4.1. The study phase consisted of categorized and uncategorized lists contain-
ing items presented up-side-down or upright. Recognition consisted of an inclusion
and an exclusion memory tests.
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to use the same lists of categories in the categorized as in the uncategorized presen-
tation format. Importantly, however, used lists were matched for word frequency,
familiarity and name agreement (see Table 4.1). We counterbalanced between par-
ticipants whether categorized or uncategorized lists were presented first. Study lists
contained 8 items each and were presented randomly within a block. Half of the
items within a list were presented up-side-down, the other half upright (perceptual
manipulation). Half of the items presented upside-down/ upright presented two ob-
jects, the other half presented one object (i.e., criterion for recollection). Participants
judged whether the displayed object was soft or hard.
Recognition phase. Additional to the items presented during study, 40
non-studied items (20 of those were related to items presented in categorized format
(related distractors), 20 were unrelated to items in categorized format (unrelated
distractors)) were presented during recognition. Thirteen participants were excluded
from the analyses (five 5-year-olds, three 7-year-olds, one 11-year-old and four adults)
because they were unable to repeat the instructions at the end of recognition.
4.2.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group, encoding condition
(perceptual vs. semantic) and item type for inclusion and exclusion condition are
shown in Table 4.2.
Preliminary analysis. One 5-year-old performed below chance (fewer than
69 correct trials out of the 120, overall accuracy below .575) and was hence removed.
To check for order effects of completing inclusion or exclusion first, recol-
lection and familiarity were entered into two one-way ANOVAs with age group (5-
vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) and test order (inclusion vs. exclusion presented
first) as between-subjects variable. For recollection there was no effect of whether
exclusion or inclusion were completed first, F(1, 95) = 1.76, p = .188, and this was
the case across all age groups as there was no significant interaction, F(3, 95) =
.11, p = .957. The same was true for familiarity, F(1, 95) = .01, p = .974 and this
was the case across all age groups, F(3, 95) = 1.17, p = .324. Thus, order was not
included as an analysis factor.
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Table 4.1
Means (SD) word norms of categorized and uncategorized lists, upright and upside-
down presentation and recognition blocks A and B
N items
Word Frequency Familiarity Name agreement %
(Stuart et al., 2003) (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980)
Semantic
Category 60 38.91 (53.41) 3.68 (.82) .51 (.52)
Uncategorized 60 55.52 (104.11) 3.68 (.83) .39 (.44)
Effect
F(1, 112) = 1.12,
p = .292
F(1, 119) = .00,
p = .983
F(1, 119) = 1.89,
textitp =.172
Perceptual
Upright 40 45.57 (77.20) 3.61 (.83) .51 (.47)
upside-down 40 57.26 (104.22) 3.70 (.84) .45 (.44)
Effect
F(1, 72) = .29,
p = .590
F(1, 79) = .19,
p = .661
F(1, 79) = .40,
p = .528
Recognition
Block A 60 50.54 (99.61) 3.60 (.89) .47 (.53)
Block B 60 44.27 (63.66) 3.76 (.75) .42 (.43)
Effect
F(1, 112) = .16,
p = .691
F(1, 119) = 1.13,
p = .290
F(1, 119) = .28,
p = .599
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Hits and False alarms.
Table 4.2
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as well as recollection and familiarity estimates as a function of age, test condition (Inclusion vs. Exclusion),
item type, semantic (categorized vs. uncategorized lists) and perceptual manipulation (upright vs. upside-down presentation).
5-year-olds (N = 30) 7-year-olds (N = 20) 10-year-olds (N = 24) Adults (N = 29)
Item type Semantic Perceptual Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion
New items
Unrelated .16 (.19) .11 (.03) .08 (.10) .04 (.06) .05 (.08) .04 (.08) .04 (.09) .03 (.06)
Related .20 (.19) .13 (.18) .24 (.18) .06 (.09) .25 (.13) .15 (.15) .23 (.14) .06 (.10)
Targets
uncategorized
Upright .67 (.17) .48 (.31) .81 (.22) .56 (.31) .88 (.13) .59 (.35) .81 (.25) .68 (.20)
Upside-down .66 (.22) .51 (.24) .82 (.17) .57 (.32) .88 (.13) .66 (.26) .88 (.15) .75 (.23)
Categorized
Upright .53 (.21) .49 (.28) .67 (.23) .56 (.34) .78 (.18) .51 (.31) .77 (.21) .62 (.25)
Upside-down .58 (.23) .47 (.27) .77 (.22) .49 (.33) .84 (.21) .63 (.33) .81 (.22) .65 (.28)
Non-
targets
Uncategorized
Upright .64 (.25) .23 (.21) .80 (.30) .36 (.33) .84 (.21) .28 (.23) .88 (.15) .29 (.20)
Upside-down .69 (.27) .24 (.27) .81 (.21) .32 (.33) .84 (.19) .30 (.26) .85 (.17) .26 (.22)
Categorized
Uright .53 (.24) .23 (.19) .67 (.23) .38 (.27) .77 (.23) .33 (.28) .76 (.18) .36 (.25)
Upside-down .52 (.22) .27 (.22) .80 (.22) .30 (.34) .82 (.17) .33 (.34) .86 (.22) .27 (.25)
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To demonstrate that assumptions underlying the PDP were met, a 3 (item
type: new items vs. non-targets vs. targets) x 2 (test condition: Inclusion vs. Exclu-
sion) x 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA was per-
formed on acceptance rates collapsed across perceptual and semantic manipulations
on item type and test condition as within-subject variables and age group as between-
subjects variable. Note that four separate ANOVAs for each semantic/ perceptual
manipulation (categorized-upright, categorized-upside down, uncategorized-upright,
uncategorized-upside down) revealed identical results to the results reported below.
There was a main effect of test condition, F(1, 99) = 256.10, p < .001, ηp2
= .72, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion. There
was a main effect of item type, F(2, 99) = 844.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .90 where more
yes-responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn to
new items (ps < .001). Further, there was a main effect of age, F(3, 99) = 5.75, p =
.001, ηp2 = .15, where 5-year-olds gave fewer yes-responses than both 11-year-olds
(p = .004) and adults (p = .003), the other age groups did not differ (all ps > .14).
There was a significant item type by age group interaction, F(6, 99) = 11.26, p <
.001, ηp2 = .25, where responses to new items (ps > .111) did not differ between
the age groups whereas responses to targets only increased between 5-year-olds and
both 10-year-olds and adults (ps < .006) and non-targets increased between 5-year-
olds and all older age groups (ps < .004). This suggests that base rates to new
items did not differ across age. The condition by the item type interaction, F(2, 99)
= 125.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .56 suggests that participants understood and followed
the instructions. In exclusion more yes-responses were given to targets than to non-
targets than in turn to new items (ps < .001), whereas in inclusion only new items
differed from both, targets and non-targets (p < .001). Further, more yes-responses
were given to new items, targets and non-targets in inclusion than in exclusion (p
< .001) suggesting a shift in bases rates between inclusion and exclusion. This shift
in base rates to new items between inclusion and exclusion is crucial to incorporate
in the estimation of recollection and familiarity (see Chapter 1). Additionally, age
group, test condition and item type interacted, F(6, 99) = 2.69, p = .016, ηp2 =
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.08. This was driven by increases of yes-responses to non-targets in inclusion (hits)
but not in exclusion (false alarms) with age. Importantly, all age groups were in
inclusion able to discriminate between earlier presented and new items (all ps <
.001) and in exclusion gave more yes-responses to targets than to non-targets and in
turn to new items (all ps < .006). Thus, participants across all age groups, including
5-year-olds were able to discriminate between the different item types, showing that
they were able to follow the instructions.
Familiarity and Recollection. To test whether recollection was available
in all age groups, recollection values were compared to the critical baseline value of
.11 (see Chapter 1). Recollection values across all condition were above the baseline
in all age groups (5-year-olds: all ts(29) > 3.56, p < .01; 7-year-olds: all ts(19) >
2.56, p < .05; 11-year-olds: all ts(23) > 5.21, p < .001; adults all ts(28) > 5.98,
p < .001), demonstrating that participants across all age groups made recollection
based responses. To investigate how recollection was affected by age as well as by
the semantic and perceptual manipulation a 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds
vs. adults) x 2 (semantic: categorized vs. uncategorized) x 2 (perceptual: upside-
down vs. upright) ANOVA was performed on recollection estimates with age group as
between subjects-factor and semantic and perceptual as within-subject factor. There
was a main effect of age, F(3, 99) = 3.04, p < .032, ηp2 = .08 where recollection
increased marginally between 5- (M = .37) and 11-year-olds (M = .53, p = .077)
and between 5-year-olds and adults (M = .52, p = .079). The other age groups did
not differ (all ps > .990). There was a main effect of the semantic manipulation on
recollection, F(1, 99) = 14.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .13 where recollection was higher
after encoding items in an uncategorized (M = .51) than a categorized format (M
= .41). There was a main effect of the perceptual manipulation, F(3, 99) = 8.93, p
= .004, ηp2 = .08, where recollection was higher when items were presented upside-
down (M = .50) than when presented in upright orientation (M = .43). None of
the interactions reached significance.
T-tests comparing familiarity values against the critical baseline value of
.11 revealed that familiarity based recognition was evident across all age groups
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(5-year-olds: all ts(29) > 5.33, p < .001; 7-year-olds: all ts(19) > 5.01, p < .001;
11-year-olds: all ts(23) > 6.61, p < .001; adults all ts(28) > 7.16, p < .001)). The
ANOVA revealed a main effect of age for familiarity, F(3, 99) = 4.38, p = .006, ηp2
= .12, where familiarity was lower in 5-year-olds (M = .40) than in both 11-year-olds
(M = .60, p = .018) and adults (M = .59, p = .012). The other age groups did not
differ. There was a main effect of the semantic manipulation on familiarity, F(1, 99)
= 6.06, p = .016, ηp2 = .06, where familiarity was higher after encoding items in
an uncategorized (M = .56) than a categorized format (M = .50). No other main
effect or interactions reached significance.
Table 4.3
Recollection and familiarity estimates as a function of age, semantic (categorized vs.
uncategorized lists) and perceptual manipulation (upright vs. upside-down presenta-
tion)
Age 5 7 10 Adults
Semantic Perceptual (N = 30) (N = 20) (N = 24) (N = 29)
Recollection
Uncategorized
Upright .31 (.24) .29 (.31) .46 (.33) .39 (.25)
Upside-down .47 (.37) .52 (.34) .55 (.30) .55 (.27)
Categorized
Upright .43 (.29) .43 (.37) .57 (.30) .57 (.23)
Upside-down .28 (.26) .49 (.30) .53 (.34) .57 (.37)
Familiarity
Uncategorized
Upright .44 (.32) .57 (.37) .63 (.34) .66 (.67)
Upside-down .43 (.33) .52 (.37) .62 (.34) .57 (.35)
Categorized
Upright .36 (.23) .47 (.26) .60 (.33) .56 (.31)
Upside-down .36 (.20) .55 (.42) .52 (.30) .58 (.33)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
In sum, both recollection and familiarity were already available at the age
of 5. Familiarity and recollection changed at a similar rate with age. Across all age
groups the semantic manipulation affected both processes whereas the perceptual
manipulation affected only recollection. Specifically, recollection and familiarity
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were higher after encoding items in an uncategorized than in a categorized format
(semantic manipulation). Recollection was higher across all age groups when items
were presented upside-down (incongruent with the real world) than when presented
upright. Familiarity was left widely unaffected by this perceptual manipulation.
This finding is inconsistent with Maril et al.’s (2011) study in which colour-word
pairs that were congruent with the real world (red strawberry) led to higher memory
accuracy than incongruent pairs (blue strawberry). A potential explanation for this
difference in findings lies in the similarity between to be encoded item and the to-be
retrieved item. In Maril et al.’s (2011) study, imagining the incongruent pair may
reduce the similarity between the encoded item (e.g., a blue strawberry) and the
target item (e.g., normal strawberry). In the current experiment, imagining the
incongruent item, may lead to mental rotation of the item and thus, increases the
similarity between the encoded item (e.g., an upside-down dog) and the target item
(e.g., upright dog). This is consistent with the generalized context model (Nosofsky,
1984) which says that to classify items as earlier seen or new, similarity of items
under consideration is compared to all seen items and all new items. High similarity
between the item under consideration and the earlier seen item leads to higher
memory accuracy (Nosofsky, 1984).
The finding that items presented upside-down increases recollection com-
pared to items presented upright, might be explained by distinctiveness (Dodson &
Schacter, 2001, 2002b, 2002a; Gallo, Meadow, Johnson, & Foster, 2008). Distinct
items enhance memory because they catch attention by violating the established
context (Jenkins & Postman, 1948). In other words, distinctiveness is generated by
violation of expectations about the world. Upside-down presented items are more
distinct than upright presented items as they violate people’s expectations about
the world. Similar benefits of distinct items have been shown for incongruent versus
congruent stimuli (e.g., Michelon & Snyder, 2006). Thus, current findings demon-
strate that distinctive information leads to higher recollection throughout childhood
and this is already the case at 5 years of age.
Further, surprisingly in contrast to the expected perceptual to seman-
4.2. EXPERIMENT 7 131
tic shift, no interactions between age and perceptual or semantic manipulations
emerged, indicating that these manipulations affected children and adults’ recogni-
tion processes to a similar extent. This might be due to the difference in methods
used in this current paradigm which did not allow for perceptual false memories
(Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004). Further attention was not directed towards either
perceptual and semantic features (Maril et al., 2011).
Further, in contrast to our predictions, where the perceptual manipula-
tion was expected to affect familiarity more than recollection (Yonelinas, 2002),
the opposite pattern emerged. In contrast to our predictions, with more effects
of semantic manipulations on recollection than familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002), the
semantic manipulation affected both processes. Even though this is inconsistent
with the dominant dual-process view, it is consistent with findings from semantic
fluency after which increases in both processes were found (Yonelinas, 2002). This
provides support for the idea that both processes can be sensitive to semantic ma-
nipulations. Our findings are consistent with the notion that recollection provides
accurate memory for details (Hembacher & Ghetti, 2013) whilst familiarity based
recognition seems to extract meanings of items (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
Next, we aimed to investigate the link between false memories and pro-
cesses underlying recognition, by conducting a regression on false memories and
familiarity/ recollection.
The link between false memories and processes underlying recogni-
tion memory. First, we aimed to check whether false alarm patterns to related
and unrelated distractors revealed results in line with research showing an increase
of semantic false memories with age (for a review see Brainerd et al., 2008). To
control for baseline false alarms we calculated a false memory index by subtracting
acceptance rates to unrelated distractors from acceptance rates to related distractors
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Note that here and throughout this Chapter the term
“false memory” refers to false alarms that are semantically related to the category
structure (minus false alarms to unrelated distractors). To investigate whether false
memories increase as a function of age, this false memory index was entered into a
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one-way ANOVA with age group (5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) as between-
subjects factor. False memories increased with age, F(3, 99) = 7.02, p < .001, ηp2
= .18, where both 11-year-olds (M = .16, p < .001) and adults (M = .11, p = .024)
showed more false memories than 5-year-olds (M = .04). The other age groups did
not differ (see Figure 4.2).
Thus, in this experimental design, where items were encoded in a catego-
rized or uncategorized format, false memories increased with age and older children
and adults show more false memories than younger children. This developmental
effect replicates previous developmental studies using category lists (e.g., Brainerd
et al., 2004; Howe, 2006a) and DRM lists (e.g., Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007;
M. C. Wimmer & Howe, 2009). This is consistent with the idea that increases in
false memories with age may reflect stronger associative activation (Howe et al.,
2009) or more gist-based processing (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) in older children and
adults than in younger children
To explore potential links between false memories and processes underlying
recognition (i.e. recollection and familiarity) as a function of age, we regressed false
memories on familiarity and recollection (separately), age group (5- vs. 7- vs. 11-
year-olds vs. adults), and the familiarity/recollection x age interaction. We used
a linear regression because of the continuous nature of the independent variables
familiarity and recollection.
Recollection did not predict false memories, F(1, 95) = .726, p = .396 (see
Figure 4.3). False memories rates were higher as a function of age, F(3, 95) = 6.78,
p < .001 where 5-year-olds (M = .01) showed fewer false memories than 7- (M =
.13, p = .059), 10-year-olds (M = .17, p < .001) and adults (M = .12, p = .020),
and 7-year-olds showed fewer false memories than 10-year-olds (p = .012). There
was no significant interaction between recollection and age, F(3, 95) = .49, p = .690.
Familiarity was linked to false memories, F(1, 95) = 12.78, p < .001 (see Figure
4.3). There was a significant main effect of age, F(3, 95) = 4.65, p = .004 where
5-year-olds (M = -.01) showed fewer false memories than 10-year-olds (M = .09, p =
.002) and adults (M = .08, p = .052) and 7-year-olds (M = .05) showed fewer false
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Figure 4.2. Semantic false memory index (related – unrelated distractors) as a
function of age.
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memories than 10-year-olds (p = .09). There was no significant interaction between
familiarity and age, F(3, 95) = .103, p = .958.
Figure 4.3. The link between false memories and recollection (left panel) and famil-
iarity (right panel).
Together, consistent with DRM literature, false memories increased as a
function of age (Brainerd et al., 2008). Whilst recollection was not linked to false
memories, familiarity partially mediated the link between false memories and age.
These results show that familiarity is linked to false memories and sensitive to seman-
tic rather than perceptual features during encoding. THis in line with the idea that
familiarity based recognition is beneficial for extracting the overall meaning rather
than detailed perceptual attributes of objects (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Hembacher
& Ghetti, 2013). Further, no link between recollection and false memories was found.
In sum, both recollection and familiarity increased with age. The percep-
tual and semantic manipulations affected processes underlying recognition memory
but the magnitude of the effect was comparable across all age groups. Thus, there
was no evidence for a developmental shift from perceptual to semantic processing
across development. A possible explanation might be that in the current experiment
attention was not directed towards either perceptual or semantic features. Thus, in
Experiment 8a attention was explicitly directed towards the perceptual and seman-
tic features of presented items. Further, across all age groups false memories were
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linked to familiarity rather than to recollection. In Experiment 8a we presented all
study lists in a categorized format to examine processes underlying the formation
of false memory formation further.
4.3 Experiment 8a
To investigate the perceptual to semantic shift further, a perceptual and a seman-
tic encoding condition based on Ghetti & Angelini’s first experiment (2008) was
implemented. Six-, eight-, and ten-year-old children and young adults completed a
perceptual encoding condition, in which they stated the colour (red or blue) of the
presented line drawing and a semantic encoding condition, in which they made a
semantic judgement depending on the colour of objects (for objects presented in red
participants stated whether an item was soft or hard, for items in blue whether it
was heavy or light). In later recognition they had to indicate whether an item was
earlier presented in red or in blue. Ghetti and Angelini (2008) found that in all age
groups both recollection and familiarity are higher after semantic than after per-
ceptual encoding. Importantly, the magnitude of semantic encoding on recollection
was larger for older than younger children. However, semantic encoding increased
familiarity to the same extent across all age groups. These increasing benefits of se-
mantic encoding across childhood are consistent with a developmental shift towards
semantic processing (Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004).
In Experiment 8a attention was explicitly directed towards the perceptual
and semantic features during encoding. In perceptual encoding participants had
to find the colour (e.g., red or blue) that matched the presented item (e.g., red
motorbike), in semantic encoding a matching category exemplar had to be found
(e.g., car or apple). Items were presented in category lists. There were two main
differences to Ghetti and Angelini’s study (2008): Instead of drawing participant’s
attention towards the later to be-retrieved (i.e., colour) during encoding, partici-
pants here had to recollect a feature which did not actively receive attention (i.e,
number of items). Second, Ghetti and Angelini (2008) presented the encoding lists
in an uncategorized format, whereas they were presented in a categorized format in
this study. This allowed the investigation of the indirect effects of perceptual and
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semantic encoding.
First, we aimed to investigate the developmental shift from perceptual
to semantic processing which suggests that young children rely more on perceptual
processing, whereas older children and adults rely more on semantic processing (e.g.,
Bach & Underwood, 1970; Maril et al., 2011). In line with findings from Ghetti
and Angelini (2008) we expected that semantic compared to perceptual encoding
increases recollection more than familiarity. Importantly, the magnitude of this
effect is expected to increase with age. Alternatively, if the encoding conditions
result in comparable increases of recollection and familiarity across all age groups,
then there is no evidence supporting the developmental shift from perceptual to
semantic processing. Second, differential effects of encoding on recollection and
familiarity alongside distinct developmental increases provide evidence in line with
dual-process theory. Finally, we aimed to further investigate developmental changes
of false memories as well as processes underlying false memory formation. Based on
Experiment 7, we expected false memories to increase across age and to be related
to familiarity, but not to recollection.
4.3.1 Method
Participants. A total of 116 children and adults (55% female) took part;
27 5-year-olds (M = 5.7 years, SD = 4 months), 25 7-year-olds (M = 7. 6 years, SD
= 3 months), 24 10-year-olds (M = 10.7 years, SD = 3 months) and 40 adults (M
= 19.6 years, SD = 3 years).
Materials and Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experi-
ment 1. In total 110 coloured drawings from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980)
data base were used.
The study phase started with four practice trials. Either one or two ob-
jects were presented in the upper part of the screen; two boxes were displayed in the
lower third of the screen (see Figure 4.4). There were two study conditions: In the
perceptual encoding condition one box displayed a colour matching the presented
item, the other a non-matching colour (e.g., presented item: motorbike; colours:
blue or red). In the semantic encoding condition one box displayed an iconic item
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of a matching category, the other box an iconic item of a non-matching category
(presented in black and white) (e.g., presented item: arm, iconic items: finger or
pineapple). Participants were asked to find the box matching the presented item.
After each practice trial visual feedback on accuracy was given (happy or sad smiley).
If participants failed the first four practice trials (1 pig, 2 dresses, 2 kettles, 1 um-
brella), the same four practice trials were presented again. None of the participants
failed the practice test more than two times.
Figure 4.4. The study phase consisted of a perceptual (find the matching colour) and
a semantic encoding (find the matching category item) condition. The recognition
phase contained an inclusion and an exclusion memory test.
After the practice trials were completed, the study phase started and par-
ticipants were instructed to remember as many items as possible. Participants were
presented 2 blocks containing 4 category lists each (animals, clothing, fruits, kitchen
utensils, vehicles, body parts, vegetables, furniture). Each list consisted of 8 items
presented as colourful drawing. In one block participants had to find the matching
colour (perceptual encoding), in the other block participants had to find the iconic
item matching the category (semantic encoding). Iconic items were defined as items
with the highest familiarity in that category and did not change throughout one
encoding block. Block order was counterbalanced between participants and lists as
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well as items within a list appeared in random order within each block.
The recognition phase consisted of 64 studied items, 16 non-studied items
related distractors and 16 unrelated distractors (presented auditorily and as written
words). The procedure was otherwise identical to that of Experiment 1.
Item type (target, non-target, distractors related and unrelated), study
blocks (perceptual vs. semantic), distractor type (related vs. unrelated) as well as
recognition blocks were matched for word frequencies (Stuart et al., 2003), familiarity
and complexity (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) (Table 4.4). Two 7- and five 5–
year-olds were removed because they were unable to repeat the instructions after
completing the recognition phase.
Table 4.4
Means (SD) word norms of item type, study type (semantic vs. perceptual) and
recognition block A and B.
N items Word Frequency Familiarity Name agreement
(Stuart et al., 2003) (Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980)
Item type A 32 89.43 (261.70) 3.75 (.77) .55 (.10)
Item type B 32 33.48 (39.76) 3.85 (.77) .52 (.09)
Distractor related 16 19.33 (16.42) 3.92 (.64) .56 (.14)
Distractor unrelated 16 32.25 (46.27) 3.56 (.70) .57 (.14)
Effect F(3, 94) = 1.05, p = .374 F(3, 94) = .75, p = .525 F(3, 94) = .34, p = .794
Study type
Study type A 32 101.83 (260.03) 3.81 (.89) .47 (.53)
Study type B 32 21.83 (21.83) 3.81 (.63) .59 (.53)
Effect t(29.65) = 1.68, p = .104 t(62) = .003, p = .997 t(62) = -.91, p = .367
Recognition
Block A 48 56.61 (206.42) 3.80 (.73) .50 (.58)
Block B 48 41.80 (70.13) 3.76 (.75) .52 (.50)
Effect t(90) = .46, p =.646 t(94) = -.26, p = .795 t(94) = -.24, p = .813
Note. Item type A and B refers to target, non-target items. Study type A and B refers
to semantic and perceptual encoding. Both were counterbalanced between participants.
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4.3.2 Results and Discussion
Mean proportions of “yes” responses as a function of age group, encoding condition
(perceptual vs. semantic) and item type for inclusion and exclusion condition are
shown in Table 4.5.
Preliminary analysis. One 11-year-old and one adult performed below
chance (fewer than 69 correct trials out of the 120, overall accuracy below .575)
and were hence removed.
To check for order effects of completing inclusion or exclusion first, recol-
lection and familiarity were entered into two one-way ANOVAs with age group (5-
vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) and test order (inclusion vs. exclusion presented
first) as between-subjects variable. Recollection was higher when inclusion was pre-
sented first (M = .42) than when exclusion was presented first (M = .31), F(1, 99)
= 6.39, p = .013, ηp2 = .06, and this was the case across all age groups as there was
no significant interaction, F(3, 99) = .67, p = .569, ηp2 = .02. However, as there
was no effect of whether exclusion or inclusion was completed first on familiarity,
F(1, 99) = 1.25, p = .266, ηp2 = .01 and this was the case across all age groups,
F(3, 99) = .84, p = .477, ηp2 = .02, exclusion/ inclusion order was not included as
an analysis factor.
Hits and False alarms. To examine whether participants across all ages
were able to discriminate between the different item types in inclusion and exclusion
and whether base rates to new items differed across conditions, a 3 (item type: new
items vs. non-targets vs. targets) x 2 (test condition: Inclusion vs. Exclusion) x 4
(age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA was performed on
acceptance rates collapsed across perceptual and semantic encoding with item type
and test condition as within-subject variables and age group as between-subjects
variable. Note that two separate ANOVAs (one for perceptual, one for semantic
encoding) revealed identical results to the results reported below.
There was a main effect of test condition, F(1, 103) = 168.03, p < .001, ηp2
= .62, where more yes-responses were given in inclusion than in exclusion. There
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Table 4.5
Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion condi-
tion as a function of age and encoding type in Experiment 8.
Item type Target Non-target Distractor
Encoding condition semantic perceptual semantic perceptual related unrelated
Exclusion
5-year-olds (N = 27) .44 (.19) .44 (.20) .19 (.17) .20 (.17) .12 (.13) .02 (.06)
7-year-olds (N = 23) .59 (.23) .50 (.23) .29 (.23) .23 (.18) .07 (.11) .02 (.06)
10-year-olds (N = 23) .48 (.26) .46 (.20) .22 (.20) .16 (.16) .16 (.13) .04 (.09)
Adults (N = 34) .56 (.25) .44 (.23) .31 (.22) .31 (.20) .11 (.09) .04 (.11)
Inclusion
5-year-olds (N = 27) .55 (.21) .50 (.21) .50 (.23) .44 (.22) .12 (.12) .04 (.07)
7-year-olds (N = 23) .61 (.24) .49 (.23) .67 (.21) .54 (.22) .21 (.24) .04 (.10)
10-year-olds (N = 23) .66 (.15) .63 (.21) .67 (.17) .58 (.23) .23 (.16) .02 (.05)
Adults (N = 34) .72 (.16) .72 (.19) .72 (.20) .66 (.20) .13 (.10) .05 (.07)
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was a main effect of item type, F(2, 103) = 861.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .89 where more
yes-responses were given in response to targets than to non-targets and in turn to
new items (all ps < .001). Further, there was a main effect of age, F(3, 103) = 6.51,
p < .001, ηp2 = .16, where 5-year-olds gave fewer yes-responses than adults (p <
.001) whereas all other age groups did not differ (all ps > .071). All these effects
interacted. First, as shown by the age by condition interaction, F(3, 103) = 2.77, p
= .045, ηp2 = .07, yes-responses only increased with age in inclusion, not in exclusion
(all ps > .245). However, all age groups gave more yes-responses in inclusion than
in exclusion (all ps < .001) suggesting a difference in base rates to new items across
conditions. Second, as shown by the item type x age group interaction, F(3, 103)
= 5.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, responses to new items (all ps > .234) did not differ
between the age groups whereas responses to targets and non-targets increased with
age. Importantly, this suggests that base rates to new items did not differ across
age. Third, the condition by the item type interaction, F(6, 103) = 53.08, p < .001,
ηp2 = .34 shows that in exclusion more yes-responses were given to targets than to
non-targets than in turn to new items (all ps < .001). However, in inclusion new
items differed from both targets and non-targets (all ps < .001) but targets and non-
targets did not differ from each other (p > .999). Importantly, this suggests that
participants across all age groups were able to understand and follow instructions
in inclusion as well as in exclusion. Additionally, age group, test condition and item
type interacted, F(3, 103) = 4.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Briefly, this was driven
by age increases of yes-responses to targets in inclusion (hit) between 5- and both
10-year-olds (p = .046) and adults (p < .001) and 7-year-olds and adults (p = .001)
but not in exclusion with age (ps > .351).
Familiarity and Recollection. Mean proportions of familiarity and recol-
lection estimates as a function of age and encoding type are displayed in Table
4.6.
To test whether recollection was used in all age groups, recollection values
were compared to the critical baseline value of .11 (see Chapter 1). Recollection af-
ter both perceptual and semantic encoding was above the baseline in all age groups
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(5-year-olds: perceptual, t(26) = 2.80, p = .009; semantic, t(26) = 4.22, p < .001;
7-year-olds: perceptual, t(22) = 3.42, p = .002; semantic, t(22) = 3.82, p < .001; 11-
year-olds: perceptual, t(22) = 6.37, p< .001; semantic, t(22) = 6.60, p< .001; adults:
perceptual, t(33) = 5.60, p < .001; semantic, t(33) = 7.18, p < .001), demonstrating
that participants across all age groups made recollection based responses. To exam-
ine how recollection was affected by encoding type and age a 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7-
vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2 (encoding type: perceptual vs. semantic) ANOVA
on recollection estimates was performed with age group as between-subjects factor
and encoding type as within-subject factor. Recollection did not differ between age
groups, F(3, 103) = 2.12, p = .103, ηp2 = .06. There was a main effect of encoding
type on recollection, F(1, 103) = 5.28, p = .023, ηp2 = .02 where recollection was
higher after semantic (M = .40) than after perceptual (M = .33) encoding. This
was the case for all ages as indicated by the non-significant interaction, F(3, 103) =
.10, p = .959, ηp2 = .01.
T-tests comparing familiarity values against the critical baseline value of
.11 revealed that familiarity based recognition was evident across all age groups
(5-year-olds: perceptual, t(26) = 3.95, p < .001; semantic, t(26) = 3.60, p < .001;
7-year-olds: perceptual, t(22) = 5.11, p < .001; semantic, t(22) = 6.93, p < .001;
11-year-olds: perceptual, t(22) = 3.69, p < .001; semantic, t(27) = 5.03, p < .001;
adults: perceptual, t(33) = 7.18, p < .001; semantic, t(33) = 7.98, p < .001)). The
ANOVA revealed that familiarity increased with age, F(3, 103) = 7.69, p < .001,
ηp2 = .18, where familiarity was higher in adults (M = .49) than in 5-year-olds (M
= .24, p < .001). There was a main effect of encoding type, F(1, 103) = 5.94, p
= .017, ηp2 = .05 where familiarity was higher after semantic (M = .40) than after
perceptual (M = .34) encoding. This was the case for all age groups as indicated
by the non-significant interaction, F(3, 103) = .97, p = .408, ηp2 = .03.
One aim of the current experiment was to investigate how directly drawing
attention to perceptual and semantic features of items affects recollection and fa-
miliarity. We expected higher recollection and familiarity estimates after semantic
encoding and increasing benefits on recollection as a function of age (Ghetti & An-
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Table 4.6
Recollection and familiarity parameter estimates as a function of age and encoding
type in Experiment 8.
Recollection Familiarity
Semantic Perceptual Semantic Perceptual
5-year-olds (N = 27) .34 (.28) .25 (.27) .24 (.18) .24 (.17)
7-year-olds (N = 23) .37 (.32) .28 (.24) .44 (.23) .33 (.20)
10-year-olds (N = 23) .45 (.24) .40 (.22) .38 (.26) .32 (.27)
Adults (N = 34) .44 (.26) .37 (.27) .53 (.31) .46 (.25)
gelini, 2008). We showed higher recollection and familiarity estimates after semantic
(i.e., category matching) than after perceptual encoding (i.e. colour matching). How-
ever, in contrast to our predictions based on the shift from perceptual to semantic
encoding, this was the case to a similar extent across all age groups.
Further, we predicted that familiarity reaches an adult level earlier than
recollection (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Similar to previous experiments, both rec-
ollection and familiarity were available across all age groups, including 5-year-olds.
However, surprisingly, familiarity estimates were lower in 5-year-olds than in adult-
hood whereas recollection did not change across age. We have observed a similar
developmental pattern in Experiments 2 and 6, in which a response deadline was ap-
plied at retrieval. A 2 (Experiment: Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 8a) x 4 (age group:
5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) ANOVA on overall accuracy revealed no differ-
ences between accuracy in Experiments 2 and 8a, F(1, 175) = .01, p = .993 and no
age group by Experiment interaction, F(3, 175) = 1.03, p = .382. This indicates com-
parable task difficulty across these two experiments. This suggests that the current
encoding set-up served as a divided attention condition at encoding which in turn
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(similarly to a response deadline at retrieval) decreased overall accuracy across all
age groups resulting in a reduction of recollection across all ages to the level of 5-year-
olds. Specifically, here attention had to be directed, not only to the to-be encoded
item, but also towards two boxes (matching colour or category). Dividing attention
at encoding reduces recollection more than familiarity (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002). This
suggests that under difficult task conditions, recollection does not change across age,
whereas familiarity changes across age. Developmental trajectories will be examined
in more detail in the Chapter 5.
The link between false memories and processes underlying recognition
memory. Next, to check whether studying category lists led to an increase of false
memories with age a false memory index was calculated by subtracting acceptance
rates to unrelated distractors from acceptance rates to related distractors (Snodgrass
& Vanderwart, 1980). This false memory index was entered into a one-way ANOVA
with age group (5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) as between-subjects factor.
False memories differed of a function of age, F(3, 103) = 3.44, p = .020, ηp2 = .09,
where both 5-year-olds (M = .09, p = .089) and adults (M = .08, p = .016) had
fewer false memories than 11-year-olds (M = .16). The other age groups did not
differ (see Figure 4.5).
Thus, after encoding category lists the false memory index increased up
to the age of 10 years and decreased in adulthood to the level of 5-year-olds. The
increase of semantic false memories throughout childhood is consistent with the pat-
tern in Experiment 7. However, the significant decrease in false memories between
10-year-olds and adults contrasts with Experiment 7 where false memories did at
least not differ significantly between 10-year-olds and adults. In these experiments
pictures instead of as in traditional experiments words were encoded. Thus, it is
possible that the distinctiveness of the pictures helped adults to reduce false mem-
ories (Hege & Dodson, 2004) by allowing them to use strategic retrieval processes
(Gallo et al., 2008).
To explore potential links between false memories and processes underlying
recognition (i.e. recollection and familiarity) as a function of age, we regressed false
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Figure 4.5. False memory index (related – unrelated distractors) as a function of
age.
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memories on familiarity and recollection (separately), age group (5- vs. 7- vs. 11-
year-olds vs. adults), and the familiarity/recollection x age interaction. Recollection
did not predict false memories false memories, F(1, 102) = 1.31, p = .255. False
memories rates were higher as a function of age, F(3, 102) = 3.76, p = .013, where
10-year-olds (M = .24) made more false memories than 5-year-olds (M = .12, p =
.003) and adults (M = .018, p < .001). The other age groups did not differ. There
was no significant interaction between recollection and age, F(3, 102) = .37, p =
.771. Familiarity was linked to false memories, F(1, 102) = 7.98, p = .006 (see
Figure 4.6). There was a significant main effect of age„ F(3, 102) = 5.39, p = .002
where false memories were higher in 10-year-olds (M = .10) than in all other age
groups (5-year-olds, M = .05, p = .061; 7-year-olds, M = -.03, p = .063; adults,
M = .05, p < .001). There was no significant interaction between familiarity and
age, F(3, 102) = 1.87, p = .139. Consistent with the Experiment 7, false memories
increased up to the age of 10. Again, across all age groups false memories were only
linked to familiarity rather than to recollection.
Figure 4.6. The link between false memories and recollection (left panel) and famil-
iarity (right panel).
Together, Experiment 8a aimed to investigate the developmental shift from
perceptual to semantic processing by directly drawing attention to perceptual (i.e.,
colour) and semantic (i.e., category) features of the items. Directing attention to
semantic features resulted in higher recollection and familiarity than directing at-
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tention to perceptual features. Importantly, these advantages of semantic encoding
did not increase with increasing age. These findings suggest that the developmental
shift from perceptual to semantic processing does not manifest itself in familiarity
and recollection as measured by the PDP.
There are two potential explanations of why we did not find evidence con-
sistent with the perceptual to semantic shift. First, the current experiments only
allowed for semantic, but not for perceptual false memories. In previous studies
(e.g. Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004) both, perceptual (i.e., rhyming words) as well as
semantic false memories could emerge. Thus, in our experiments the perceptual to
semantic shift could not manifest itself in the pattern of false memories. Solely the
increase of semantic false memories across age is an indication for this shift.
Further, the perceptual to semantic shift has also been demonstrated in
true memories (Hasher & Clifton, 1974) and is thus expected to be reflected in
processes underlying recognition. Even though Maril et al. (2011) demonstrated
findings consistent with a perceptual to semantic shift by showing differences in
neuronal activation patterns between children and adults during encoding, they did
not find any behavioural evidence in line with a shift in a later recognition task.
Thus, it is possible that this shift can only be demonstrated in free recall memory
tasks but not in recognition memory tasks.
Together, the current experimental design does not allow for perceptual
false memories and requires a recognition memory test. Thus, the PDP might not
be a suitable method to capture the perceptual to semantic shift. In Experiment
8b we conducted a final study to investigate whether the shift can be observed on a
preference level instead of in recognition memory performance.
4.4 Experiment 8b
The previous experiments found no shift from perceptual to semantic processing,
suggesting that the PDP is not suitable to investigate this shift. However, it is
possible that children show a preference for perceptual over semantic features. In
Experiment 8b, we aimed to examine whether the preference for perceptual or seman-
tic features changes across childhood. Participants were presented with a colourful
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drawing and two boxes, one containing a matching colour (perceptual preference),
the other a matching iconic category exemplar presented as line drawing (seman-
tic preference). Young children are expected to show a perceptual preference, this
preference is expected to shift to a semantic preference in adulthood.
4.4.1 Method
Participants. The same participants took part as in Experiment 8a.
Materials and Procedure. Participants first completed Experiment 8a,
then Experiment 8b. Thirty-two items and colours matching these items were used
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). One colourful picture of an item was presented at
the top half of the screen (e.g., motorbike), two boxes, one containing a matching
colour (e.g., red; perceptual preference), the other one a matching iconic category
item (e.g., car; semantic preference) were presented in the lower third of the screen.
The experimenter pointed to the item presented at the top of the screen and asked
participants “What does this go with?” whilst pointing at the two boxes (see Fig-
ure 4.7). All items were presented during encoding in Experiment 8a. Items were
presented in a random order. Whether the semantic or the perceptual matching
feature was presented in the left or right box was randomised.
Figure 4.7. Method outline for Experiment 8b.
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4.4.2 Results and Discussion
For each of the 24 presented items participants were asked to choose between the box
matching the colour (e.g., red) or box matching the category (e.g., car). First, mean
proportion category choices were entered in a 2 (preference: perceptual vs. semantic)
x 4 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 10-year-olds vs. adults) mixed ANOVA with the first as
within and the second factor as between-subjects variable. There was a main effect
for preference, F(3, 112) = 29.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .21 where perceptual preferences
(M = .64) were more frequent than semantic preferences (M = .36). This was
qualified by an age x preference interaction, F(3, 112) = 6.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .16,
where only 5-year-olds (p < .001) and adults (p < .001) showed a preference for the
perceptual over the semantic box, 7- (p = .298) and 10-year-olds (p = .926) were
equally likely to show perceptual as to show semantic preferences. Thus, young
children seem to attend more on the perceptual than on the semantic features of
items. Seven and 10-year-olds do not seem to have such a preference and are as
likely to sort by perceptual as by semantic features. Surprisingly, in adults a pattern
similar to that found in 5-year-olds.
To further investigate the unexpected pattern in adults, we analysed how
consistent participants were in their preferences for semantic and perceptual features
across trials. Participants who choose the category box in at least 80% of the
trials were classified as consistently showing a semantic preference; participants who
choose the coloured box in at least 80% of the trials were classified as consistently
showing a perceptual preference. The remaining participants were classified as not
showing a clear preference for either semantic or perceptual features.
Chi-square tests were conducted to examine whether age groups differed
in their response strategy. Choice consistency differs across age, χ2(3) = 12.41, p =
.006 (see Figure 4.8). 5-year-olds differ in their consistency pattern from 7- (χ2(2)
= 11.83, p = .002), 10-year-olds (χ2(2) = 11.99, p < .001) and adults (χ2(1) = 4.70,
p = .044). Specifically, in line with the idea that for younger children perceptual
features are more salient (e.g., Bach & Underwood, 1970), 59% of the 5-year-olds
consistently chose the perceptual option, as opposed to only 18% of the 7-year-olds,
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20% of the 10-year-olds and 33% of the adults. Additionally, adults differ from both
7- (χ2(2) = 6.45, p = .034) and 10-year-olds (χ2(2) = 8.08, p = .015). Specifically,
12% of the 7- and 17% of the 10-year-olds showed a consistent semantic preference
whereas none of the 5-year-olds do so.
Figure 4.8. Proportion of participants who showed a clear semantic, a clear percep-
tual preference or no clear preference as a function of age group.
This decreased consistency in preferences might indicate that older chil-
dren and adults understand that both choices are technically correct (e.g., a red
motorbikes is both “red” and from the same semantic category as the “car”), but
that they are choosing the in their opinion most appropriate one. In some cases the
perceptual information is more salient (e.g., red strawberry) whereas in other cases
sometimes the semantic information is more salient (e.g., motorbikes are part of the
same category as cars). This might result in less consistent preferences in the older
age groups.
In sum, 5-year-olds have a consistent perceptual preference compared to
the majority of older age groups, who do not show such consistent preferences, or if
anything, prefer the semantic option. Interestingly, adults do not show a semantic
4.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 151
preference. This might explain the findings of a lack of false memory age effect in
adults in Experiment 8a. Adults simply do not focus on semantic features to the
same extent as 7- and 10-year-olds. Instead, if adults have a clear preference, then
this is a perceptual one, and thus, do not generate as many false memories as 7- and
10-year-olds.
4.5 General discussion
Experiment 7 and 8a used the PDP to investigate whether the perceptual-semantic
shift can be explained in terms of developmental changes in familiarity and recol-
lection. In Experiment 7 attention was not directed towards either perceptual or
semantic features to examine this shift across development. Both recollection and
familiarity were higher after encoding items in an uncategorized than in a catego-
rized format (semantic manipulation). Recollection was higher when items were
presented upside-down than after upright presentation (perceptual manipulation).
This perceptual manipulation did not affect familiarity. The effect of the percep-
tual manipulation can be explained by the distinctiveness (Dodson & Schacter, 2001,
2002b, 2002a; Gallo et al., 2008). Upside-down presented items are incongruent with
the real world. This leads to deeper encoding because prior expectations about the
world are violated (e.g., Einstein, McDaniel, & Lackey, 1989). Importantly, these ef-
fects did not differ between age groups and thus did not provide evidence in line with
a shift from perceptual to semantic processing across development. Further, recol-
lection and familiarity were available already at the age of 5 and were both increased
between the age of 5 and 10. Together, the dissociation of memory processes after
the perceptual manipulation is consistent with dual-process theory; however, com-
parable age-related increases for recollection and familiarity are inconsistent with
our predictions.
In Experiment 8a attention was explicitly directed towards the perceptual
and semantic features during encoding. Both recollection and familiarity were higher
for items encoded during semantic than during perceptual encoding and this was
the case across all age groups. This is in contrast to our predictions drawn from the
notion that there is a perceptual-semantic shift across childhood (see also Ghetti
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& Angelini, 2008) where more benefits of semantic encoding on recollection were
expected with increasing age. Further, the absence of a clear dissociation of recol-
lection and familiarity and the developmental pattern where familiarity increased
between the age of 5 and adulthood, whilst recollection did not improve with age,
does not provide evidence in favour of dual-process theory. Together, we did not find
a shift from perceptual to semantic processing across childhood. Neither the exper-
imental nor the developmental evidence provides evidence in favour of dual-process
theory.
Experiment 8b demonstrated that a perceptual-semantic shift manifests
itself in a consistent preference for perceptual over semantic categories in 5-year-olds,
compared to the majority of older age groups, which do not show such consistent
preferences, or if anything, prefer the semantic option. Thus, we demonstrate a
shift from focusing on perceptual features to focusing on semantic features across
childhood (Maril et al., 2011).
Together, the results from Experiments 7 and 8 have important implica-
tions for theories of recognition memory and the perceptual-semantic shift. First,
we examined the shift from perceptual to semantic processing across childhood (e.g.,
Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004). In this current set of studies, the only evidence in line
with the perceptual to semantic shift occurs on a preference level in which younger
children seem to prefer the perceptual option whereas older children seem to prefer
the semantic option. However, this perceptual to semantic shift is not reflected
in recollection or familiarity parameters. In other words, younger children show a
preference for perceptual features; however, this preference does not result in better
memory performance. Instead, across all age groups, recollection and familiarity are
higher when participants are prompted to focus on semantic instead of perceptual
features.
One limitation of this set of studies is that the current design only allows
for semantic, not for perceptual false memories. Instead, we mainly focused on
manipulations to investigate the perceptual-semantic shift during encoding. Future
research should allow for semantic as well as perceptual false memories.
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Second, a dissociation of recollection and familiarity was only found after
the perceptual manipulation in Experiment 7, where only recollection was boosted
when items were presented upside-down rather than upright during encoding. How-
ever, the conceptual manipulation in Experiment 7 as well as the perceptual vs. se-
mantic encoding in Experiment 8 did not result in a dissociation of recollection
and familiarity or led to differential effects across age groups. Further, dual-process
theory predicts that familiarity reaches an adult level earlier than recollection (see
Chapters 2, 3). However, in Experiment 8 we found age-related increases for famil-
iarity, whereas the ability to recollect did not differ across age. In Experiment 7 we
found comparable increases for both processes. These developmental trends seem
to be highly dependent on the nature of the task. Thus, only the dissociation, but
not the latter findings provide support for dual-process theory.
Third, consistent with DRM findings (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008), Exper-
iment 7 and 8a demonstrated an increase in semantic false memories throughout
childhood, suggesting that 11-year-olds’ associative networks are more elaborate
than 5-year-olds’. Our data suggest that false memories are linked to familiarity:
people who relied more on familiarity were more likely to endorse novel, unseen
items as recognized. No such link was found between false memories and recol-
lection. These findings contrast with previous studies which demonstrated that
semantic false memories induced by a DRM procedure are more associated with
“remember” than with “know” responses (e.g., Gallo, 2010; Roediger & McDermott,
1995). One potential explanation for the link between false memories and famil-
iarity across all ages is the increase in speed at which associative networks can be
activated. As children age, not only do their associative networks become larger,
but the speed to access related concepts increases (M. C. Wimmer & Howe, 2009).
This increase in knowledge and ability seems to paradoxically lead to an increase in
false memories via the use of familiarity.
To conclude, first, the dissociation consistent with dual-process theory was
only found after a perceptual manipulation. The semantic manipulation and the
perceptual vs. semantic encoding manipulation affected recollection and familiarity
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to a similar extent. Second, the perceptual conceptual shift was not reflected in
familiarity and recollection as measured by the PDP but was reflected in a pref-
erence paradigm. Finally, false memories induced by category lists were linked to
familiarity rather than to recollection when a method was used that does not require
introspection in memory states. We now turn to Chapter 5 in which we present a
general discussion of the findings in this dissertation and their wider implications.
Chapter 5
General Discussion
5.1 Introduction
The goal of this dissertation was to provide a developmental test of whether recog-
nition memory is best described by single- or dual-process models (for a debate on
this in the adult literature see e.g. Pratte & Rouder, 2011; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).
Dual-process theories (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) of recognition memory propose the ex-
istence of two memory processes, namely recollection (slow acting process where
qualitative details about an event are recalled) and familiarity (fast acting, auto-
matic and effortlessly executed). Single-process accounts propose that recognition
decisions are based on one single memory strength in relation to a decision criterion
(for a review see Wixted, 2007). On the principle of parsimony it is argued that if
all data can be explained using one single process, then there is no need to posit the
existence of a second process (Jang, Wixted, & Huber, 2009).
This debate whether single- or dual-process accounts are better suited to
explain recognition memory is due to methodological issues mainly based on re-
search in adults (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). The few studies examining
the dual-process nature of recognition memory in children applied methods that re-
quired accurate self-report of memory experience (i.e., the remember-know paradigm;
Billingsley et al., 2002) or the ability to monitor memory strength (i.e., the ROC
procedure; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Abilities to monitor memory processes increase
throughout childhood (cf. Ghetti et al., 2011; Roebers, 2002). This makes it diffi-
cult to dissociate whether memory findings reflect children’s changes in recognition
memory or their ability to monitor memory processes.
To overcome the need for self-report on memory states we adopted the
PDP which allows assessing recollection and familiarity across a wide age range by
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contrasting two tasks (see also Anooshian, 1999; Holliday & Hayes, 2000, 2001; Hol-
liday et al., 2002). The PDP solely relies on old/ new responses which are based on
the memory strength in relation to an internal criterion but not on meta-memorial
judgements. The appropriateness of the PDP to examine the development of recog-
nition memory was established in Chapter 2, by showing that even 5-year-olds, were
able follow the instructions of inclusion and exclusion test conditions as reflected in
the ability to discriminate between new items, targets and non-targets. Experiment
1 and 3 provided novel findings on the nature of recollection by demonstrating that
even 5-year-olds are able to recollect items not only on the basis of list membership
(Anooshian, 1999), but also on the basis of perceptual details, such as number and
location of objects.
Once we successfully demonstrated that the PDP is appropriate to measure
recognition memory in children, we had three concrete aims. First, we aimed to test
dual-process theory by dissociating recollection and familiarity in early childhood.
Second we aimed to test whether these two processes follow distinct developmental
trajectories (second aim). Finally, we aimed to apply the PDP to an interesting
developmental memory phenomenon, the perceptual to semantic shift (e.g., Bach &
Underwood, 1970; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004).
To investigate our first aim we applied the double dissociation logic. Exper-
imental evidence in favour of dual-process theories arises when variables selectively
affect recollection rather than familiarity, and other variables selectively affect fa-
miliarity rather than recollection (i.e., a double dissociation; Yonelinas et al., 2010).
These double dissociations suggest that single dissociations do not simply occur due
to differences in sensitivity of recollection and familiarity measures but provide sup-
port for the dual-process assumption (Yonelinas, 2002). However, if recollection and
familiarity are affected to the same extent, then this favours a single-process model.
In line with our predictions drawn from dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 2002), only
recollection was eliminated in 5-year-olds and reduced across all ages after limit-
ing response time during retrieval. Familiarity was left unaffected (Experiment 2
and 4). The total absence of recollection in 5-year-olds suggests that they relied
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exclusively on familiarity and that recollection is more fragile in 5-year-olds than in
older children and adults. Note that this elimination of recollection was not due to
tougher deadlines in 5-year-olds compared to older age groups (see Chapter 2 and
methodological implications below). Further, this successful dissociation of recog-
nition memory in early childhood supports the notion that familiarity is a faster
acting process than recollection (Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;
Yonelinas, 2002) and provides first support for dual processes being present the age
of 5. An alternative explanation of this single dissociation in line with single-process
theory might be that recollection is a more sensitive measure than familiarity (Berry
et al., 2012). Only double dissociations provide compelling evidence for dual-process
theory which cannot be explained by differences in sensitivity. Therefore, we aimed
to experimentally manipulate familiarity in Chapter 3.
According to dual-process theory, familiarity should be relatively easier to
experimentally increase than recollection (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003). In Chapter 3
memory strength was manipulated at encoding by presenting items once or thrice. In
a later recognition test repetition mainly increased recollection but not familiarity in
7-, 11-year-olds and adults. Importantly, only familiarity was boosted in 5-year-olds.
Thus, repetition during encoding affected memory processes differently in children
than in adults. Repetition during encoding combined with limited response time
during recognition resulted only in adults in boosts for familiarity. Consistent with
Chapter 2, limiting response time resulted in a reduction of recollection across all
age groups. This seems to indicate that if recollection is hindered (due to a response
time limit or a less developed process in young children) then familiarity benefits
more from repetition than recollection. However, if the ability to recollect is not
impaired, recollection benefits more from repetition than familiarity.
Together, we showed in Chapters 2 and 3 that limiting response time during
retrieval selectively reduced recollection while familiarity was unaffected across all
age groups. In Chapter 3 we showed that repeated item presentation boosted famil-
iarity more than recollection in young children and in adults under limited response
time. The finding that a response time limit affects recollection, and repetition af-
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fects familiarity constitutes a double dissociation. This double dissociation across
childhood, caused by theoretically motivated experimental manipulations, provides
a novel contribution to dual-process theory demonstrating that two processes are
already available at the age of 5.
Second, we aimed to investigate whether recollection and familiarity follow
distinct developmental courses across childhood. In line with dual-process theory
where recollection is assumed to be more effortful and familiarity more automatic
and given that basic recognition abilities (i.e., familiarity) are already available in
infants (for a review see Bauer, 2004), familiarity was expected to reach a maximum
adult level earlier than recollection (cf. Anooshian, 1999). In this dissertation the
development of recollection and familiarity differed across experiments. Consistent
with these predictions, in Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5 recollection reached a maximum
adult level later than familiarity, thus suggesting distinct processes underlying recog-
nition, consistent with dual-process theory (cf. Anooshian, 1999). In Experiment
7 both processes showed comparable age-related increases suggesting that a single-
process model is sufficient to explain the development of recognition memory. In
Experiments 2, 6 and 8 familiarity reached a maximum adult level later than recollec-
tion, providing evidence inconsistent with single-and dual-process models. Because
these developmental patterns are not clear cut, we conducted a meta-analysis to
evaluate age-related increases of recollection and familiarity across experiments and
to extract potential moderators of developmental change (see section 5.2).
Third, after empirically validating the PDP, we aimed to examine whether
the developmental shift from perceptual to semantic processing across childhood
(e.g., Bach & Underwood, 1970; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004) is reflected in famil-
iarity and recollection parameters and whether semantic false memories are linked
to familiarity or recollection across childhood. Experiment 7 encouraged semantic
processing by presenting items in a categorized or an uncategorized lists format, and
perceptual processing by presenting items in upright or upside-down orientation. In
Experiment 8a items were encoded in a semantic (sort items by semantic category)
or in a perceptual encoding (sort items by colour) condition. Perceptual and seman-
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tic features (whether manipulated by differences in stimuli or encoding conditions)
affected all age groups to the same extent. This is in contrast to our predictions
suggesting a greater reliance on perceptual features in young children and a greater
reliance on semantic features in older children and adults. The shift from percep-
tual to semantic processing was only evident in Experiment 8b where 5-year-olds
showed a perceptual preference compared to the majority of older children, who did
not have such consistent preferences, or if anything, preferred the semantic option.
However, this preference did not result in differences of familiarity and recollection
as measured by the PDP.
Further, interestingly, we demonstrated across two experiments that the
semantic false memory index (i.e., difference between false alarms and sematic false
alarms due to categorical study lists) is only linked to familiarity but not to recollec-
tion. This contrast with findings from subjective measures of recollection and famil-
iarity, showing that semantic false memories induced by DRM lists are accompanied
more often by remember (i.e., associate of recollection) than by know-responses (i.e.,
associate of familiarity) (e.g., Gallo, 2010; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). However,
note that false alarms (not induced by DRM lists) are usually accompanied by know-
responses (e.g., Perfect et al., 1996; Wixted, 2009). Importantly, the finding that
semantic false memories induced by categorical lists, are linked to objective measures
of familiarity rather than to objective measures of recollection, is novel. Together,
semantic false memories seem to elicit a strong remember response (i.e., recollec-
tion). This is incompatible with previous findings that false memories are primarily
driven by recollection (remember response).One limitation of this set of studies is
that the current design only allows for semantic, not for perceptual false memories.
Future research should allow for semantic as well as perceptual false memories.
5.2 Meta-analysis
We conducted a meta-analysis to further examine the first two aims of this dis-
sertation. First, we aimed was to investigate whether the developmental pattern
of recollection and familiarity is more compatible with single- or a dual-process
theories of recognition memory (for detailed predictions, see Chapter 1). Develop-
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mental changes for recollection and familiarity differed between experiments, that
is, sometimes recollection increased more steeply than familiarity (Experiments 1,
3, 4 and 5), sometimes the opposite was the case (Experiments 2, 6 and 8) and
sometimes both processes increased a similar rate (Experiment 7). Throughout this
dissertation, we explained these absolute differences in recollection and familiarity
by differences in task difficulty (measured by overall accuracy) between experiments.
For instance, under higher task difficulty (operationalized by a response time limit;
Experiments 2, 6) familiarity increased more steeply than recollection whereas under
lower task difficulty (operationalized by no response time limit; Experiments 1 and
3, 5) recollection increased more steeply than familiarity. Similarly, comparable task
difficulty between Experiments 2 and 8 resulted in similar developmental patterns
for recollection and familiarity. Thus, the aim of this meta-analysis was to gain a
clear picture of the developmental courses of recollection and familiarity by identi-
fying moderating variables. Variables that lead to a dissociation of recollection and
familiarity might in turn also affect the developmental course of recollection and
familiarity. Thus, we aimed to reinvestigate factors (e.g., limiting response time,
task difficulty) resulting in a dissociation of recollection and familiarity across all
experimental conditions.
First, to summarize what factors affect recollection and familiarity, means
and confidence intervals of recollection and familiarity estimates were calculated for
each condition within each experiment (e.g., recollection for single and thrice pre-
sented items) and age group (see Figure 5.1). To get an indication which variables
moderate recollection and familiarity, estimates were rank ordered from lowest to
highest estimate. Mean parameter estimates are displayed as vertical lines in Figure
5.1. For interpreting confidence intervals, note that if confidence intervals are just
touching, then there is a reliable difference corresponding to a p-value of approxi-
mately .01. An overlap of confidence intervals by about 1/4, half the average margin
of error, corresponds to a p-value of approximately .05 (Cumming & Finch, 2005).
To summarize the results of this dissertation we plotted mean familiarity
and recollection in ascending order as a function of age. Figure 5.1 shows that
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Figure 5.1. Rank ordered mean estimates of recollection (left panel) and familiarity
(right panel) for each experimental condition and age group. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals of the mean. The vertical line indicates the overall mean,
the grey area the confidence interval.
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lower recollection as well as familiarity estimates are more dominant in 5- (10 out
of 14 recollection estimates, 13 out of 15 familiarity estimates) and 7-year-olds (8
out of 14 recollection estimates, 8 out of 15 familiarity estimates) whereas higher
estimates are more dominant in 11-year-old (9 out of 14 recollection estimates, 10
out of 15 familiarity estimates) and adults (9 out of 14 recollection estimates, 11 out
of 15 familiarity estimates). In line with our predictions this seems to indicate that
recollection and familiarity are moderated by age group.
Thus, to investigate whether recollection and familiarity increase at a dif-
ferent rate across age, recollection and familiarity estimates were sorted by age group
(see Figure 5.2). Mean parameter estimates per age group are indicated by the ver-
tical lines. Recollection increased from .34 [.31, .37] in 5-year-olds to .51 [.48, .53]
in adults. Similarly, familiarity increased from .42 [.39, .44] in 5-year-olds to .60
[.57, .63] in adults. Thus, recollection (age 5 to 7, diff = .09; age 7 to 11, diff =
.08; age 11 to adults, diff = .01) and familiarity (age 5 to 7, diff = .12; age 7 to 11,
diff = .06; age 11 to adults, diff = .01) seem to increase at similar rates with age.
This is consistent with the idea that a single-process model is sufficient to explain
the development of recognition memory. Importantly though, Figure 5.2 shows ex-
tensive variability of recollection and familiarity estimates. This variability might
be caused by the different experimental manipulations and in turn obscure distinct
age-related changes for recollection and familiarity. Consistent with this idea, Chap-
ters 3 and 4 provided preliminary evidence showing that the developmental course
of recollection and familiarity is affected by task difficulty. Thus, in a next step, we
aimed to identify variables that affect the developmental course of recollection and
familiarity. If a variable results in a dissociation across all experiments, then this
variable might also affect the development of these processes. Given that this meta-
analysis examines the development of recognition memory across all experiments, we
aimed to identify variables that result in a dissociation even when all experiments
are analysed.
One obvious variable that might dissociate recognition memory is the lim-
ited response time manipulation (see Chapters 2 and 3). We collapsed across all
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Figure 5.2. Mean estimates of recollection (left panels) and familiarity (right panels)
for each experimental condition as a function of age group (first row presents 5-year-
olds, second row 7-year-olds, third row 11-year-olds, fourth row adults). Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals of the mean. The vertical line indicates the mean
estimate for each age group, the grey area the confidence interval.
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age groups and divided the experimental conditions into a group of experiments
conducted under limited (i.e., Experiments 2, 4, 6) and a group of experiments con-
ducted under self-paced response time (i.e., Experiments 1, 3, 5, 7, 8). Even though
Experiments 7 and 8 were not developed with the unlimited vs. limited time con-
trast in mind, strictly speaking they are self-paced and thus should be considered
in this group. We will turn to this later. This was done to summarize findings
across all experiment and to identify what factors might obscure the developmental
changes in recollection and familiarity (this will be investigated below). Figure 5.3
shows that the response time limit simultaneously reduced recollection (Cohen’s d
= .26) and increased familiarity (Cohen’s d = .18). Decreases in recollection after a
response time limit are in line with dual-process theory (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) how-
ever, increases in familiarity are unexpected and not compatible with a simple of
dual-process model. Importantly, note that only Experiments 1 to 6 were designed
to investigate effects of limited response time. Experiments 7 and 8, however, were
designed to investigate the perceptual to semantic shift across development. In fact,
in line with Chapters 2 and 3, if Experiments 7 and 8 were excluded from this anal-
ysis then recollection is reduced (Cohen’s d = .35) whereas familiarity is unaffected
(Cohen’s d = .06). This shows that Experiments 7 and 8 were outliers creating
this unpredicted pattern of increased recollection. Importantly, the pattern where
Experiments 7 and 8 are excluded is in line with dual-process theory which posits
that recollection is a slower process than familiarity (e.g., Light et al., 2004). This is
equivalent to our main effects after a limiting response time. To investigate whether
a limited response time manipulation affects age-related increases of recollection
and familiarity, we investigated slopes (age and recollection, age and familiarity) for
limited and self-paced response time below.
Based on the finding that task difficulty seems to affect age-related in-
creases of recollection and familiarity, we next split the current set of experiments
by task difficulty (see Chapter 4 and section 5.1). Task difficulty applies to all exper-
imental conditions equally. Further, it might be an important variable when one’s
interest lies in the development of cognitive processes across childhood because how
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Figure 5.3. Mean estimates of recollection (left panels) and familiarity (right panels)
for each experimental condition (Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the
mean). Mean parameter estimates for limited and self-paced response time are
indicated by the vertical lines.
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easy or hard a task is, is inherently confound with age. To do so, we first calculated
the overall accuracy per condition, then we rank ordered the studies by accuracy
and finally median-split all experimental conditions into groups with the highest
mean accuracy (i.e. easier tasks) and lowest mean accuracy (i.e. harder tasks). Fig-
ure 5.4 demonstrates that lower task difficulty (i.e., easier tasks) resulted in higher
recollection and familiarity estimates than higher task difficulty (i.e., harder tasks).
Importantly, consistent with dual-process theory the effect of task difficulty seems
to be larger on recollection (Cohen’s d = .61) than on familiarity (Cohen’s d = .28).
This is consistent with the idea that familiarity is a more automatic process, and
should thus, be less affected by task difficulty than recollection.
In sum, this dissertation provides in three experiments and this meta-
analysis clear evidence that a response time limit affects recollection (mean dif-
ference: .10) more than familiarity (mean difference: .02) and that task difficulty
affected recollection (mean difference: .17) more than familiarity (mean difference:
.08). Evidence showing that familiarity can be affected more than recollection arises
after repeated item presentation in Experiment 5 for children and in Experiment 6
for adults. Importantly, the finding that limiting response time and harder task
conditions differentially affected recollection and repeated item presentation differ-
entially affected familiarity, provides evidence for a double dissociation consistent
with the idea that there are two distinct cognitive processes underlying recognition
memory (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003). It should be noted that task difficulty is a post-
hoc variable which allows dissociating recollection from familiarity. Further research
should actively manipulate task difficulty (see below) to provide further evidence in
line with double dissociations.
Whilst these double-dissociations provide evidence in line with dual-
process theory, similar age-related changes of recollection and familiarity point
more towards single-process theory (see Figure 5.2). After identifying variables
that affect recognition memory, we will now investigate whether they moderate
the developmental course of recollection and familiarity. The basic assumption
following from dual-process theory where familiarity is more basic and automatic
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Figure 5.4. Mean estimates of recollection (left panels) and familiarity (right panels)
for each experimental condition (Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the
mean). Mean parameter estimates for easiest and hardest experiments are indicated
by the vertical lines.
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than recollection is that familiarity reaches a maximum adult level earlier than
recollection (see also Lyons et al., 2010). Given that limited response time and
higher task demands were shown to reduce recollection resulting in an increased
reliance on familiarity, this is expected to affect developmental changes in these
processes across.
First, mean recollection and familiarity parameters for each classification
(i.e., limited vs. self-paced response time, easiest vs. hardest tasks) were plotted as
a function of age. Then, the effect of age on recollection and the effect of age on
familiarity was estimated and used as a proxy for developmental trajectories. These
linear contrasts provide a summary statistic of an increase or decrease over age
groups (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004) and thus, allowed assessing the linear trend of the
four age groups. These effects were added to the mean plots. In an additional plot
mean slopes and confidence intervals for recollection and familiarity were displayed.
Figure 5.5 displays slopes and confidence intervals of recollection and fa-
miliarity estimates under limited and self-paced response time as well as collapsed
across conditions. The effects of recollection and familiarity on age are identical if
collapsed across conditions (see plot on the right “total”) as well as under unspeeded
conditions and hence, seem to provide evidence in line with single-process theory.
This replicates the above reported finding of identical developmental increases across
both processes (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 1.3). However, under speeded task condi-
tions there is a trend for familiarity to develop more steeply than recollection (this
is indicated by the confidence intervals). This tendency for different developmen-
tal changes with age suggests that task specific factors affect whether differential
developmental patterns for recollection and familiarity can be detected.
Similarly, trends for different developmental patterns for recollection than
familiarity emerge if task difficulty is taken into account. Means (left and middel
panel) and slopes (right panel) of parameter estimates across age for easier and
harder conditions are displayed in Figure 5.6. Task difficulty, an important factor
in developmental psychology (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002) was operationalized
by memory accuracy. Specifically, under more difficult task conditions, there is a
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Figure 5.5. Mean recollection and familiarity estimates across age in unspeeded tasks
(left panel) and speeded tasks (middle panel) (Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals of the mean). The right panel shows slopes of recollection and familiarity
estimates for speeded, unspeeded and all conditions.
trend for familiarity to increase more steeply than recollection. The opposite devel-
opmental pattern emerges under easier task condition with a trend for recollection
to increase more steeply than familiarity. This can be seen in Figure 5.6 where
the recollection point is not within the confidence interval of familiarity and vice
versa. Thus, interestingly, if the task demands are low, then recollection increases
more steeply than familiarity whereas if the task demands are high, then familiarity
increases more steeply than recollection. Whereas the former pattern is consistent
with dual-process theory (cf. Ghetti & Lee, 2014), the latter pattern suggests that
these straightforward predictions drawn from dual-process theory are too simple and
do not hold as a general rule.
5.3 Theoretical implications
5.3.1 Dual-process theory in memory
The two main objectives of this dissertation were to investigate whether processes
underlying recognition can be dissociated and whether recollection and familiarity
follow distinct developmental courses across childhood. A meta-analysis revealed
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Figure 5.6. Mean recollection and familiarity estimates across age in the easiest
conditions (left panel) and the hardest conditions (middle panel) (Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals of the mean). The right panel shows slopes of recollection
and familiarity estimates for the easiest, the hardest and all conditions.
complex developmental trajectories for recollection and familiarity. When collapsed
across all experimental conditions, recollection and familiarity change at a similar
rate. This contrasts with previous developmental research where these processes
followed distinct developmental trajectories and is consistent with single-process
theory (e.g., Berry et al., 2012). Importantly, this meta-analysis revealed that fac-
tors resulting in a dissociation of processes underlying recognition also affect the
development of recollection and familiarity. We demonstrated reversed distinct age-
related increases for recollection and familiarity as a function of task difficulty, oper-
ationalized by limited response time and overall accuracy. Specifically, under easier
task conditions (i.e., higher memory accuracy) recollection increased more steeply
across age than familiarity. This is in line with straight-forward predictions drawn
from dual-process theory which posits that familiarity is faster and more automatic
(Yonelinas, 2002) and should thus reach an adult level earlier than recollection. It
is also consistent with the standard developmental story showing that familiarity is
stable from age 8 whereas recollection increases into adolescence (for an overview
see Ghetti & Lee, 2014). However, the finding that under harder task conditions
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(i.e., lower memory accuracy and limited response time) familiarity increased more
steeply across age than recollection, challenges existing developmental evidence (cf.
Ghetti & Lee, 2014) and provides novel insight showing that developmental changes
are dependent on task specific factors (here difficulty).
We showed that task difficulty and response deadlines moderate the de-
velopmental trends of recollection and familiarity. This reversal of developmental
increases as a function of task difficulty does not readily follow from current dual-
process theories rooted in research with adults. Specifically, if familiarity is an
automatic process, it should reach an adult level earlier than recollection. This
should be the case regardless of task related factors. The finding that age-related
increases vary as a function of task complexity makes it difficult to compare devel-
opmental trends across studies. This emphasizes the importance of investigating
how task related factors obscure age-related increases in recollection and familiarity.
Thus far, Ghetti and Angelini’s study (2008) demonstrated that long encoding time,
combined with a deep encoding manipulation results in no developmental change for
familiarity. Similarly, Chapter 2 demonstrated that limiting response time results
in no developmental increase for recollection. Traditional dual-process theories of
memory are challenged to provide an explanation why recollection increases more
steeply as a function of age under some conditions than familiarity, whereas in other
conditions familiarity increases more steeply as a function of age than recollection.
A fully specified theory of the development of recognition memory should specify
factors linked to these contexts to allow for testable a priori predictions about the
developmental rate.
An alternative interpretation, more consistent with dual process theory,
suggests that the observation of distinct trajectories for familiarity and recollection is
demonstrative of two processes underlying recognition memory. High task demands
have a large effect on the effortful recollection process (but not familiarity), resulting
in a reduction of recollection in all age groups. If the ability to use recollection
negatively affected, people necessarily have to rely more on the automatic familiarity
process. Familiarity thus increases with age under such conditions simply because
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adults’ memory abilities are higher than children’s. However, given the automaticity
of familiarity, dual-process theory would predict that familiarity undergoes little or
no developmental change, regardless of task features, making it difficult to explain
steeper age-related increases in familiarity than in recollection.
Whereas the developmental courses of recollection and familiarity provide
a less clear pattern, double dissociations following experimental manipulations pro-
vide evidence consistent with dual-process theory. Processes were dissociated by
limiting response time which selectively affected recollection wheras familiarity was
unaffected. This was already the case in 5-year-olds (Chapters 2 and 3). Second,
repeated item presentation boosted familiarity more than recollection in young chil-
dren and adults under limited response time (Chapter 3). This demonstrates that
recollection and familiarity can be manipulated independently from each other con-
sistent with a double dissociation. Unlike single dissociations, such findings cannot
simply be explained in terms of differences in the sensitivity of the measures (i.e.,
recollection being more sensitive than familiarity; Berry et al., 2012) but provide
compelling evidence in line with dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas &
Jacoby, 1994).
5.3.2 Theories of encoding
In Chapter 3 repeated item presentation during encoding resulted in differential
boosts of recollection and familiarity as a function of age and response time condition
(i.e., limited vs. self-paced response time). Specifically, repetition resulted in more
benefits for familiarity than recollection in young children and in adults under limited
response time. It resulted in more benefits for recollection than familiarity in 7-,
11-year-olds and adults when there was no response time limit. Thus, benefits of
repetition do not seem to be process specific.
Theories of memory encoding explain what happens if an item is repeat-
edly encoded. Shiffrin, Ratcliff and Clark (1990) assume that benefits of repetition
are due strengthening of a memory trace. Repetition supports the maintenance of
the stimuli which results in a stronger memory trace than when items were only
presented once. This is reflected in increased familiarity (Parkin et al., 1995). The
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increase in familiarity after repetition in young children in this dissertation suggests
that repetition resulted in a strengthening of memory traces. Raaijmakers (2003)
argues that repetition leads to the storage of additional contextual details. Thus, dis-
tributed repetition of items promotes elaborative encoding which is associated with
memory for contextual details and thus, recollection. We encountered increases in
recollection in older children and adults which according to Raaijmakers (2003) are
due to the storage of additional details as a result of repetition. Thus, in young
children repeated item presentation seems to result in increased familiarity due to
the strengthening of memory traces. In older children and adults it seems to re-
sult in increased recollection due to the storage of additional details. This might
imply that these two theories should take the cognitive capacity of the participants,
operationalized by age into account.
5.3.3 Source and item memory
There are also further theoretical considerations that follow from the current disser-
tation. Previous research has investigated quantitative changes in memory devel-
opment such as the ability to distinguish between memories based on the origin of
those events (i.e., source monitoring; M. K. Johnson et al., 1993). Specifically, in
source monitoring tasks, participants discriminate items on the basis of, for exam-
ple, which list a word was presented in during encoding (e.g., two lists in different
modalities, auditory vs. visual lists) (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). Source
memory tasks can vary in a variety of factors, such as time delay between encoding
and retrieval, forced choice vs. free recall or number of encoded items. These factors
seem to affect the age at which children are able to recall the source (Drummey &
Newcombe, 2002). Thus, dependent on task complexity source monitoring seems
to develop throughout childhood, between 4 and 6 years, up to young adulthood
(Cycowicz, Friedman, & Duff, 2003; Lindsay et al., 1991; for a review, see Raj &
Bell, 2010). Developmental studies investigating source memory provide evidence of
quantitative changes in recognition memory development. In the current experimen-
tal design task performance in inclusion is comparable to item memory; exclusion
performance is comparable to source memory. Thus, our data might suggest in line
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with Drummey and Newcombe’s findings (2002) that the developmental course of
source and item memory is highly dependent on task demands.
Together, source memory provides insight into the development of remem-
bering contextual details. However, it does not inform about the processes un-
derlying remembering. Recollection and familiarity estimates provide process pure
measures of processes underlying recognition. Source and item memory cannot be
used as proxies for recollection and familiarity, respectively, because both processes
may contribute to source and item memory judgements (Diana et al., 2008; Mollison
& Curran, 2012; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Otherwise put, source and item memory
judgements can be based on the recollection of specific source details or a vague feel-
ing of familiarity about that source. Thus, age-related changes in source and item
memory can be a result of an increase in recollection, familiarity, or both. The PDP
in combination with the DPSD framework allows estimating pure measures of recol-
lection and familiarity. These process measures allow the investigation of whether
the quality of a memory (i.e., recollection of contextual details (e.g., number, loca-
tion of items) vs. familiarity) differs across age. This underscores the importance of
using the PDP which allowed disentangling qualitative processes underlying recog-
nition memory.
5.4 Methodological implications
Developmental evidence providing objective estimates of recollection and familiarity
is sparse due to some restrictions. Traditional methods such as the remember/ know
procedure (e.g., Billingsley et al., 2002, for developmental evidence) and the ROC
method (e.g., Ghetti & Angelini, 2008, for developmental evidence) require the mon-
itoring of memory strength. In contrast, the PDP allows directly assessing processes
underlying recognition memory without asking participants to introspect on their
memory by contrasting two task conditions. Thus, the PDP is an ideal paradigm to
measure processes underlying recognition in childhood. This dissertation presents
an adaption of the PDP which is an excellent new method to estimate recollection
and familiarity in children as young as 5 years old.
Importantly, there are multiple critical assumptions underlying the PDP.
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First, the PDP has been critiqued for its difficult instructions in the exclusion con-
dition (Curran & Hintzman, 1997; Graf & Komatsu, 1994). In the current disser-
tation, we took a number of steps to make sure that participants understood the
task and followed the instructions. Before starting a new phase, practice examples
were provided to ensure that participants understood the instructions. Furthermore,
participants were required to repeat instructions at the end of the recognition con-
ditions. To ensure that participants across all age groups were able to follow the
instructions two exclusion criteria were applied. Only participants who were able to
verbally explain the instructions and who performed above chance were included in
the analysis. Findings demonstrate that the PDP can be used in children as young
as 5 years, as shown by their ability to distinguish between previously seen items
on the basis of recollective information (see also Anooshian, 1999). Note that the
conclusions of this dissertation would not have changed if below chance performers
were included in the analysis. For instance, all age groups, including 5-year-olds
were able to recollect when there was no response time limit (Experiments 1, 3,
5-8).
Second, the PDP has been critiqued for a difference in base rates to new
items between the two test conditions, namely inclusion and exclusion. If base rates
to new items differ between inclusion and exclusion, then these differences need to
be taken into account when recollection and familiarity are estimated, otherwise,
parameter estimates might not be reliable. One way of dealing with differences in
response bias is by using the DPSD model (Yonelinas, 1994) to estimate recollection
and familiarity (for recent support of the DPSD see, Klauer & Kellen, 2015). In the
DPSD model the base rates to new items in inclusion and exclusion are incorporated
when recollection and familiarity are estimated. Throughout this dissertation two
criteria were estimated to fit the DPSD model if the difference between false alarms
rates to new items in inclusion and exclusion was bigger than .20. Otherwise a one
criteria model was fitted to the data (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation
for this cut-off point). Importantly, a different cut-off point for fitting the one or two
criteria model would not have changed the conclusions of this dissertation. We used
176 CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION
the DPSD model to avoid unreliable parameter estimates and negative recollection
estimates.
Importantly, when recollection and familiarity are modelled, these esti-
mates range from 0 to 1. Thus, when testing whether recollection and familiarity
is above chance, a comparison against 0 is inappropriate. Simulations in Chapter 1
revealed that .11 is an appropriate value to demonstrate the absence or presence of
recollection and familiarity.
In this dissertation we applied a response time limit in three studies (Chap-
ters 2 and 3) which resulted in a dissociation of recollection and familiarity. However,
it is possible that the response deadline, which was always set at 1 standard deviation
below the mean per age group, was not equally strict across age groups. Although
the use of age-appropriate deadlines based on the same criterion suggests this is a
principled approximation, the response deadline may be more stringent for one age
group than other age groups. Differences in timed out rates between age groups
(e.g., in Experiment 2 5-year-olds failed to respond within the deadline more often
than older age groups) provide evidence for this idea. Importantly, additional anal-
yses where 5-year-olds were matched with the older groups on the rate at which they
were able to respond within the deadline, showed no different pattern to previously
reported analysis. This demonstrates that the ability to respond within the deadline
does not appear to mediate the differential effect on recollection and familiarity seen
across all age groups.
5.5 Future Research
5.5.1 Dual-process theory in memory
This dissertation provided first evidence that recollection and familiarity are two
qualitative different processes available from age 5 onwards. Thus far, only few
studies contributed to the dual-process debate from a developmental point of view
(e.g., Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). We demonstrated a double-dissociation of recollec-
tion and familiarity by applying a response time limit at retrieval, by repeating items
at encoding and by investigating recognition memory across childhood. Future re-
search should investigate how other well established manipulations from the adult
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literature affect recognition memory in childhood. For instance, divided attention
has been shown to affect recollection more than familiarity, whereas fluency ma-
nipulations have been shown to affect familiarity more than recollection (Yonelinas,
2002). Further double-dissociations would provide a conceptual replication of the
findings in this dissertation and thus, provide additional evidence of two processes
being active in early childhood already. First, this would strengthen the evidence in
favour of dual-process theory. Second, this could provide more information about
which conditions affect the developmental pattern of recollection and familiarity.
After identifying manipulations that result in consistent double dissocia-
tions across childhood (e.g., divided attention and fluency), the effect of these on
the developmental patterns of recollection and familiarity should be investigated.
This dissertation provided preliminary evidence that the developmental course of
recollection and familiarity is moderated by task difficulty. However, splitting tasks
by overall accuracy as done in this meta-analysis is a crude way of determining task
difficulty. Future research should aim to systematically uncover conditions which
affect the developmental course of recollection and familiarity. There are three
possible outcomes. One outcome is that familiarity consistently reaches an adult
level earlier than recollection. This is compatible with straightforward predictions
drawn from dual-process theory and in line with previous developmental research
(e.g., Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Second, it is possible that a thorough examination
of developmental trajectories after various manipulations reveals that recollection
and familiarity consistently develop simultaneously and in a very similar manner
(similar to the overall developmental trajectory reported in Figure 5.2). These de-
velopmental trajectories are compatible with single-process theory (e.g., Ward et al.,
2013). However, single-process theory would need to provide an explanation why
double dissociations can occur. The third outcome is that age-related increases in
recollection and familiarity systematically reverses as a function of task difficulty.
The identification of these factors will further our understanding the development of
recognition memory crucially by uncovering factors that obscure the developmental
trajectories of recollection and familiarity.
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5.5.2 Perceptual to semantic shift
The aim of Chapter 4 was to explore what role recollection and familiarity play in
the perceptual to semantic shift. However, due to the experimental design partici-
pants did not have the opportunity to show perceptually related memories. Thus,
there was no way to contrast the perceptual and semantic performance adequately.
Future research should attempt using a simpler design. One way to test the per-
ceptual to semantic shift is by using a procedure more similar to previous studies
demonstrating this shift. Hasher and Clifton (1974) showed that 7-year-olds recalled
more rhyming (perceptually related) than semantically related or unrelated words,
11-year-olds recalled more semantically related than rhyming or unrelated words
and adults recalled rhyming and semantically related words equally well. It was
concluded that for 7-year-olds perceptually features are more salient than seman-
tic information, whereas for 11-year-olds semantic information is more salient than
perceptually features.
In a future experiment participants could be presented with lists of rhyming
words (perceptually related) and lists of semantically related words (e.g., DRM lists).
Half of the items should be presented by a male voice, the other half of the items
by a female voice. Gender of the voice during encoding can be used as recollective
criterion in the exclusion phase. This experimental set-up allows, in contrast to
experiments in Chapter 4, for both perceptual and semantic based memories and
provides recollection and familiarity estimates. Given that if an item is recollected,
contextual details about an item are available (Yonelinas, 2002), participants with
high recollective abilities are expected to be able to reject perceptually similar items
(i.e., rhyming words). Further, given that the ability to recollect is more developed in
adults than in children, fewer perceptual false memories are expected in adults than
in children. Thus, adults are expected to reject perceptually false memories on the
basis of recollection, whereas young children rely more on familiarity. Further, given
that semantic networks are more developed in adults than in children, and semantic
false memories are linked to familiarity rather than to recollection (see Chapter 4),
we would predict fewer semantic false memories in children than in adults.
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A different approach to investigate the perceptual to semantic shift across
childhood is by changing the nature of the recollective criterion. In the current tasks
this recollective criterion was of perceptual nature and even 5-year-olds successfully
discriminated earlier seen items on the basis of a perceptual feature of the encoded
item (i.e., location, number of items). However, it is possible that the nature of
the recollective information plays an important role in participant’s ability to suc-
cessfully recollect. Future experiments could use a semantic instead of a perceptual
criterion as basis for recollection. For instance, during encoding participants could
be asked for some items “Does this fit in a shoebox?” and for other items “Is this
typically found indoors or outdoors?” In exclusion participants then have to exclude
items for which they were, for example, asked whether it fitted in a shoebox, and
include items for which they had to say where they are typically found. Impor-
tantly, this task cannot be solved by simply retrieving perceptual details of items;
instead semantic information about the encoding process has to be retrieved. In line
with the perceptual to semantic shift literature, we would expect that particularly
young children have difficulties in recollecting items on the basis of semantic infor-
mation whereas the nature of recollective information is not expected to matter for
11-year-olds and adults.
5.6 Conclusion
This dissertation focused on the development of processes underlying recognition
memory: recollection and familiarity. The PDP was adapted to be suitable for
young children to advance the theoretical debate between single-process accounts,
according to which there is only one process underlying recognition memory, and
dual-process accounts, according to which there are two qualitative different pro-
cesses underlying recognition memory. To avoid issues of differential response crite-
ria being associated with inclusion and exclusion instructions, the dual-process signal
detection theory modelling approach was applied. We demonstrated that both fa-
miliarity and recollection are present at 5 years of age. Consistent with dual-process
theories, limiting response time during recognition eliminated recollection in 5-year-
olds and led to lower recollection values across all ages, whereas familiarity was
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left unaffected. Converging evidence was found by demonstrating that repetition
of items at encoding resulted in differential boosts of familiarity and recollection
in young children and in adults, even under limited response time. Using these
experimental manipulations theoretically rooted in standard recognition memory
research in adults, we provided evidence consistent with a double dissociation, sug-
gesting that two qualitative different processes underlie recognition memory from an
early age onwards. Converging evidence came from the developmental angle, with
well-established experimental manipulations uncovering the distinct developmental
course of recollection and familiarity. Unexpectedly, these trajectories differed as
a function of task difficulty. This complex developmental pattern challenges pre-
vious developmental findings (see Ghetti & Lee, 2014) which state, in line with
dual-process theory that familiarity develops during early childhood and is followed
by the development of recollection. Steeper increases for familiarity than recollec-
tion are not compatible with single-process theory but are also difficult to reconcile
with standard accounts of dual-process theory. A further novel finding was that the
perceptual to semantic shift was only observed in a preference paradigm, but not
reflected in familiarity and recollection parameters. We demonstrated that familiar-
ity predicts semantic false memories across all age groups. The current dissertation
has demonstrated that the distinction of recollection and familiarity, in particular
when accounting for factors that result in dissociations, is crucial for uncovering the
development of recognition memory.
Appendix
Simulation: Recollection differs from 0
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